Wednesday, 18 May 2011

Good news for Christchurch?

John Small writes,
This is the best news I’ve heard from ChCh in some time. Roger Sutton has accepted appointment as head of CERA.
Good news? The news would be better if we were being told that they have done away with CERA. I have never really seen any justification for it. Rebuilding the city should be a bottom up process not top down. Let the property owners rebuild their property their way, not the government's way. Let the people with the best information and incentives make the decisions, that is, the property owners.

But given we live in a second (or third) best world may be this is good news. They could have appointed someone a lot worse.

Technology and people

Erik Brynjolfsson writes at the Economic of Information blog about self-driving cars. He says,
I suspect the biggest barrier to the adoption of self-driving cars is not technological [ ... ]. Instead, the impediments will be regulatory and cultural. There are about 40,000 deaths on the America's roads each year with our human drivers. But suppose the robotic cars were 100 times safer. That would still be 400 deaths per year. Can you imagine the public outcry, no to mention the legal judgments, that would follow the first time a human was killed due to an error by a robotic car? Will they have to be 100% perfect before the are adopted?
Its easy to see that fear of litigation or over regulation could delay the introduction of this new technology. The government not letting self-driving cars on the road until they are "100% safe" would clearly delay their introduction and cost lives, in much the same way as delays in getting new drugs approved by the FDA does, while fear of legal judgements could stop the firm from introducing the technology.

Geography and offshoring to China

An often asked question with reagrd to production these days is Why do firms offshore manufacturing to China? Alyson C. Ma and Ari Van Assche use data from China's processing trade regime to argue that a hidden driver is the country's geographic proximity to its East Asian neighbours.
Anecdotal evidence is rife with tales of multinational firms that have offshored their production to China, stoking fears that it is leading to a hollowing-out of manufacturing around the world. Many private sector analysts and policymakers attribute this offshoring wave to Chinese home-grown factors such as its low labour costs, stable political system, aggressive export promotion policies, and undervalued exchange rate.

But the usual explanations may not tell the whole story. China depends heavily on imported intermediate inputs [ ... ]. In recent research we consider the possibility that some of China’s attractiveness stems from its proximity to East Asian suppliers of industrial inputs [ ... ]. In short, another factor behind China’s success may simply be the bliss of its proximity to its East Asian neighbours.
So China's attractiveness as an offshoring location is due, in part, to the smiple fact that it is close to other countries in East Asia. Its geographic proximity to its East Asian neighbours provides it with access to the region's upstream suppliers and downstream markets. These results should be no surprise if we look at other famous offshoring locations around the world. They virtually all are located next to large and wealthier economies. Mexico neighbours the US. Turkey and Poland are located next to the EU-15. China, Thailand and Vietnam are in the vicinity of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.

Geography does matter.

Tuesday, 17 May 2011

EconTalk this week

William Byers of Canada's Concordia University and author of The Blind Spot talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the nature of knowledge, science and mathematics. Byers argues that there is an inherent uncertainty about science and our knowledge that is frequently ignored. Byers contrasts a science of wonder with a science of certainty. He suggests that our knowledge of the physical world will always be incomplete because of the imperfection of models and human modes of thought relative to the complexity of the physical world. The conversation also looks at the implications of these ideas for teaching science and social science.

Opportunity to see the MONIAC in action

Come and see a public demonstration of the MONIAC – 'Monetary National Income Analogue Computer' – the first Wednesday of every month.

This early econometric computer ingeniously uses water to model flows of money in an economy. Kiwi Bill Phillips built it in 1949, drawing on his electrical and engineering experience, to make a computer that could do complex calculations beyond the ability of other computers at the time. Phillips went on to become a professor at the London School of Economics, and is best known for his work on the Phillips Curve.

The acronym MONIAC was apparently invented to echo the ENIAC digital computer then being developed in the United States.

By contrast with those machines the MONIAC operated wholly on analogue principles, using water to simulate flows of money. Around 14 were built.

