Monday, 6 June 2011

Smith and Keynes share a birthday

Or so claims Don Boudreaux over at Cafe Hayek.
In what is surely one of history’s great ironies, today [June 5] is the birthday of both Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes.
But I don't think there is a great irony here since we don't know Smith's actual date of birth. June 5 is most likely the date of his baptism, not birth. Why that date is on his gravestone as his date of birth no one knows.

North Korean "Global Happiness Index" ranks China no. 1

From Marginal Revolution comes news of this report on happiness research from North Korea:
China is the happiest place on earth(!!) according to a new global happiness index released by North Korea's Chosun Central Television. China earned 100 out of 100 points, followed closely by North Korea (98 points), then Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela. Coming in at 203rd place is America (or rather "the American Empire", 美帝国), with only 3 happiness points. South Korea got a measly 18 points for 152nd place.
Obviously all that income Americans have isn't doing them much good. And some people wonder why there are economists who have doubts about (or aboot, if you happen to come from that place of unreported happiness near to the very unhappy "American Empire") happiness research!!

A graph is worth a thousand words

Tim Worstall at the blog of the Adam Smith Institute points us to this graph.


The graph comes from a new book "The Haves and the Have-Nots", by the World Bank economist Branko Milanovic, which is about inequality around the world. The graph shows inequality within a country, in the context of inequality around the world. It can take a bit of time to get your heard around it but it is worth it. Worstall writes,
A little background. Branko Milanovic, from whom the data comes, is a researcher into inequality. He tells us that there are three ways of measuring this globally. We could use the average income of each country and then compare these averages, this is Concept 1. Not all that useful as we're thus comparing the 400,000 people of Luxembourg as one unit with the 1.3 billion of India as one unit. Concept 2 takes these averages and then weights them by population. Thus we transform the 50 ish units representing the 900 million of Africa into something we can compare to the 1.3 billion of India. Concept 3 is much more difficult to calculate but is much more informative: treating the world as one unit and comparing incomes across the world.
What happens when you use method 3? In the graph the population of each country is divided into 20 equally-sized income groups, ranked by their household per-capita income. These are called "ventiles" and of course each "ventile" translates to a cluster of five percentiles (see the horizontal axis). Since the cost of goods varies from country to country, household income numbers are adjusted for purchasing power, i.e. income is show in PPP dollars. In other words, the graph adjusts for the cost of living in different countries, so we are looking at consistent living standards worldwide (as best we can). On the vertical axis, you can see where any given ventile from any country falls when compared to the entire population of the world.

Consider, for example, Brazil. Brazil's bottom ventile - the poorest 5 percent of the Brazilian population - is as poor as anyone in the world, registering a percentile in the single digits when compared to the income distribution worldwide. Meanwhile, Brazil also has some of the world's richest, as you can see by how high up on the chart Brazil's top ventile reaches. In other words, this one country covers a very broad span of income groups.

As for America, notice that the entire line is in the top portion of the graph. This tells us that the entire country is relatively rich. In fact, America's bottom ventile is still richer than most of the world: That is, the typical person in the bottom 5 percent of the American income distribution is still richer than 68 percent of the world's inhabitants. Now compare the U.S. to India. India's poorest ventile corresponds, not surprisingly, to the 4th poorest percentile worldwide. But India's richest 5% are only in the 68th percentile. So yes, what this says is that America's poorest are, as a group, about as rich as India's richest.

So being poor in the evil capitalist U.S. is better than being rich in most of the world. Not a result, I'm guessing, too many people would have picked.

It would be cool to see more countries on the graph. What would New Zealand's curve look like?

Sunday, 5 June 2011

Word for the day

BureauPrat

Defined at
the MacDoctor blog to mean:
Professional scientist/clinician who has joined the forces of the damned administrative workforce.

Test your economic literacy

or lack thereof!!! You can take the 13-question economic literacy test from the Minneapolis Federal Reserve.

