Wednesday, 1 June 2011

Even more questions

Previously I had Questions and more questions from Bryan Caplan and Mark Perry. Now Sam Bowman at the Adam Smith Institute blog wants to ask his own questions:
3. An excess of supply in labour is usually called unemployment; minimum wage supporters deny that minimum wage laws create unemployment. What other goods can a price floor be set above the market price without creating an excess of supply?

4. Why don't you want minimum wage to be £20/hr, or £100/hr, or £1,000/hr? If wages can be set by government without any ill effects, why not solve most social problems simply by raising the minimum wage?
Again I'm sure there will be no answers forthcoming.

Tuesday, 31 May 2011

Interesting times

Lindsay Perigo writes at the Solo blog,
Perigo! followers will also have noted the empathy between Don Brash and me, even though I'm a 1000% libertarian and he's about a 65% one. In our present crisis, 65% will do me. Quite simply, I believe his becoming Act leader has brought a glimmer of hope to New Zealand's economic and political landscape, which otherwise was unfailingly bleak. I believe that, in these parlous, debt-ridden, Political Correctness-infested circumstances, everyone—including members of Libertarianz—concerned about stopping the rot and initiating a meaningful restart toward freedom and prosperity, should get in behind—on a suck-it-and-see basis, letting Don know that if he doesn't really try to deliver, or becomes captive to those notorious forces within Act alien to freedom and prosperity, then we'll all be out of there before you can say "Epsom." I say this as someone who has fought the conservatives and compulsionists within Act tooth and nail since its inception and delivered Libz, as leader, its highest party vote (by a factor of 600%) since its inception.
Well I never thought I would see the day, Lindsay Perigo a member of Act! I can't help thinking this will do more good for Act than it will do for Perigo. Perigo is being pragmatic by accepting that he has a better chance of achieving, at least part of, what he wants with Act than he has under the Libz banner. There will be battles between Perigo (and Brash) and the conservative elements of Act. Having Perigo around could help Brash in these battles. I guess the good thing to come from this is that it will strengthen the Liberal (in the classical meaning) faction of Act, which is all to the good. Returning Act to a truly Liberal party would be a good first move towards rejuvenating politics in New Zealand. A powerful Liberal voice has been missing from political discourse for far too long. I wish Perigo luck, he will surely need it.

Bad thinking on privatisation

In a recent posting on privatisation at his blog Roger Kerr writes
Thus in a recent letter to the Dominion Post, investment analyst Garth Ireland wrote:
Labour leader Phil Goff says that, under Labour, there will be no asset sales (May 2). He says: “It is economic madness. The power companies return $700 million in dividends every year – that is lost forever”. But is it?

Surely the sale price received today is equivalent to the future expected dividends? Nothing is lost. Dividends of $700m a year at a rate of return of, say, 10 per cent are equivalent to $7 billion today.

Mr Goff claims that the dividends “pay for 10,300 teachers, 12,600 new police officers or 33,000 hip replacements”. He can still spend the $7b sale proceeds or the $700m each year forever. They are equivalent.
This drew the following comment on the Dominion Post website:
“Surely the sale price received today is equivalent to the future expected dividends?” I think you sir may in fact not get it. “The future expected dividend” is infinite. Inflation happens, and so does increasing dividend.

If we sell it for 7 billion, that is ALL we ever get and it will end up like kiwi rail, run down by the owners to maximise profit. The 7 Billion will become worth less and less. And we will become asset poor.

If we keep it, the value will increase, dividends will increase as electricity becomes our primary fuel source (Oil crisis), and because we (the NZ government, and by default the NZ people) will invest in it, it will not become run down.