The MONIAC was capable of making complex calculations that could not be performed by any other computer at the time. The linkages were based on Keynesian and classical economic principles, with various tanks representing households, business, government, exporting and importing sectors of the economy.

Water pumped around the system could be measured as income, spending and GDP. The system was programmable, and experiments with fiscal policy, monetary policy and exchange rates could be carried out.

This is a FREE public demonstration.

When: from12.15 to 12.45 pm on the first Wednesday of every month.

Where: Reserve Bank Museum, No. 2 The Terrace, Wellington

Website: http://www.rbnzmuseum.govt.nz/activities/moniac/introduction.aspx for more information on the MONIAC

Monday, 16 May 2011

Economist’s favourite economists

From the survey mentioned in the previous posting comes three questions on economist’s favourite economists.

The first question:
Are there any economic thinkers who wrote prior to the twentieth century whom you regard with great respect, admiration, or reverence? If so, please list, up to three:
The top three economists: (1) Adam Smith, (2) David Ricardo and (3) Alfred Marshall. Not great surprises there.

What may be more surprising is just how much Smith dominates everybody else. To get a numerical ranking the authors awarded Smith six points, Ricardo five points, and Marshall four points. On this ranking Smith got more than 1200 points (1265) with Ricardo getting least than half that (520) and Marshall just 329points.

The second question:
Are there any economic thinkers of the twentieth century and now deceased whom you regard with great respect, admiration, or reverence? If so, please list, up to three:
The top three economists: (1) John Maynard Keynes, (2) Milton Friedman and (3) Paul Samuelson. Here, Keynes would get six points, Friedman five points, and Samuelson four points.

The points for the top three are: Keynes 726, Friedman 654 and Samuelson 460. So Keynes and Friedman are well ahead of Samuelson. Hayek came in fourth, but well back on only 219 points.

I’m not sure I would rank Samuelson that high. I would go for Hayek above him and I really don’t see how J. K. Galbraith got to 6th on the list!!

The third and last question:
Are there any economic thinkers alive today over the age of 60/under the age of 60 whom you regard with great respect, admiration, or reverence? If so, please list, up to three:
The top three in each group: Economist over the age of 60: (1) Gary Becker, (2) Kenneth Arrow and (3) Robert Solow. Economist under the age of 60: (1) Paul Krugman, (2) Greg Mankiw and (3) Daron Acemoglu.

The Becker/Arrow/Solow grouping makes some sense, although for me I would put Coase at number 1 for this group. He came in 4th. Tullock got to 19th. John Nash is 13th on the list and he's not even an economist. What about Bengt Holmström, Oliver Williamson or Oliver Hart? None of then even make it to the list.

As to the Krugman/Mankiw/Acemoglu group. This I really don’t get. Ok may be Acemoglu makes sense but Krugman and Mankiw at (1) and (2)? Not for me. What about Jean Tirole, Andrei Shleifer or Kevin M. Murphy?

Right-wing economists?

The results of a a new survey of U.S. economists have been released in a new paper in the journal "Econ Journal Watch". The paper is 'Economics Professors’ Favorite Economic Thinkers, Journals, and Blogs (along with Party and Policy Views)' by William L. Davis, Bob Figgins, David Hedengren, and Daniel B. Klein, "Econ Journal Watch", Volume 8, Number 2 May 2011, 126-146.

The authors generated a random list of 2000 individual professors (tenure-track, assistant to full professors, excluding emeriti) belonging to 300 U.S. economics departments, in proportion to the size of the department. The response rate was 15.2 percent with 299 surveys being returned. The mean age of our 299 respondents is about 59, and the median 58, so the group is older than one might expect. Of the 299 respondents, 239 were men, 57 women, and 3 did not report gender.

One question asked in the survey related to political views:

To which political party have the candidates you’ve voted for in the past ten years mostly belonged? The answers:
The possible responses being: Democratic, Green, Libertarian, Republican and other.
Democratic 56.4%
Green 1.7%
Libertarian 5.4%
Republican 20.7%
“Other” checked but nothing written 3.8%
Cannot vote 3.7%
Choose not to vote 1.0%
No answer 7.4%
So the sum of Democratic and Green voters is nearly 60% of the survey. The sum of Republican and Libertarian voters is half that.