I got 13/13, so it must be easy, but a lot of people don't seem to be that literate. The Minneapolis Fed reports that back in 1998 when it set out to answer the question: How Economically Literate are People? it found that the answer was not very.
To try to answer the above question, the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis commissioned a national telephone poll that was conducted in September and October 1998 by the Minnesota Center for Survey Research at the University of Minnesota. Four hundred and four randomly selected adults from throughout the United States were asked 13 questions designed to test their understanding of economic literacy. The average score was 45 percent, which reveals some understanding, also suggests a need for improvement. (The entire survey, which has a sampling error of plus or minus 5 percentage points, follows this article.)

The Minneapolis Fed's 13 questions were based on the six key concepts of economic literacy described in this article. For example, as discussed earlier, the basis for much of economic reasoning is that people and societies face trade-offs. Yet only 28 percent and 19 percent of those surveyed, respectively, answered correctly the questions that deal with this concept (questions 2 and 3). Respondents did only somewhat better when asked about the role of government in the economy (questions 10, 12 and 13). Only 38 percent got the right answer to the question dealing with incremental thinking (question 9).

Questions 5 through 8 of the survey ask how markets coordinate consumption and production, and 46 percent on average answered correctly. Respondents got a 60 percent score when asked about trade promoting growth (questions 1 and 4). Ninety percent, however, got the right answer to the question about relative prices guiding decision-making (question 11). (emphasis added)
Can you do better than 45%?

(HT: Carpe Diem)

Saturday, 4 June 2011

U.S. unemployment fact

Tyler Cowen reports,
People unemployed over 6 months rose by a whopping 361k, 44% of all unemployed.
What does this tell us about human capital? If you're made redundant and don't get a new job quickly your human capital depreciates to such a degree that you become almost unemployable? Or is it that those with the lowest marginal product, and thus I guess the lowest human capital, get fired first and because of the low human capital find it difficult to get another job?

How migration shaped our world and will define our future

In this audio interview from VoxEU.org Ian Goldin, director of the Oxford Martin School at the University of Oxford, talks to Romesh Vaitilingam about his new book, ‘Exceptional People’, co-authored with Geoffrey Cameron and Meera Balarajan. They discuss how migrants have fuelled human progress over centuries, the benefits for sending and receiving countries, and why pressure from both demand and supply could lead to a doubling of cross-border migration flows over the next few years.

Romer on growth, technological change, and an unlimited human future

Back in 2001 Reason journalist Ronald Bailey interviewed economist Paul Romer. Bailey wrote,
As one of the chief architects of "New Growth Theory," Paul Romer has had a massive and profound impact on modern economic thinking and policymaking. New Growth Theory shows that economic growth doesn't arise just from adding more labor to more capital, but from new and better ideas expressed as technological progress. Along the way, it transforms economics from a "dismal science" that describes a world of scarcity and diminishing returns into a discipline that reveals a path toward constant improvement and unlimited potential. Ideas, in Romer's formulation, really do have consequences. Big ones.

Before New Growth Theory, economists recognized that technology contributed substantially to growth, but they couldn't figure out how to incorporate that insight into economic theory. Romer's innovation, expressed in technical articles with titles such as "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth" and "Endogenous Technological Change," has been to find ways to describe rigorously and exactly how technological progress brings about economic growth. As Robert Solow told Wired in 1996, "Paul single-handedly turned [the study of economic growth] into a hot subject."
At one point Bailey asked about why are people richer today than they were 100 years ago. Romer's rely makes a nice point about how little changes in the way we do things can add up to be big changes in welfare:
Many things contributed, but the essential one is technological change. What I mean by that is the discovery of better ways to do things. In most coffee shops these days, you'll find that the small, medium, and large coffee cups all use the same size lid now, whereas even five years ago they used to have different size lids for the different cups. That small change in the geometry of the cups means that somebody can save a little time in setting up the coffee shop, preparing the cups, getting your coffee, and getting out. Millions of little discoveries like that, combined with some very big discoveries, like the electric motor and antibiotics, have made the quality of life for people today dramatically higher than it was 100 years ago.
One small step for Starbucks ...

(HT: Adam Smith Institute)

Is compulsory voting the way to go?