Would you sell your kidney for short term profit? I think you would. Think long term, thinking short term led to the current problems.
Kerr then makes the point that we need to think in terms of the discounted value of the future (infinite?) dividend stream. A dollar tomorrow is not worth the same as a dollar today.
The future expected dividend may indeed be infinite (if the SOE performs well). But what Garth Ireland was pointing out is that to compare the value of the asset to the Crown if it remained in public ownership with the value to the Crown of a sale, you have to discount the future (infinite) dividend stream to express it in net present value terms. People value a dollar today more than they value a dollar in 100 years’ time.

On that basis, the Crown’s financial position is no worse as a result of the sale.
Kerr also notes that the government could gain from a sale,
because the new private owners of the business are likely, on average, to operate it more efficiently, the Crown is likely to be better off financially (relative to keeping the asset) because in a competitive sale process it will capture some of the likely efficiency gains.
But there seems to be other problems with the quote from the Dominion’s website. First, obviously the future income stream is not infinite as this would require the firm to exist forever. Firms tend not to be around for that length of time. So we can't get the $700 million forever. Secondly the $7 billion is not all that we get if an SOE is sold as taxes on the private firm’s profits will be taken by the government. Thirdly there seems to be confusion as to the relationship between the dividends of $700 million per year and profit maximisation. The writer of the Dominion posting says “If we sell it for 7 billion, that is ALL we ever get and it will end up like kiwi rail, run down by the owners to maximise profit” which seems to indicate that the writer thinks maximising profits is a bad thing. But if the firm doesn’t maximise profits where does the writer think the dividends are going to come from? We only get the $700 million each year because the SOE sets out to maximise profits. So even if we have public ownership we still have to have profit maximisation to get the $700 million in dividends. So if it is bad for the private firm to maximise profits it must also be bad for the SOE to maximise profits, so we can have either profit maximisation by the SOE and the $700 million in dividends or non-profit maximisation by the SOE and miss out on the dividends. The actions of a profit maximising SOE will be the same as the actions of a profit maximising private firm. Both will do whatever they need to to maximise profits.

There are good reasons for not liking partial privatisation but those given in the comment on the Dominion Post website are not some of them. Kerr is right when he says,
One of the difficulties of debunking myths about privatisation is that some people do not get basic factual or economic points even when they are clearly explained.

Incentives matter: alarm clock file

The perfect gift for the economist who has everything:


Its one way I guess of finding out someone's willingness to pay for sleep.

(HT: Marginal Revolution)

Questions and more questions

Bryan Caplan asks
1. If the minimum wage is a good idea, shouldn't unpaid internships be illegal as well? If not, why not?

2. Name the main arguments in favor of the legality of unpaid internships. Aren't all of them equally good arguments for allowing people to work for wages greater than zero and less than the minimum wage?
While Mark Perry asks
1. If ticket scalping laws that make it illegal to sell a ticket to a concert or sporting event above face value are a good idea, shouldn't selling a coin, bond, car, or house above face value, sticker price or list price also be illegal as well? If not, why not?

2. Name the main arguments in favor of selling a coin, bond, car or house above face value/list price. Aren't all of them equally good arguments for allowing people to selling tickets above face value?
Not I think that anyone will bother to answer them.

EconTalk this week

William Easterly of New York University talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the oft-heard claim that poor countries led by autocrats grow faster than poor countries that are democratic. Drawing on a recent paper, "Benevolent Autocrats," Easterly argues that while some autocracies do indeed grow very quickly, a much greater number do not. Yet, the idea that the messiness of democracy is inferior to a dictatorship remains seductive. Easterly gives a number of arguments for the perennial appeal of autocracy as a growth strategy. The conversation closes with a discussion of the limitations of our knowledge about growth and where that leaves policymakers.

Monday, 30 May 2011

The GM nationalisation in review

In this Cato Daily Podcast Dan Ikenson reviews the nationalisation of G.M. by the U.S. government.

Entrepreneurs and university

What is the opportunity cost of university for entrepreneurs? John Tayor writes at the Economcis One blog:
On PBS NewsHour yesterday Peter Thiel argued that the opportunity cost of college may be surprisingly high for many students, and indeed, as widely reported this past week, he raised the opportunity cost for some impressive 20 Under 20 prize-winning entrepreneurs. Economist Richard Vedder was on Peter's side of the argument, and not so surprisingly Wesleyan University President Michael Roth was not.