The authors also calculate a party-voting index: (#Democratic + #Green)/(#Republican + #Libertarian + 0.1). The “+ 0.1” appearing in the denominator is there to solve the problem that arises when it is otherwise zero. Crudely speaking, the index is the ratio of Left to Right. The Left to Right ratio within the entire sample is 2.23.

Which means economists, in the U.S. at least, are far from being a bunch of "right-wingers".

Sunday, 15 May 2011

Governments are here to help(?)

Some governments set out to help entrepreneurs ...
Russian tax law is so complex that Novikov Restaurant Group employs five accountants at each restaurant.
this just isn’t one of them. But it does give new meaning to "cooking the books".

(HT: Marginal Revolution)

Interesting blog bits

  1. Joan Costa-i-Font, Stefan Felder and Andrew Felton ask Does ageing really affect health expenditures? If so, why?
    Over the last half century, life expectancy in the industrialised world has risen dramatically – and so has the healthcare bill. Is population ageing the main reason? This column argues that while ageing does affect health spending, it is far less important than many think. It adds that obsession with an ageing population is a dangerous red herring that prevents dealing with the real culprits of rising costs.
  2. Richard Posner asks Does the Earth Have Room for 10 Billion People?
    On May 3, the United Nations issued its 2010 Revision of World Population Projections, which, according to the media, predicts that the world’s population, expected to reach 7 billion by the end of this year, will be 10.1 billion by the end of the century. But the media reports have tended to be imprecise. The UN report offers three predictions—a high, medium, and low—depending on different assumptions. The high is almost 16 billion and the low 6.2 billion (which is actually lower than the current world population), and a cautious appraisal of the report is that it provides a plausible basis for thinking that the world population will probably be between 6 and 16 billion 89 years from now.
  3. Laura Freschi asks Are Lax US Gun Laws Spilling Violence into Mexico?
    The answer may be yes. But you do have to ask, What are the effects on deaths of "the war on drugs"?
  4. Liberty Scott gives a UK and NZ roundup
    Recent political events in both countries.
  5. Peter Klein on Frank Knight and the Austrians
    In what ways was or wasn't Knight an Austrian?
  6. Matthew Philips asks Does Destroying Highways Solve Urban Traffic Congestion?
    And yes it could.
  7. Don Brash's Dear John Letter
    Makes a number of good points.
  8. Greg Mankiw on Evaluating ARRA
    Tim Conley and Bill Dupor have a new paper on the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (that is, the Obama stimulus bill).

Saturday, 14 May 2011

Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the debacle of mortgage finance

In this audio from VoxEU.org Viral Acharya and Matthew Richardson talk to Viv Davies about their recent book ‘Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Debacle of Mortgage Finance’. Originally set up as government sponsored enterprises, the financial collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac led to a massive government intervention that has already cost US taxpayers around $150 billion. The authors discuss their analysis of how these institutions collapsed, why housing finance in the US is broken and what now needs to be done to reform the system.

The top ten lines for hitting on an economist

Sarah Skwire at the Modified Rapture blog points out the obvious,
Economics is the sexiest and most romantic of professions.
Like somebody actually needed to be told this!! She goes on to offer "The Top Ten Lines for Hitting on an Economist":
1. You’ve got the curves to supply my demand!

2. Let’s go to bed and try to disprove the law of diminishing marginal utility.

3. You’re my very favorite kind of moral hazard.

4. I have a feeling you really understand the “nature of the firm.”

5. Baby, I love you so much I’m willing to forgo my exit option.

6. Wanna talk about our private goods?

7. You’re an economist. I’m an economist. How about a little horizontal integration?

8. Now those are some tangible assets!

9. I’ll reveal my preferences if you will.

And the very best pick up line to catch your own economist, as well as the filthiest thing ever said in public by an economist (and I include various jokes I’ve heard at cocktail parties) is brought to us by the dynamic duo of Roberts and Papola, and comes straight from their new Hayek/Keynes rap video.