Dan Usher has a new working paper out on A Duty to Vote. The abstract reads:
A duty to vote may be many things. It may be no more than an obligation to cast one's ballot as self-interestedly or as altruistically as one pleases. It may a requirement to vote for the political party most likely to yield the highest social welfare. It may be a requirement to choose between competing parties in the interest of one's social class or with recognition of the needs of the poor. It may include a requirement to inform oneself about the issues in an election. This paper begins with a critique of the argument denying any duty to vote because, as with participants in the market, there is no conflict between self-interest and public interest in the choice whether to vote or abstain. The core of the paper is a discussion of several interpretations of the duty to vote, and there is a brief review of pros and cons of compulsory voting.
I wonder what the incentives are for voting if it is compulsory? I can't see people who are being forced into voting exactly taking a lot of time and effort over getting to know the issues or the candidates. Do you really want these people voting?

Friday, 3 June 2011

Interesting blog bits

  1. Richard A. Epstein asks Reforms? What Reforms?
    One distinguished legal scholar, Epstein, has a go at another distinguished legal scholar, Cass Sunstein.
  2. Gary Becker asks Another Tech Bubble in the Offing?
    The dotcom boom at the end of the 1990s was a classical and magnificent bubble. Venture capitalists and other investors were throwing tens, and often hundreds, of millions of dollars at Internet startups and fledgling biotech companies that usually were not making profits, and frequently did not have any sales. The bubble burst in 2000, and the huge valuations placed on these companies disappeared, along with many of the companies. It is only a decade later, but a second dotcom boom has begun, and some early signs are surfacing of a possibly another bubble.
  3. Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr. on Money and Inflation: What’s Going On in the World?
    Are America and the world at risk for another inflationary episode similar to the 1970s and early 1980s? Or do current low rates of inflation portend low inflation for the foreseeable future?
  4. Tom Papworth on How to introduce a minimum wage without raising unemployment
    Supporters of a minimum wage are quick to point out that the introduction of the minimum wage in the UK was not accompanied by rising unemployment, as economic theory would suggest. What explains the labour market's seeming resilience in the face of what should be a very bad policy?
  5. David Cowan argues Fiscal autonomy is the key to localism
    Local government is arguably one of the fundamental institutions of a free society. It ensures that local people have a significant degree of control over how the state acts in their community. Yet centralising instincts have dominated in recent decades and the central state’s power has increased at the expense of local government and other civil institutions.
  6. Roger Kerr on The State of the Australian Economy
    Recently appointed Australian Secretary to the Treasury Dr Martin Parkinson gave an interesting post-budget speech on the Australian economy. Several themes are relevant to economic challenges in New Zealand
  7. Hugh Pavletich on Sorry about the sewage, we are too busy gardening in the Red Zone!
    While owners of central Christchurch property are being ordered by the government’s bureaucrats at CERA to cough up demolition plans for buildings they are aren't even allowed to visit, supposedly because it’s too risky for them, council gardeners are allowed in to central Christchurch to plant flowers—presumably to make wreaths to plant around the businesses the council has killed.
  8. Marga Peeters on Egypt’s demographic pressure – Where and how to create jobs?
    After the drama of Egypt’s revolution comes the economic reality – one of the catalysts for regime change was the country’s high unemployment. This column shows that the growing number of young people entering the job market will only add to the pressure. It argues that job creation in the private sector should be the number one priority for stimulating Egypt’s economic growth.

Should compensation be paid?

Nigel Hawkins writes at the Adam Smith Institute blog that
[...] Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel, who confirmed that all 17 of the nation’s nuclear power stations would close by 2022.
and notes
However, this controversial decision has wide-ranging repercussions for the EU, whose common energy policy – Germany now being anti-nuclear and France being ardently pro-nuclear – is seriously frayed. Germany will become increasingly reliant on gas-generated power and an expansion of renewables. Both E.On and RWE, Germany’s leading utilities, are furious and may pursue the issue through the courts, unless very large compensation is paid.
The question is, Should compensation be paid to power companies who run the nuclear power stations? You may well say yes given that there previously legal business has just shut down by an arbitrary decision by the government. The utilities will suffer a very large loss because of the government's decision.

Now apply the same argument to a different case. Consider the situation of salve owners at the time the British government declared slavery illegal. The salve owners previously legal business was just shut down by an arbitrary decision by the government. The slave owners suffered a very large loss because of the government's decision. Should they have been compensated?