But the opportunity cost argument is worth taking seriously, and the entrepreneurship example is certainly a good one for the introductory economics course. Ever since Tiger Woods took my Stanford Economics 1 course in 1996, I’ve started my text book and first lecture with the story about how he dropped out of Stanford and joined the pro tour after learning about opportunity cost from me. But in the 7th Edition (out this fall) we are using examples closer to Peter Thiel's (who also was a Stanford student).
It should be noted that along with Tiger Woods entrepreneurs like Mark Zuckerberg, Steve Jobs and Larry Ellison dropped out of university, to work on business opportunities. So not everyone needs to go to university, something that the government should think about, given its seeming obsession with having everyone at university.

New York University lands Paul Romer

A big catch for NYU. David Leonhardt writes at Economix:
New York University has landed a star economist: Paul Romer, a leading expert on economic growth, who has been at Stanford for the last 15 years. Mr. Romer has been a visiting professor at N.Y.U. this year.

Perhaps most interesting, Mr. Romer will run a new project — the Urban System Project, based at N.Y.U.’s Stern School of Business. As Mr. Romer recently wrote:
In the last 10,000 years, humans built cities to house 3 billion people. In this century, we will make room for another 3 to 6 billion. Because both the worldwide and urban population will stabilize this century, humans will never again have this chance to remake our system of cities.

Many of the people who will shape this process — national policy makers, mayors, corporate strategists, and managers of sovereign and private wealth — now see the city as a fundamental unit of social analysis. To use an analogy from software, cities are the modules of the modern world. Externally, they connect via such standardized interfaces as the shipping container, the airplane, the Internet. Internally, they can be diverse, experimental, and innovative. As they respond to technological and environmental change, new and restructured cities will be our most important source of social progress.
Romer is best known for this work on "endogenous growth" or the “new growth theory,” which emphasizes the role of technology in economic growth. His most recent work has been on what is called "charter cities". This is where in poor country would turn over a piece of land to be managed by a more affluent country or countries. One such model is Hong Kong. Sebastian Mallaby summarised the idea as:
Rather than betting that aid dollars can beat poverty, Romer is peddling a radical vision: that dysfunctional nations can kick-start their own development by creating new cities with new rules… By building urban oases of technocratic sanity, struggling nations could attract investment and jobs; private capital would flood in and foreign aid would not be needed.
Given some of the recent hires by NYU one wonders how much money they have to throw around on getting the best people.

World trade and the Doha Round: A deficit of political leadership

In this audio from VoxEU.org Peter Sutherland talks to Viv Davies about the final report of the high-level trade experts group, published this week, on 'World Trade and the Doha Round'. The report traces the imminent failure of the Doha Round back to what the authors consider to be "a deficit of political leadership"; they also make the case for why the WTO matters.

Sunday, 29 May 2011

Entrepreneurship, compensation, and the corporation

Henry Manne has a new paper in the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics (Vol. 14, No. 1, p.3–24, Spring 2011) on the above topic. The abstract is given below, note that use of insider trading as a method of compensation and for the encouragement of innovation.
This paper revisits the concept of entrepreneurship, which is frequently neglected in mainstream economics, and discusses the importance of defining and isolating this concept in the context of large, publicly held companies. Compensating for entrepreneurial services in such companies, ex ante or ex post, is problematic—almost by definition—despite the availability of devices such as stock and stock options. It is argued that insider trading can serve as a unique compensation device and encourage a culture of innovation.

Does management matter?

A question asked by Claire Brunel in the latest NBER Digest. She writes,
Do differences in management practices cause differences in firm performance? Although economists typically have believed that competition will simply drive badly managed firms out of the market, co-authors Nicholas Bloom, Benn Eifert, Aprajit Mahajan, David McKenzie, and John Roberts find that that is not the case, at least in the Indian textile industry.

