Friday, 10 October 2008

Executive compensation in widelyheld US firms

The European Society for New Institutional Economics runs a yearly School on New Institutional Economics. This paper comes from the 2007 school. It is by Jesse Fried of U.C. Berkeley and is on "Executive Compensation in Widely-Held US Firms". The abstract reads
Over 70 years ago, Berle and Means described the problems that arise because of the separation of ownership and control in widely-held U.S. companies. These companies are owned by dispersed public shareholders, but controlled by their managers who have substantial discretion under state corporate law. My lecture will focus on how managers have used their power to obtain pay arrangements that do not serve shareholders’ interests. I will also discuss and evaluate the various efforts made by shareholders and the federal government to address this problem.
The powerpoint version of the presentation can be download here.

An addition and useful article to read on this topic is Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem"

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