A third case. Should compensation be paid to businesses who are forced into bankruptcy when a government changes of a policy of protection to a policy of free trade? Again the businesses have suffered because of a arbitrary decision by the government.

So should compensation be paid by the government in all cases, none of the cases or only some of the cases, and why? Here is Steven E. Landsburg with his No answer to, at least, the trade case.

Crunching the currency

Over at Kiwblog David Farrar writes,
In my Stuff blog, I take a look at the currency, with the record highs against the US and UK. I concluded:
Politically the currency can have a big impact on the economy and the popularity of the government. But it is not something governments can do a lot about in the short term, unless they want to risk billions of dollars in currency speculation. Long-term policies that lead to better productivity can lead to a stronger currency, but in a way which doesn’t harm the export sector so much, as the increased productivity gives them competitive advantage. That is how you get a win-win.
"but in a way which doesn’t harm the export sector"? Will mercantilism not die? I figured that the death blow was delivered to mercantilism back in 1776, but it appears not. Why is Dave, and many others, worried about what happens to exporters? As I have said before Imports good; exports bad:
Why? Well, notice that Adam Smith pointed out more than 240 years ago that "Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production" and that the measure of a country's true wealth, is the total of its production and commerce. That is, a country's wealth is what the people of that country can consume. The great 19th century French economic pamphleteer Frédéric Bastiat wrote, "Consumption is the end, the final cause, of all economic phenomena, and it is consequently in consumption that their ultimate and definitive justification is to be found." Note also that exports are things that we produce and send to other (overseas) people. That is, they are goods and services that we produce but do not consume and thus they lower our welfare. Imports on the other hand, are goods and services that other counties produce and send to us to increase our consumption. This means imports increase our welfare. So imports are welfare increasing and exports are welfare decreasing. Therefore "imports are good; exports are bad"
Christina Romer has written about the exchange rate recently,
Our exchange rate is just a price — the price of the dollar in terms of other currencies. It is not controlled by anyone. And a high price for the dollar, which is what we mean by a strong dollar, is not always desirable.
Thus a strong dollar is not always a good thing but the same is true of a low dollar. Romer continues - you can replace New Zealand for United States in this,
Such discussions would start with some basic economics. The desire to trade with other countries or invest in them is what gives rise to the market for foreign exchange. You need euros to travel in Spain or to buy a German government bond, so you need a way to exchange currencies.

The supply of dollars to the foreign exchange market comes from Americans who want to buy goods, services or assets from abroad. The demand for dollars comes from foreigners who want to buy from the United States.

Anything that increases the demand for dollars or reduces the supply drives up the dollar’s price. Anything that lowers the demand for dollars or raises the supply causes the dollar to weaken.

Consider two examples. Suppose American entrepreneurs create many products that foreigners want to buy, and start many companies they want to invest in. That will increase the demand for dollars and so cause the dollar’s price to rise. Such innovation will also make Americans want to buy more goods and assets in the United States — and fewer abroad. The supply of dollars to the foreign exchange market will fall, further strengthening the dollar. This example describes very well the conditions of the late 1990s — when the dollar was indeed strong.

Now suppose the United States runs a large budget deficit that causes domestic interest rates to rise. Higher American interest rates make both foreigners and Americans want to buy more American bonds and fewer foreign bonds. Thus the demand for dollars increases and the supply decreases. The price of the dollar will again rise.

[ ... ]

Both developments — brilliant American innovation and troublesome American budget deficits — caused the dollar to strengthen. Yet one is clearly a positive for the American economy, the other a negative. The point is that there is no universal good or bad direction for the dollar to move. The desirability of any shift in the exchange rate depends on why the dollar is moving. (Emphasis added)
So a high/low dollar could be good or bad. It depends on why its high or low. The exchange rate like any price just tells what the relative demand for the dollar is, but it doesn't tell us anything about whether this is a good or bad thing. The question that must be asked is, Why is the dollar "strong" or "weak"? The answer to this question will tell us if we should be worried about the state of the economy. The exchange rate is just a price, at best a signal of the underlying condition of the economy.