10. Bottom up or top down?
In the comments to the post Steve Horwitz offers up,
Hey baby, let’s make our utility functions interdependent!

Missing posts

I see I'm still missing four posts from yesterday. Blogger keep telling us that they are coming back but I've yet to see the evidence. Don't know if any comments are missing.

Thursday, 12 May 2011

Understanding the US housing boom

At the centre of the global financial crisis was a housing boom and bust in the U.S. A New York University team has looked at the flaws in the design of U.S. housing finance that opened the door for the mayhem that followed. A column at VoxEU.org describes the race to the bottom that occurred among Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the too-big-to-fail private financial institutions.

In their article, A race to the bottom: Understanding the US housing boom, Viral Acharya, Matthew Richardson, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh and Lawrence J. White argue that
There was, during 2003-7, a race to the bottom between the huge government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – and the private financial sector, consisting of too-big-to-fail large complex financial institutions. Both the GSEs and the too-big-to-fail institutions were making highly leveraged bets on the mortgage market at below-market funding rates in credit markets that were implicitly backed by the government.
The U.S. mortgage market changed dramatically starting 2003:
The mortgage market in the US increased dramatically in size, especially starting late 2003 with the sharp growth of the riskier subprime and Alt-A mortgage lending [ ... ]. Since the too-big-to-fail institutions couldn’t compete directly with Fannie and Freddie because of the GSEs’ access to government guaranteed capital and their roughly 40 basis points lower cost of borrowing, they instead moved along the credit curve, dealing in increasingly shaky mortgage loans that the GSEs had difficulty competing with given the walls, even if somewhat porous, around their underwriting standards. Also, the too-big-to-fail institutions greatly increased their leverage, through use of asset-backed commercial paper and sale-and-repurchase (“rep”) financing, allowing them to expand by issuing cheap debt.

The too-big-to-fail firms were not only creating more toxic mortgage-backed securities but also investing in those same securities. Over 50% of AAA-rated non-GSE mortgage-backed securities were held within the financial sector!
The Acharya, Richardson, Van Nieuwerburgh and White column continues,
This growth in private label mortgage-backed securities was the culmination of the dream of the 1982 “Commission on Housing”. It did, however, have an important and unintended consequence that what would have caused great consternation to that Commission: it encouraged the GSEs to take on riskier portfolios too in order to prevent their market share from being eroded by the private sector too-big-to-fail institutions.
It is instructive to note that the Fannie and Freddie share of the mortgage market rose shapely beginning 2005. This was in contrast to the sharp fall in the preceding years when they lost market share to private label mortgage-backed securities.

Before 2003, as a fraction of their total mortgage-backed securities portfolio, each year the GSEs purchased approximately 10% in lower-quality loans. For the period from 2004 to 2007 this fraction saw a shape increase, averaging 50%.
While there is little doubt that, starting in the mid 1990s, government-mandated affordable housing goals played an important role in shifting Fannie and Freddie’s profile to riskier mortgage loans, it is an interesting question as to how much of the GSEs’ steeper dive into lower-quality mortgages was driven by those mandates and how much by their desire to maintain and expand their market shares.
Acharya, Richardson, Van Nieuwerburgh and White's conclusion:
The bottom line is that it is not possible to fix the US housing finance without dismantling the GSEs in a phased manner and removing their impact on housing markets, lest another race to the bottom emerge in due course once benign conditions return and capital and credit more readily available. However, it is pie in the sky to believe that systemic risk will not exist in the mortgage finance market once the GSEs leave this world. Too-big-to-fail institutions will gradually build up this risk on their balance sheets. It is unavoidable. As a result, it is crucial that the external costs of systemic risk are internalised by each of these firms, or we will end up with an alternative group of private GSE-financial firms in the mortgage finance area. The Dodd-Frank Act in the US, even if imperfect, serves as a useful step in the direction of focusing regulatory attention on systemic risk contributions of the private financial firms.
and
[ ... ] when governments run their own banks badly in good times, they crowd out private banks and thereby encourage them to take greater risks. A secular credit boom and bust must follow. The seeds of such a new cycle are currently being sown.