In "Does Management Matter: Evidence from India" (NBER Working Paper No. 16658), the researchers analyze the results of an experiment conducted among large multi-plant textile firms in India. A randomly chosen set of plants received free consulting on modern management practices, while other plants in the industry did not. When the authors compare the performance of the plants that received management advice with those that did not, they find that adopting the recommended management practices had three main positive effects. First, it raised average productivity by 11 percent, through improved quality and efficiency and reduced inventory. The evidence suggests that firms spread the "good management" practices from their plants that received the advice to other plants that they owned.

Second, it increased decentralization of decision making: owners delegated more power over hiring, investment, and pay to their plant managers. This happened in large part because the improved collection and dissemination of information that was part of the change in management process enabled owners to monitor their plant managers better, making them feel more comfortable with delegating.

Third, it increased the use of computers, which were necessitated by the data collection and analysis that are involved in modern management. Increased computerization, in turn, raised the demand for educated employees.

Because these practices were profitable, the authors ponder why firms had not adopted them before. They find that informational barriers were a primary factor in explaining this lack of adoption. Firms were often not aware of the existence of many modern management practices, such as inventory norms and standard operating procedures, nor did they appreciate how these could improve performance.

Moreover, it appears that firms that are poorly managed are not rapidly driven from the Indian textile market. Indeed, competition is limited by constraints on firm entry and growth. Tariff protectionism prevents entry of foreign competition which would force domestic firms to adopt more efficient practices. And, trust issues prevent delegating, thereby limiting how much additional productivity better management technology can generate from a single manager.
A couple of things seem interesting here: one being that the reason for non-adoption of profitable management practices was asymmetric information. Firms were not aware of modern management practices. What then is the standard of management training in India? Surely any decent management programme would teach the "best practice" methods of management. The second point is the effects of tariff protection which keeps out foreign competition which would force the local companies to upgrade their management thinking. This is something not normally thought about when considering the downside of trade barriers.

Saturday, 28 May 2011

Tyler Cowen, America's hottest economist

Or so says Bloomberg Business Week, they have an article on Cowen here.

While a business magazine may reflect the public perception as to who's "hot" in economics, you may wonder who other economists would pick as the "hottest economist". According to this survey the top 3 economists under the age of 60 are: Paul Krugman, Greg Mankiw and Daron Acemoglu. Cowen comes in 16th on this list.

Technology and the academic world

Yes technology effects even the academic world. An announcement from the American Economic Association:
On April 15, 2011, the Executive Committee voted to drop “double-blind” refereeing for the Association’s journals. The change to “single-blind” refereeing (the referees’ identity remains undisclosed) is effective July 1, 2011. Easy access to search engines increasingly limits the effectiveness of the double-blind process in maintaining author anonymity. Double-blind refereeing also increases administrative costs of the journals and makes it harder for referees to identify an author’s potential conflicts of interest arising, for example, from consulting.
It will be interesting to see if there are any changes to the papers accepted by the AEA's journals from now on and thus it will allow a test of the effectiveness of double-bind refereeing.

Friday, 27 May 2011

When is insider trading legal?

For the U.S. at least, it appears it is when you're a politician. Valerie Richardson writes in The Washington Times:
An extensive study released Wednesday in the journal Business and Politics found that the investments of members of the House of Representatives outperformed those of the average investor by 55 basis points per month, or 6 percent annually, suggesting that lawmakers are taking advantage of inside information to fatten their stock portfolios.

“We find strong evidence that members of the House have some type of non-public information which they use for personal gain,” according to four academics who authored the study, “Abnormal Returns From the Common Stock Investments of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives.”

To the frustration of open-government advocates, lawmakers and their staff members largely have immunity from laws barring trading on insider knowledge that have sent many a private corporate chieftain to prison.
The obvious way to deal with this is make insider trading legal for everyone, not just a small select group.