A high dollar may harm the export sector, but so what? It helps importers and consumers. Why should we want to help exporters at the expense of importers and consumers? There is nothing inherently good about exporting, so there is nothing inherently good (or bad) about any level of the exchange rate. Just let the exchange rate be will you!

Macroeconomics in one ... cartoon


(HT: Greg Mankiw)

Thursday, 2 June 2011

Sustaining top-line growth: The real picture

This article by Bing Cao, Bin Jiang, and Tim Koller comes from the McKinsey Quarterly.

Maintaining high growth rates for a company is a lot harder than many business seems to think.
Finally, it’s worth bearing in mind just how many casualties the growth game has. Beginning in the mid-1970s, a quarter of all the large companies we studied actually shrank in real terms in a given year. That’s sobering, since most companies today are publicly projecting healthy growth over the next five years. In fact, many of these mature companies will get smaller in real terms. In related research, we find that a startling 44 percent of all companies that grew at rates faster than 15 percent from 1994 to 1997 were growing at rates lower than 5 percent ten years later.
The last sentence in particular illustrates the problem and suggests just how important entrepreneurship within a company can be. Without ongoing innovation a firm can die, there is always the need to find new products to replace revenue declines from current offerings as they mature. As markets grow sometimes large amount market share must be grabbed to meet growth goals. Given that all your competitors will be doing the same thing, this is not easy task.

Tyler Cowen gives advice on academic publishing

George Mason University economics professor Tyler Cowen gives advice on academic publishing for aspiring classical liberal academics. Dr. Cowen made these remarks at the Institute for Humane Studies Summer Research Fellowship weekend seminar in May 2011.


Tyler Cowen: Academic Publishing from Kosmos on Vimeo.

Journalists and economics :-(

One of the things that economist John Taylor is famous for is the Taylor Rule (the Taylor Rule says that the federal funds rate should equal 1.5 times the inflation rate plus .5 times the GDP gap plus 1), something so well known now that even journalists have heard of it. Unfortunately. Note the following:
Over at Market Beat: WSJ.com's inside look at the markets, Mark Gongloff reports that Standard Chartered’s David Semmens says that “Based on a strict Taylor-rule calculation, the first effective fed-funds rate increase shouldn’t come until the first quarter of 2013.”
So the Taylor Rule tells us that interest rates should stay basically where they are, at least for now.
And over at Business Insider, Art Cashin of UBS reports that Jim Brown of Premium Investor says that “the Taylor rule says the Fed funds rate should be -1.65%” suggesting the need for a QE 2.5.
So the Taylor Rule also tells us that interest rates should fall.

No calculations are given in either of these articles. I wonder if the journalists involved ever thought that checking the calculations of the results they were reporting would be a good idea? As it turns out such a thought would have been at good idea as at his blog, Economcis One, John Taylor writes,
So I think the economy would be better off if the Fed started moving to a higher funds rate now rather than later, and I certainly see no rationale for another round of quantitative easing.
Thats right, John Taylor says that the Taylor Rule argues for an interest rate increase and he provides the calculations to back it up.
Over here at Economics One, I can report that the Taylor Rule says that the fed funds rate should now be 1 percent, and I can provide the calculations. Available data (through the 1st quarter) show that the inflation rate is about 1.6 percent (GDP deflator smoothed over four quarters) and the GDP gap is about 4.8 percent (average of San Francisco Fed survey). This implies an interest rate of 1.5 X1.6 + .5X(-4.8) + 1 = 2.4 - 2.4 +1 = 1.0 percent.

Wednesday, 1 June 2011

Tapu Misa on the "Dismal Science" (updated)

In an article in the New Zealand Herald Tapu Misa asks
Since the global financial crisis, I've wondered if even economists understand what Thomas Carlyle called "the Dismal Science".
I would ask, Does Tapu Misa understand why Carlyle called it the "Dismal Science"? It seems strange to me that Misa would invoke Carlyle. There are a any number of errors in Misa'a attack on economics contained in the Herald article  but what I find particularly weird is that Misa, like so many people who wish to attack economics, quotes Carlyle.