Things you learn at 2am

It is widely assumed that Ronald Coase introduced the concept of "transaction costs" to economics in 1937, he just didn't use the term, and that the term was first used by Jacob Marschak in 1950. But, it seems, life and economics isn't that simple. For the record Coase wrote about "the cost of using the price mechanism".

So what I discovered at 2am was that Sir John Hicks wrote back in 1935 that,
The most obvious sort of friction, and undoubtedly one of the most important, is the cost of transferring assets from one form to another" (Hicks 1935: 6).
His friction looks a lot like our transaction cost. So Hicks was 5 years ahead of Coase.

As to the label, "transaction costs", Marschak did write,
"[...] the individual has exchanged one commodity against another (say 1 against 2), he had to sacrifice, in addition, positive amounts of at least one of the N commodities: 'the so called transaction cost' (in money paid to advertising agents or brokers, or in ones own leisure, etc.)" (Marschak, 1950: 162).
in 1950 but Tibor Scitovsky wrote in 1940,
One reason (for holding cash rather than profitable assets - annotation by the author) must be liquidity preference, another, perhaps equally important one, seems to be high transaction costs (brokerage charges, stamp duties, commissions, etc.) on long-term securities" (Scitovsky, 1940, 307).
So Scitovsky was 10 years ahead of Marschak.
  • Hicks J. R. 1935. A Suggestion for Simplifying the Theory of Money. Economica 2: 1-19.
  • Marschak, J. 1950. The Rationale for the Demand for Money and of "Money Illusion". Metroeconomica, 2: 71-100.
  • Scitovsky, T. 1940. A Study of Interest and Capital. Economica 7 (27): 293-317.

If you want a hundred trillion dollars

this is what it could look like.

Unfortunately its a one hundred trillion dollar note from Zimbabwe and is worth around US$5

But that's what hyperinflation does for you.

The Wall Street Journal has a story on this note.
The notes are a hot commodity among currency collectors and novelty buyers, fetching 15 times what they were officially worth in circulation. In the past decade, President Robert Mugabe and his allies attempted to prop up the economy—and their government—by printing money. Instead, the country's central bankers sparked hyperinflation by issuing bills with more zeros.

The 100-trillion-dollar note, circulated for just a few months before the Zimbabwe dollar was officially abandoned as the country's legal currency in 2009, marked the daily limit people were allowed to withdraw from their bank accounts. Prices rose, wreaking havoc.

The runaway inflation forced Zimbabweans to wait in line to buy bread, toothpaste and other essentials. They often carried bigger bags for their money than the few items they could afford with a devalued currency.
These days all transactions in Zimbabwe are carried out in foreign currencies, mainly the U.S. dollar and the South African rand.

Wednesday, 11 May 2011

Free trade and democracy

The economic effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) are widely studied, but what about the political impact of FTAs? Using data from over 125 countries over the past 60 years, this column from VoxEu.org argues that by removing protectionism, free trade can lower the government's power and hence the incentives of autocrats to hold office. All this can help strengthen democracy.

In recent research, Ornelas and Liu (2011), Xuepeng Liu and Emanuel Ornelas present evidence that participation in free trade agreements can destroy protectionist rents. They can also serve as commitment devices to destroy future protectionist rents. Of course rent seekers are never much in favour of FTAs and now we have on more reason why.
Since such [protectionist] rents are attractive for autocratic groups, FTAs can lower their incentives to seek power. While this has little value in established democracies, where the rule of law is strong and the risk of authoritarian disruption is negligible, it can be important for unstable democracies. These threatened states should therefore have an extra incentive to seek involvement in FTAs, over and above the incentive stemming from the agreements’ potential trade gains.
Ornelas and Liu
[...] provide the theoretical basis for [their] claims by extending the trade integration model of Ornelas (2005) to allow for endogenous changes in the political regime. At any trade regime domestic firms exchange contributions for protection with the government, which cares about national welfare and the contributions it receives. Key to understand the impact of an FTA is the recognition that the equilibrium external tariffs change with the constraint imposed by the agreement on the internal tariffs. Taking this into account, it can be shown that even though an FTA still permits lobbying for protection against excluded countries, the volume of protectionist rents falls after the formation of the agreement.