But Richardson as notes,
Strict laws ban corporate executives from trading on their insider knowledge, but no restrictions exist for members of Congress. Lawmakers are permitted to keep their holdings and trade shares on the market, as well as vote on legislation that could affect their portfolio values.
One law for them and another for us.

What is the economic value of the internet?

Is a question asked by Tyler Cowen at Marginal Revolution. He is commenting on a new study of the value of the interest by McKinsey. He writes,
The study shows a few things:

1. Most of the economic benefits of the internet are in fact captured in current economic statistics, which I’ve already argued do not look so fabulous. The point is not to blame the internet, as without it things would have been worse. The point is that the internet gains, in absolute terms, haven’t been large enough to produce a rosy picture overall.

2. The direct and indirect economic effects of the internet account for 3.8% of U.S. gdp, as currently measured (p.15). That’s less than many people think and that value is already incorporated in the current gdp measure. The good news — and it is good news — is that there is lots of room for future growth from internet impact. We’ve yet to really organize our economy around the internet, as we someday will, and then the gains will be enormous. In the meantime we are waiting.

3. What about the unpriced consumer surplus gains from the internet? The study considers that too:
In general, this surplus is generated from the exceptional value users place on Internet services such as e-mail, social networks, search facilities, and online reservation services, among many others. This value far outweighs the costs, both actual costs such as access and subscription fees and annoyances such as spam, excessive advertising, and the need to disclose personal data for some services. In the United States, for example, research conducted with the Interactive Advertising Board found that consumers placed a value of almost €61 billion on the services they got from the Internet, while they would pay about €15 billion to get rid of the annoyances, suggesting a net consumer surplus of about €46 billion.
There are so many problems with the measurement of all aspects of the knowledge economy, not just the internet, - see Section 5 of this paper for a discussion of some of them - that I'm not sure what you can make of any such measurement exercise.

Interesting blog bits

  1. N. Stephan Kinsella on How Intellectual Property Hampers the Free Market
    Advocates of free-market capitalism commonly believe in the legitimacy of intellectual property (IP) because IP rights are thought to be important to a system of private property. But are they?
  2. Don Boudreaux says Beware of Celebrating Decreases in the Current-Account Deficit
    Keynesians – or, more generally, economists obsessed with aggregate demand – are fond of exports because foreigners’ expenditures on exports are demand for ‘our’ country’s goods and services. Aggregate-demand-obsessed economists also dislike imports because ‘our’ consumers’ expenditures on imports is demand, not for output produced at home but, rather, for output produced abroad. Unless that ‘demand’ returns to the home economy in the form of foreigners’ demand for ‘our’ exports, then aggregate-demand-obsessed economists are unhappy because the sum of C+I+G+[Xports-Mports] goes down. But .....
  3. Nico Voigtländer and Hans-Joachim Voth on The geography of hate: How anti-Semitism in interwar Germany was influenced by the medieval mass murder of Jews
    Is violence a cultural trait passed from one generation to the next? This column examines an extreme case – anti-Semitism in Germany. It shows that towns that murdered their Jews during the Black Death (1348-1350) were also much more likely to commit violence or engage in anti-Semitic acts in interwar Germany, nearly 600 years later. This suggests racial hatred can persist over centuries.
  4. Kevin K. Tsui on More oil, less democracy: Evidence from worldwide crude oil discoveries
    It has been widely argued that natural-resource wealth is a curse that leads to corrupt politicians, closed and illiberal societies, and defunct economies. This column presents new evidence on the political impacts of oil wealth. It argues that the effects depend on geology and history, shedding light on the recent uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa.
  5. Nicola Lacetera, Devin Pope and Justin Sydnor on Limited attention costs: Sometimes driving a mile costs $200
    People like to take shortcuts and this affects how we make decisions. Looking at auctions of more than 22 million used cars in the US, this column finds that buyers will often only pay attention to the first few digits of mileage. So if you have driven your car 30,000 miles, you might have to sell it for $200 less than if you had driven in 29,999 miles.
  6. Gary Becker on Subsidies to Oil and Other Energy Sources
    President Obama and members of Congress are calling for a sharp reduction in the substantial direct subsidies to American oil companies. Many countries also give an indirect subsidy to oil producers and refiners by subsidizing the purchase of gasoline. In Saudi Arabia, for example, subsidies have reduced the price of a liter of gasoline (1 gallon equals about 3 ¾ liters) to 12 cents, which had made gasoline there cheaper than bottled water. The largest subsidies to gasoline are usually found in oil producing countries: Saudi Arabia, Iran (although the Iranian government greatly reduced gasoline subsidies in 2010), Russia, Venezuela, Indonesia, and the UAE. Yet, the economic case for either direct or indirect subsidies to the production and refining of oil is quite weak.
  7. Justin Wolfers on Google's New Correlation Mining Tool: It Works!
    You may have heard of Google Trends. It’s a cool tool which will show you the ups-and-downs of the public’s interest in a particular topic—at least as revealed in how often we search for it.
  8. David Friedman on Learning from Evidence: Not
    This morning I listened to a commencement address by a former judge. It struck me as an interesting example of the failure to modify beliefs on the basis of evidence.
  9. Mark Perry notes that Global Sticks Moves from China to Thunder Bay
    Why has Global Sticks, a manufacturer of wooden ice cream sticks, moving from Dalian, China to Thunder Bay, Ontario? It’s the kind of low margin manufacturing that is never supposed to come back after it leaves North America for cheaper labour abroad.