This comes from Professor David Levy, writing in The Freeman magazine, who does understand why economics is the dismal science:
In December 1849 Thomas Carlyle published “Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question” in the London monthly Fraser’s Magazine. In it he labeled the economics of his contemporaries “the dismal science.” In the next issue of Fraser’s, the greatest British economist of that era, John Stuart Mill, responded. That brief exchange—it counts less than 20 pages—is at the very heart of the nature and significance of classical British economics.

While everyone has heard that economics is the “dismal science,” almost no one in economics these days seems to know what aroused Carlyle’s ire. The failing is not Carlyle’s; he is as clear as can be as to what exactly is the problem with economics. It stands opposed to racial slavery. In the passage I quote next—which contains the first use of “dismal science” in the language—the only fact that a modern reader lacks is that Exeter Hall was the heart of organized Evangelicalism, the moral center of the British antislave movement:
Truly, my philanthropic friends, Exeter Hall Philanthropy is wonderful; and the Social Science—not a “gay science,” but a rueful [one]—which finds the secret of this universe in “supply-and-demand,” and reduces the duty of human governors to that of letting men alone, is also wonderful. Not a “gay science,” I should say, like some we have heard of; no, a dreary, desolate, and indeed quite abject and distressing one; what we might call, by way of eminence, the dismal science. These two, Exeter Hall Philanthropy and the Dismal Science, led by any sacred cause of Black Emancipation, or the like, to fall in love and make a wedding of it,—will give birth to progenies and prodigies; dark extensive moon-calves, unnameable abortions, wide-coiled monstrosities, such as the world has not seen hitherto!*

* [Thomas Carlyle], “Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question,” Fraser’s Magazine for Town and Country, December 1849, pp. 672-73.
Much of the rest is unprintable in this respectable periodical; it reads like the vile racist screed it is. Nonetheless, if one can bear the racial pornography, Carlyle makes a point of vital importance: the economics of his contemporaries in its idealization of market relationships among equals stands in opposition to his dream of slavery’s hierarchical obedience.

Too often soft-pedaled by those who admire his attack on economics, Carlyle was the premier theorist of the idealized slave society. In opposition to the economists’ supply-and-demand model of human society, he put forward the doctrine of obedience to one’s betters. While he had been making such arguments through the 1840s, it wasn’t until the “Negro Question” that he realized that all white people are “better” than all black people. This certainly made the idealized slavery more attractive for white Britons than one in which they might be on the cutting end of the “beneficent whip”—a phrase in “Negro Question” that Mill singled out for particular attention.

Carlyle idealized slavery in the same way economists idealized markets. To match the economists’ claim of mutual gain from exchange, Carlyle put forward the doctrine of the joys of service to one’s betters. And according to the way things were supposed to work, the common religion would give the details of the hierarchy. (This is why Carlyle and his admirers often had “problems” with Jews; in particular, why we find the Anglo-German writer H. S. Chamberlain cited in Mein Kampf for his rants on the subject.)
Carlyle's article was reprinted in pamphlet form in 1853 under the title "Occasional Discourse on the Nigger Question". The rest of Levy's article is well worth reading. For a book length treatment of the subject try Levy's book "How the Dismal Science Got Its Name: Classical Economics and the Ur-Text of Racial Politics". I'll guess Tapu has not read Levy's book.

Update: I see Eric Crampton made this point before me.

The state and 100 percent reserve banking

At the Free Banking blog George Selgin looks at the history of 100 percent reserve banking and points out that every significant 100-percent bank known to history was a government-sponsored enterprise, which depended for its existence on some combination of direct government subsidies, compulsory patronage, or laws suppressing rival (fractional reserve) institutions. Selgin writes,
Free bankers have been fighting a war on two fronts. On one they face champions of central banking and managed money. On the other they struggle against advocates of 100-percent reserve banking. Although the second front is a lot smaller than the first, it’s far from being unimportant, in part because the battle there is being fought against people who generally favor free markets, who might have been expected to join rather than to oppose our cause.

They oppose it for a variety of reasons, one of which is their belief that, in a truly free-market setting, fractional reserve banking wouldn’t survive. Instead, they insist, 100-percent reserve banks would prevail. That they haven't is due, in their opinion, to a banking industry playing field slanted in favor of favor fractional-reserve banks, especially by either implicit or implicit deposit guarantees financed through forced levies upon all banks, and sometimes by taxation or inflation. In short, fractional-reserve banking has been nurtured by government subsidies.