In a dynamic setting this implies that, all else equal, groups motivated mainly by office rents will have lower incentives to seek power if the country is deeply engaged in FTAs. Authoritarian groups tend to fit this description best. After all, due to their aptitude to resort to violence to keep power, authoritarian groups have less incentive to pursue policies that favour the population at large than democratic ones. If the gain of authoritarian groups from keeping power falls when the country is engaged in FTAs, but the costs and risks from attempting a coup d’état are unaltered by the agreements, the likelihood of democratic failure will therefore be lower if the country participates more intensively in FTAs.

From this we learn that if the incumbent government in an unstable democracy realises this effect of "democratic consolidation", it will seek participation in FTAs more actively than it would otherwise. There are two reasons for this:
  1. An FTA will weaken the authoritarian threat, increasing the likelihood of democracy survival.
  2. Even if the dictatorial group takes control despite the FTA, the agreement will constrain its rent-extraction activities. Hence, unstable democracies tend to enter in FTAs more frequently than other countries, all else being equal.
What does this data stuff have to say about these results?

As a start Ornelas and Liu carry out a non-parametric survival comparison between democracies with and without FTA partners. They utilise a dataset that involving 126 countries over the period 1948-2007. Their statistical analysis confirms that, democracies without FTAs are unequivocally more likely to fail than those with FTAs.

Ornelas and Liu comment,
While striking, this result may be due to other differences between democracies with and without FTA partners. Thus, we also carry out a detailed econometric analysis. We rely on the strategy pursued by Persson and Tabellini (2009), who estimate the likelihood of democratic breakdown employing the concept of “democratic capital”. The domestic component of democratic capital takes into account the history of democracy in the country, while its foreign component considers current levels of democracy abroad. Along with other covariates, these two components of democratic capital allow us to estimate the likelihood of democratic failure in a country. Employing duration analysis techniques, we find that greater participation in FTAs significantly reduces the probability of democratic breakdown; i.e., FTAs contribute to the “consolidation” of democracies. This helps to explain why democratic experiences have been particularly successful since the late 1980s.

Having estimated the likelihood of democracy failure, we use its fitted values to estimate changes in FTA participation. In doing so, we consider only the portion of the likelihood that is not predicted by FTA participation. We find that a higher level of regime uncertainty indeed induces democratic governments to seek greater participation in FTAs. This helps to rationalise the outbreak of regionalism since the early 1990s, when many countries with limited democratic experience became involved in FTAs.

Our empirical results are robust to different econometric specifications and to different measures of democracy. The results are also economically meaningful. For example, Mongolia’s hazard rate in 2005 would drop from 3% to 1% if it had the same level of FTA participation as Chile, or to just 0.3%, had Mongolia the same FTA import share as Mexico.
Now what of free trade and political freedom?

Ornelas and Liu explain that
Our analysis also indicates that the rent destruction forces of FTAs are important drivers of the results. For example, our predictions hold consistently for agreements where most of the trade among the involved parties is liberalised. By contrast, the estimates are generally indistinguishable from zero for partial-scope agreements signed under the Enabling Clause of the GATT, which allow for many exceptions, and therefore impose few restrictions on the availability of rents from protection. It is also possible that FTAs help to maintain democracies not because of their rent destruction effects, but because of pressure from more democratic FTA partners. While this is a very plausible alternative mechanism, our empirical tests suggest that FTAs with more democratic partners are as valuable for the sustainability of a country’s democracy as FTAs with less democratic partners.
To end a word of caution is needed,
While all this is “good news” for democratic countries involved in FTAs, we must stress that participation in FTAs is, unsurprisingly, no panacea. They can help to consolidate democracies, but their reach is limited, as our estimates make clear. Similarly, there are as well many reasons other than democratic instability that also foster participation in FTAs.
That said the results still give us one more reason to support FTAs. Now we see that FTAs are good for both economic and political reasons.

