Wednesday 29 March 2017

Dennis Carlton on concentration in American industry and competition policy

This is from a short interview with Dennis W. Carlton, the David McDaniel Keller Professor of Economics at the Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago, dealing with the question, Does America have a concentration problem?
Q: The discourse on concentration, market power, and bigness in many U.S. industries has increased dramatically in the last year. Do you believe that we have enough empirical evidence to show that concentration is on the rise and having adverse effects on the economy?

There is some evidence of increased concentration. But the evidence I have seen in manufacturing (I thank Sam Peltzman for his data) suggests that these increases are unlikely to have large effects on the U.S. economy. For example, using census data, with all its limitations such as ignoring imports, the evidence indicates that the U.S. economy is still generally characterized by manufacturing industries with low concentration levels.

I am skeptical of claims and have seen no convincing evidence that increased concentration overall across all industries has been a major factor in explaining poor U.S. economic performance.

Q: In your opinion, what are the main reasons for the rise in concentration?

Technology explains the rise in concentration in some industries. Regulation, which tends to burden small firms disproportionately, explains it in others.

Q: Which industries should we be concerned with when we look at questions of concentration? Do we have evidence of excessive market power, reduction in quality or investment, or growing political influence?

Every industry with very high concentration deserves scrutiny from an antitrust viewpoint. Industries where data collection is important might raise privacy issues that need to be addressed, in addition to antitrust issues.

Q: Has consolidation in the financial industry played a role in concentration or antitrust issues in the U.S.?

Concentration in the financial industry can raise antitrust concerns. The recent ABA advisory report on antitrust for the next administration raises this issue and suggests that the Federal Reserve should not adopt different merger standards than the Department of Justice.

But if the question is suggesting that bank concentration is responsible for increased concentration in other industries, I have seen no evidence of that.

Q: The five largest internet and tech companies—Apple, Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Microsoft—have outstanding market share in their markets. Are current antitrust policies and theories able to deal with the potential problems that arise from the dominant positions of these companies and the vast data they collect on users?

The report of the Antitrust Modernization Commission explicitly addressed the question of the adequacy of antitrust laws in light of new technologies in great detail, and the bipartisan panel concluded that the current antitrust laws were indeed adequate. However, special concerns regarding privacy protection can arise.

Q: Is there a connection between the growing inequality in the U.S. and concentration, dominant firms, and winner-take-all markets?

Technology influences market structure. Technology is the major factor explaining earnings inequality. But it would be misleading to say that an exogenous increase in concentration is the significant cause of increased earning inequality. The changing role of jobs because of technological change is the major reason for increased inequality.
As to the big question as to what we could see with regard to antitrust policy under the Trump administration Carlton has this to say (pdf) in the February 2017 (Vol 16 No 4) issue of The Antitrust Source.
Over at least the last ten years, complaints that antitrust policy is too lax have grown steadily in volume. Some critics have even suggested that the U.S. economy has become less competitive as a result, which they argue has led to slowing economic growth and increasing income inequality. I hope that the Trump administration’s response to such claims will be to ask for the evidence that supports these views before altering antitrust enforcement. This does not mean that the complaints should be ignored. To the contrary, it means that the Trump administration should alter antitrust policy to address concerns only when those concerns are based on evidence—not rhetoric—and only when those concerns can be appropriately addressed by antitrust policy. In the wake of these criticisms of antitrust policy, President Obama called not only for the government antitrust agencies to pursue vigorous antitrust enforcement but also for regulators to intervene in the industries they regulate to make them more competitive. I hope that the Trump administration will ask for specific evidence that any proposed regulatory intervention would likely improve competitive conditions in particular industries. The experience of regulation shows that often (though not always) regulatory intervention harms rather than helps competitiveness and economic performance, sometimes by making it more difficult for new firms to enter an industry.

Some have called for antitrust policymakers to take into account the effects of antitrust policy on income inequality and unemployment. My hope is that the Trump administration will use antitrust policy only for what antitrust does best—protection of the competitive process. Goals such as reducing poverty or decreasing unemployment are important but antitrust policy is ill-suited to achieve those goals. Over time, competition raises living standards by allocating resources to new, higher valued uses. Attaching other goals to antitrust enforcement can interfere with that process.

There are many antitrust topics that the Trump administration can usefully address. It can encourage the use of retrospective studies to evaluate past mergers as well as the techniques used to evaluate those mergers. Did past mergers systematically raise prices and do our techniques identify such cases or not? Noting that price goes up in some mergers is not a sufficient analysis unless one also takes into account that prices go down in other mergers. The issue is whether we see a systematic bias in what our government agencies are doing. A small sampling of other important topics would include guidance on the antitrust analysis of two-sided markets, bundled discounts, and tie-in cases. Finally, the FTC should think hard about its consumer protection mission, especially with regard to privacy.

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