Free bankers have tried responding to this argument by noting how fractional reserve banking has prevailed under every sort of bank regulatory regime, from the earliest beginnings of banking, not excepting regimes that involved very little regulation, like those of Scotland, Canada, and Sweden, and that lacked even a trace of government guarantees or other sorts of artificial support. But since some 100-percenters seem unmoved by this approach, I here take a different tack, which consists of pointing out that every significant 100-percent bank known to history was a government-sponsored enterprise, which depended for its existence on some combination of direct government subsidies, compulsory patronage, or laws suppressing rival (fractional reserve) institutions. Yet despite the special support they enjoyed, and their solemn commitments to refrain from lending coin deposited with them, they all eventually came a cropper. What’s more, it was these government-sponsored full-reserve banks, rather than their private-market fractional reserve counterparts, that were the progenitors of later central banks, starting with the Bank of England.
The rest of the posting is a great read for those interested in this topic.

The weak foundations of Arab economy

Timur Kuran writes in the New York Times on The Weak Foundations of Arab Democracy but in the process he also gives an outline of why the Arab world has advanced economically more slowly than the Western world.

On the political front Kuran says,
THE protesters who have toppled or endangered Arab dictators are demanding more freedoms, fair elections and a crackdown on corruption. But they have not promoted a distinct ideology, let alone a coherent one. This is because private organizations have played only a peripheral role and the demonstrations have lacked leaders of stature.

Both limitations are due to the longstanding dearth, across the Arab world, of autonomous nongovernmental associations serving as intermediaries between the individual and the state. This chronic weakness of civil society suggests that viable Arab democracies — or leaders who could govern them — will not emerge anytime soon. The more likely immediate outcome of the current turmoil is a new set of dictators or single-party regimes.
He goes on to point out problems that affect both the political and the economic aspect of Islamic society. He notes,
But the handicaps of Arab civil society also have historical causes that transcend the policies of modern rulers. Until the establishment of colonial regimes in the late 19th century, Arab societies were ruled under Shariah law, which essentially precludes autonomous and self-governing private organizations. Thus, while Western Europe was making its tortuous transition from arbitrary rule by monarchs to democratic rule of law, the Middle East retained authoritarian political structures. Such a political environment prevented democratic institutions from taking root and ultimately facilitated the rise of modern Arab dictatorships.

Strikingly, Shariah lacks the concept of the corporation, a perpetual and self-governing organization that can be used either for profit-making purposes or to provide social services. Islam’s alternative to the nonprofit corporation was the waqf, a trust established in accordance with Shariah to deliver specified services forever, through trustees bound by essentially fixed instructions. Until modern times, schools, charities and places of worship, all organized as corporations in Western Europe, were set up as waqfs in the Middle East.

A corporation can adjust to changing conditions and participate in politics. A waqf can do neither. Thus, in premodern Europe, politically vocal churches, universities, professional associations and municipalities provided counterweights to monarchs. In the Middle East, apolitical waqfs did not foster social movements or ideologies.

Starting in the mid-19th century, the Middle East imported the concept of the corporation from Europe. In stages, self-governing Arab municipalities, professional associations, cultural groups and charities assumed the social functions of waqfs. Still, Arab civil society remains shallow by world standards.
The development of the corporation was one, albeit significant, factor in the economic development of Europe. Kuran continues,
A less powerful business sector also hindered democracy. The Middle East reached the industrial era with an atomistic private sector unequipped to compete with giant enterprises that had come to dominate the global economy. Until then, Arab businesses consisted exclusively of small, short-lived enterprises established under Islamic partnership law. This was a byproduct of Islam’s egalitarian inheritance system, which aimed to spread wealth. Successful enterprises were typically dissolved when a partner died, and to avoid the consequent losses Arab businessmen kept their enterprises both small and transitory.

Arab businesses had less political clout than their counterparts in Western Europe, where huge, established companies contributed to civil society directly as a political force against arbitrary government. They also did so indirectly by supporting social causes. For example, during industrialization, major European businesses financed political campaigns, including the mass education and antislavery movements.