Thursday, 26 May 2011

Needed: plain talk about the dollar

Or so says Christina Romer who seems to have gone back to being an economist rather than an economic advisor. In an article in the New York Times she says,
Our exchange rate is just a price — the price of the dollar in terms of other currencies. It is not controlled by anyone. And a high price for the dollar, which is what we mean by a strong dollar, is not always desirable.
She continues,
Such discussions would start with some basic economics. The desire to trade with other countries or invest in them is what gives rise to the market for foreign exchange. You need euros to travel in Spain or to buy a German government bond, so you need a way to exchange currencies.

The supply of dollars to the foreign exchange market comes from Americans who want to buy goods, services or assets from abroad. The demand for dollars comes from foreigners who want to buy from the United States.

Anything that increases the demand for dollars or reduces the supply drives up the dollar’s price. Anything that lowers the demand for dollars or raises the supply causes the dollar to weaken.

Consider two examples. Suppose American entrepreneurs create many products that foreigners want to buy, and start many companies they want to invest in. That will increase the demand for dollars and so cause the dollar’s price to rise. Such innovation will also make Americans want to buy more goods and assets in the United States — and fewer abroad. The supply of dollars to the foreign exchange market will fall, further strengthening the dollar. This example describes very well the conditions of the late 1990s — when the dollar was indeed strong.

Now suppose the United States runs a large budget deficit that causes domestic interest rates to rise. Higher American interest rates make both foreigners and Americans want to buy more American bonds and fewer foreign bonds. Thus the demand for dollars increases and the supply decreases. The price of the dollar will again rise.

[ ... ]

Both developments — brilliant American innovation and troublesome American budget deficits — caused the dollar to strengthen. Yet one is clearly a positive for the American economy, the other a negative. The point is that there is no universal good or bad direction for the dollar to move. The desirability of any shift in the exchange rate depends on why the dollar is moving.
And this is the point, the exchange rate like any price just tells what the relative demand for the dollar is, but it doesn't tell us anything about whether this is a good or bad thing. The question that must be asked is, Why is the dollar "strong" or "weak"? The answer to this question will tell us if we should be worried about the state of the economy. The exchange rate is just a price, at best a signal of the underlying condition of the economy.