The role of economics in an imperfect world

In the New York Times Edward L. Glaeser discusses what economics has to contribute to the war of ideas. Given that no one seems to take any notice of what economists say I'm not that sure it really matters. Glaeser notes that
John Neville Keynes, the father of John Maynard Keynes, promulgated the distinction between positive and normative economics. Milton Friedman later made that division canonical.

Positive economics attempts to understand the world as it is; normative economics describes how the world should be. Most economists spend most of their time doing positive economics, but most economics columns advocate particular policies, which is implicitly normative economics.
Glaeser continues,
Positive economics, as usually practiced today, combines formal, mathematical models and lots of quantitative, statistical work. That’s not what economists did before World War II; Keynes’s General Theory is short on both formal models and statistics. But formal theory and statistics have triumphed, and that’s a good thing.
It's interesting that Keynes, the younger, didn't bother much with quantitative approaches given he was trained as a statistician.
In the wake of the recent crash and recession, it has become fashionable to deride the quants, whether on Wall Street or in the academy. After all, few of them saw it coming. The critics may be right to criticize excessive overconfidence, but they are wrong to suggest that the fault lies in either formal models or statistical work.

Hubris has been part of the human condition, with or without math, long before the Black-Scholes asset-pricing formula. Mathematical models create discipline. They ensure that we specify our assumption and that our conclusions then follow from our assumptions. Statistics then provide us with indispensable tests of our theories.
Glaeser adds a note of caution:
But we need to always remember that data and statistical tests never prove a theory. Typically, many different theories can explain almost any observed phenomenon. Data allows us only to reject a theory. The theories that survive are those that haven’t been rejected yet, and that’s a good reason for humility.
But what of normative economics? What place does it have in economic discussion and public policy development?
At its best, normative economics draws heavily on positive economics: scores of studies have shown the ways in which rent control can screw up a housing market, with too little supply and misallocation of housing units, and that helps formulate policy prescriptions.

Yet the economic approach to public policy is distinguished by attributes beyond an attention to evidence.

There is a strong predisposition within economics to emphasize individual freedom. Our theories start with the assumption that giving individuals more choices is a good thing — and that assumption leads to the view that people benefit from having more money or lower prices for the goods that they buy.
The basis ideas is that people know what is best for themselves and have the right to live by their assessment of what they want. In short, personal freedom. This does mean that all regulation is bad, in fact markets only work because they are regulated, in most cases by the people within the market and by competition.
That assumption doesn’t mean that all regulation is bad or even that, in some cases, people are better off facing fewer soups on a supermarket shelf. Even though people value more choices, they also value information, and an overload of choices can make it hard to figure out which soup is really best. But our assumptions do put freedom first, and that’s an important perspective.

Economics marries a predilection for personal freedom with a longstanding tendency to view the interests of the government as being distinct from the welfare of the people. Adam Smith’s “Wealth of Nations,” modern economics’ founding document, emphasized that point.

In the 18th century, it seemed clear that what was good for King George III was not necessarily good for Britain and certainly was not necessarily good for his American subjects.
Its worthwhile to keep in mind that both markets and governments are imperfect, and it's important to weigh their failures against each other - we need a comparative institutional approach. Always keep in mind that governments are not a faultless servant of the people's will, even assuming "the people" have a will. There is a healthy scepticism about the benevolence and competence of the state continued within economics.

Tuesday, 10 May 2011

The organisational economics of Al Qaeda

Craig Pirrong at the Streetwise Professor blog writes of the organisational structure of Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden:
There is a concerted effort underway to portray Bin Laden as exerting operational control over Al Qaeda, based on material collected during the raid on his compound. Color me skeptical.