Since the late 19th century, commercial codes transplanted from abroad have enabled Arabs to form large, durable enterprises like major banks, telecommunications giants and retail chains. Still, Arab companies tend to be smaller relative to global norms, which limits their power vis-à-vis the state.
Kuran closes by saying,
A stronger civil society alone will not bring about democracy. After all, private organizations can promote illiberal and despotic agendas, as Islamist organizations that denounce political pluralism and personal freedoms demonstrate. But without a strong civil society, dictators will never yield power, except in the face of foreign intervention.

Independent and well-financed private organizations are thus essential to the success of democratic transitions. They are also critical to maintaining democracies, once they have emerged. Indeed, without strong private players willing and able to resist undemocratic forces, nascent Arab democracies could easily slip back into authoritarianism.
So development of a strong civil society with its long lasting corporations which includes a powerful business sector, all of which which acts as a counterweight to government, helps both economically as well as politically.

Broadband and productivity

New Zealand is to spend billions of dollars on ultra-fast broadband (UFB) and I have to ask why? Often the answer is that UFB will increase productivity and lend to greater employment.
The productivity boost from that investment would add 1.8 percent to GDP and create 70,000, the minister has said.
But will it? Below is the abstract from a Motu Working Paper, “The Need for Speed: Impacts of Internet Connectivity on Firm Productivity" by Arthur Grimes, Cleo Ren and Philip Stevens (Motu Working Paper 09-15 Motu Economic and Public Policy Research October 2009):
Fast internet access is widely considered to be a productivity-enhancing factor. Internet access speeds vary regionally within countries and even within cities. Despite articulate pleas for network upgrades to accelerate internet access, there is little rigorous research quantifying benefits to individual firms that arise from upgraded internet connectivity. We use a large New Zealand micro-survey of firms linked to unit record firm financial data to determine the impact that differing types of internet access have on firm productivity. Propensity score matching is used to control for factors, including the firm’s (lagged) productivity, that determine firms’ internet access choices. Having matched firms, we examine the productivity impacts that arise when a firm adopts different types (speeds) of internet connectivity. Broadband adoption is found to boost productivity but we find no productivity differences across broadband type. The results provide the first firm-level estimates internationally of the degree of productivity gains sourced from upgraded internet access.
The paper's conclusion reads, in part,
After estimating our prediction models for connectivity choices, we match each “treated” firm with a set of like “control” firms (both in terms of their estimated propensity to have broadband and on their observable characteristics). Two types of matching (kernel and stratified) are adopted to check robustness of results. We then estimate the average treatment effect for treated firms (ATT) across a range of samples. We focus on ATTs relating to shifts from: (i) broadband versus no broadband, (ii) slow versus no broadband, and (iii) fast versus slow broadband. We find a (levels) productivity effect of broadband relative to no broadband of approximately 10% across all firms. The estimates indicate a marginally stronger impact on firm productivity for firms in rural (low population density) relative to urban (high density) areas but the differences are not significantly different. Our estimates show that all of these productivity gains can be attributed to adoption of slow relative to no broadband, with no discernable additional effect arising from a shift from slow to fast broadband. (Emphasis added)
Thus we conclude that a shift to broadband connectivity (from dial-up) appears to raise firm productivity but a move from slow to fast broadband may have no effect on productivity at all.

A similar note is struck by Bronwyn Howell and Arthur Grimes ("Feeding a Need for Speed or Funding a Fibre ‘Arms Race’? Productivity Questions for FTTH Network Financiers", New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation, April 2010) when they write:
Fast internet access is widely considered to be a productivity-enhancing factor. However, despite promises of substantial gains from its deployment, the evidence from recent empirical studies suggests that the productivity gains may not be as large as originally hypothesised. If substantiated, these findings suggest that current government plans to apply significant sums to bring forward the deployment of fast fibre networks (e.g. in both Australia and New Zealand) may ultimately be unlikely to generate returns to the extent anticipated by their sponsors.
So, again, why are we spending billions on ulta-fast broadband? If we are to spend huge amounts of money on UFB I would at least want to know that there are good reasons for doing so. I'm not sure increases in productivity is such a reason.