The minimum wage, again

The effects of the minimum wage are not the same across all groups in society. The effects of labour market wage mandates fall disproportionally on minority groups. In the case of the U.S. this means the effects are felt mainly by blacks. Getting good estimates of this effect is difficult due to the lack of sufficiently comprehensive data.

A new study from the Employment Policies Institute, by economists William Even (Miami University) and David Macpherson (Trinity University), overcomes this problem by amassing a dataset from the years 1994 to 2010 that includes over 600,000 data observations —including a robust sample of minority young adults.

There was in the U.S. something of a “natural experiment” created by the substantial interstate variation in the minimum wage between 1994 and 2010. The focus of the study was on 16-to-24 year-old males without a high school diploma, a group that previous studies suggest are particularly susceptible to wage mandates. The authors control for labour market and demographic differences when estimating the effects of wage mandates on minority groups.

The finding of the study suggest that among white males in this group, each 10 percent increase in a federal or state minimum wage decreased employment by 2.5 percent; for Hispanic males, the figure is 1.2 percent. But among black males in this group, each 10 percent increase in the minimum wage decreased employment by 6.5 percent. So employment for all groups falls with the fall being greatest for blacks and least for Hispanics. Looking at the p-values for the estimated elasticities of employment with respect to changes in the minimum wage you will see that the elasticities for men are significantly different from 0 for whites and blacks, but not for Hispanics. So the effect on Hispanic males could be zero.

The substantial disemployment effects that emerge from the data raise an obvious question: Why do black males suffer more harm from wage mandates than their white or Hispanic counterparts? The study argues that blacks are more likely to be employed in eating and drinking places–nearly one out of three black young adults without a high school diploma works in the industry. Businesses in this industry generally have narrow profit margins and are more likely to be adversely impacted by a wage mandate. There’s also substantial variation in regional location, as black young adults are overwhelmingly located in the South and in urban areas. It's also likely that unobserved differences in skill level and job experience play a role. To the extent that these differences are concentrated among young men of a particular race or ethnicity, this group would have the greatest risk of losing jobs when the minimum wage is increased.

Property rights are?

Yesterday's blog on copyright raised interesting questions about the very nature of property itself. Many convinced free-marketeers and libertarians seem to believe that 'property rights' are undeniable, permanent and immutable, and endow them with an almost mystical quality. I see the crucial importance of property rights as well: you can't expect people to work hard and build up capital if it can simply be stolen by others, including politicians. Property is one of the foundations of a liberal social order.

But as Milton Friedman (no leftie, he) pointed out in Capitalism and Freedom, defining what constitutes property is problematic, and often controversial. Should my ownership of a piece of land, he asks, deny others the right to fly over it in an aircraft? Precisely what rights should the shareholders of a company have? And, indeed, what should be the rules on patents or copyright? Terence Kealey, another robust liberal, argues that there should be no patents (most inventions are hard to replicate and the financial reward tends to come early), but that there should be copyright (since words are almost costless for others to replicate).

Plainly, these things are matters of judgement. They are decided in a social context. It might be a kind of natural evolution, as Hayek suggests, in which particular property rules come to be adopted, almost without thinking, because they work and support the smooth functioning of a society. It may be that the rules evolve through the common law process. (The most wonderful examples here are those regarding property disputes between neighbours, which have left us with rules such as, yes, you can cut down the branches of a neighbour's tree that spreads over your garden, but you have to offer them back the wood!). Sometimes the rights are defined in statute, as with shareholders' rights – thought that can be more hit and miss in terms of getting the balances just right.
This is Eamonn Butler writing at the Adam Smith Institute blog. An important point about property rights is that they be known and certain. Freedom from being expropriated by some political majority is important if people are to act to maximise the value of such rights. And if transaction costs are low and the rights tradeable Coase tells us that people will trade such rights until the highest valuer of those right has them. But we are still left with the problem of what exactly property rights should be and how we decide on that.