First, it’s hard to imagine how he could exercise any control at anything but the broadest strategic and conceptual level while he was relying on couriers to communicate with subordinates. Second, this hierarchical model is contrary to virtually all that has been written about Al Qaeda going back to its early days: the organization has been consistently portrayed as networked and distributed rather than hierarchical. Indeed, the conventional characterization of Al Qaeda represents it as more of a franchise operation in which the franchisees have considerable autonomy.

But let’s assume for a moment that the organization was hierarchical, and that operational elements required direction and approval from Bin Laden to implement any attack. If that’s true, we may have actually done ourselves a disservice by killing Osama. For it would be almost trivially simple to get inside AQ’s OODA (“observe, orient, decide, and act”) loop and disrupt and destroy its operations. Even if we didn’t know what AQ was up to, we could disrupt their plans just by mixing (randomizing) our strategies, by unexpectedly changing up the way we do things. If response to such changes required the locals carrying out missions to report back to OBL via a painfully slow communications system, await a decision, and wait for the decision to be couriered back, they would be unable to do anything serious. In this case, killing OBL would free the locals to be more flexible and responsive–and hence more dangerous. It would permit AQ to become more of a network, less predictable, and more able to adapt to our moves.

Given these difficulties, I find it hard to believe–exceedingly hard–that AQ actually operated this way. Even if OBL wanted to play terrorist mastermind, how could he enforce decisions? Put different, if he was the principal, how could he overcome the agency problems that would bedevil his ability to impose his will on his subordinates?
It is hard to see Al Qaeda as a hierarchical organisation. The people on the ground have the best information about what is going on in their area and thus are the best people to make operational decisions. There is no advantage to in running a top-down organisation where information has to be sent to (and from) Bin Laden, via couriers, to get a decision on what actions to take. When local information is of such importance decentralising decision making just makes sense. Also having decentralised independent operators makes the job of countering Al Qaeda that much harder since taking out one group doesn't effect any other operation. There is not central control mechanism for the U.S. to destroy in an attempt to disrupt Al Qaeda operations.

International car theft rings

The Washington Post reports on International theft rings steal hundreds of vehicles in D.C. area every year. The article says,
Officials estimate that each year in the Washington area alone, hundreds of cars are stolen and shipped overseas. New York authorities announced last June that they had charged 17 people with stealing and shipping hundreds of luxury cars. Other D.C. area police officials and a spokesman for the FBI’s Baltimore Field Office said their detectives have worked similar cases.
and
The ring’s bosses are usually based in African countries or other developing nations, where it is more difficult to find reasonably priced, mid- to high-end vehicles, authorities said. They order specific cars from middlemen in the United States, and then low-level thieves set out to get their cut.
The article also points out that incentive matter even for crime, different cars are worth different amounts to steal:
In the Prince George’s ring, the thieves are paid according to the vehicles they carjack or steal — $1,500 for a Toyota Camry, $2,500 for a RAV4, $5,000 for a Porsche Cayenne, Aponte said.
After a car is stolen,
The middlemen handle the rest. They stash the stolen cars in parking lots or neighborhoods, waiting to see whether police are on their trail. Then they load the vehicles onto shipping containers bound for Africa, police said. The rings are especially prevalent in the D.C. area, police said, because of its proximity to ports.
The question this raises is, What kinds of controls do these developing nations have on the importation of cars that makes this sort of international operation worthwhile?

NZAE meetings

Over at Offsetting Behaviour Seamus Hogan notes the upcoming New Zealand Association of Economists annual conference. He writes,
The conference is in Wellington, Wed June 29 - Fri July 1. Details are here. Eric and I are both on the programme, Eric exalting the value of alcohol and I exalting electricity markets. The visible hand's Rauparaha is also on the programme, having first gone to a phone booth to change back into his undercover identity as James Zuccollo.

But far more interesting than we humble bloggers is our keynote speaker, Tim Harford, "today's best active popular economics writer". He is scheduled to speak on the Wednesday.

Early-bird registration closes this coming Thursday.