- Eric Crampton on Stat of the week.
The Christchurch Press runs a story by Jason Krupp arguing that tobacco costs the New Zealand public health system $7 billion per year. Just how likely is that number?!
- Sam Richardson asks Rugby World Cup as a "financial success" - for whom?
Not the New Zealand taxpayer.
- Rachel Campbell, Kees Koedijk and Meir Statman on Aspirations, wellbeing, risk-aversion, and loss-aversion
Does more money always make you happy? This column argues that financial wellbeing is distinct from income. People with low income can enjoy financial wellbeing as high as people with high incomes as long as their aspirations do not exceed their incomes.
- Andrea Boltho and Wendy Carlin ask The problems of European monetary union – asymmetric shocks or asymmetric behaviour?
Divergent behaviour from Eurozone countries that have very different economic, social, and political structures is threatening the existence of the single currency. This column argues that the Eurozone is a fragile bureaucratic creation that has hardly ever raised much popular enthusiasm anywhere. If behaviour across the area remains as asymmetric as it has been over the last decade or so, the project could run into even stronger headwinds in the long run.
- Art Carden explains How Starbucks Made My Friday and Taught Me About Economic Progress
Wow. I think this is one of the coolest things I’ve ever seen: it’s a little green plug/stir stick that fits neatly into the lid of the Venti dark roast I’m enjoying. I think I vaguely recall having seen one before, but I don’t know for certain. This I do know: a seemingly mundane little innovation that few people probably even notice has made my life appreciably better by keeping my coffee hot and by keeping it from spilling. According to the baristas who served me today, a Starbucks employee invented it.
- Tim Worstall on FLA’s Report on Apple and Foxconn: Little Found and Even Less To Do
So we’ve now had the first installment of the Fair Labour Association’s report on the working conditions at Apple’s supplier Foxconn in China. They’ve found very little that should surprise or concern anyone and there’s even less to do to put matters to rest.
- Nicolai Foss on Economists, (Hard) Data, and (Soft) Data
Economists have typically been suspicious of data generated by (mail, telephone) surveys and interviews, and have idolized register data. The former are soft and mushy data, the latter are hard and serious ones. I have always been a bit sceptical regarding whether the traditional economist’s suspicion of soft data is really that well-founded;
- Arnold Kling on Ed Glaeser on Job Creation
New firms are important for job creation.
Sunday, 1 April 2012
Interesting blog bits
Cowen on blogging
The Kauffman Foundation has released this sketchbook featuring Tyler Cowen's thoughts on blogging.
Saturday, 31 March 2012
Labour's good intentions led to bad youth unemployment
Or so Eric Crampton tells us in the NBR. Interestingly the picture the NBR use of Eric looks like it was taken in the Staff Club. What does this tell you aboot Eric!!!
More seriously, Eric writes,
More seriously, Eric writes,
Something strange started happening to youth unemployment rates starting around December of 2008.and
The global recession had started in earnest, but seemed to be nowhere in New Zealand’s unemployment statistics – at least among adults.
The adult unemployment rate hit 3.3% in 2008’s December quarter; not alarmingly higher than it had been in the prior few years.
But the unemployment rate for 16 and 17 year olds, which had always tracked a fairly predictable but noisy path above the adult unemployment rate, instead took a jump.
Where we might have expected a youth unemployment rate around 14%, it instead touched 20%.
Two quarters later, when adult unemployment rates hit 4.5%, and we would have expected youth unemployment rates around 16%, the youth unemployment rate instead hit 27%.
What might have caused youth and adult unemployment outcomes to take such divergent paths? One explanation, and I think the correct one, is the Labour government’s abolition of the differential lower youth minimum wage effective April 2008.Demand curves do slope downwards. Eric continues,
Youth unemployment rates did not spike immediately afterwards, but neither would we have expected them to; employers are not likely to fire youths en masse with a change in the minimum wage, but they are likely to avoid hiring younger and riskier workers when more experienced and similarly-priced alternatives are available. And they’re also likely to stop creating the kinds of jobs that can usefully be done by lower-paid youths.
It’s always possible that something else caused the change, but it’s not easy to come up with a “something else” that either has the right timing, the right age targeting, or is big enough to plausibly have done the job.Those who wish to claim that the abolition of the youth minimum wage didn't cause the divergence in unemployment rates have the challenge of coming up with the "something else". There must be some labour economists out there who can raise to the occasion.
How not to argue against partial asset sales
I think there are good economic reasons for arguing against partial sales of SOEs. Full privatisation is a better idea. But what I don't get is why the anti-sale movement never seem to use good arguments. As this example from The Standard show most of their arguments don't stack-up.
Firstly: the Mixed Ownership Model Bill. If we want to stop Asset Sales, as many submissions as possible would be a good start. So click on the link to submit.The first argument isn't a good economic argument against sales, How many New Zealanders really understand the economic issues underlying asset sales? It may be a political argument against sales but that's a different thing. As to the second argument, if some of the returns are capital appreciation, How do we realise these results without a sale of assets? Also we get a lump-sum form the sale which compensates for the loss of dividends. For point 3, again we get a lump sum, which if the asset is sold efficiently, will equal the present value of the dividend stream. Looking at point 4, as I have noted before New Zealanders don't own the assets. Point 5 amounts to xenophobia and to not realising that if ownership goes overseas it is because overseas buyers can utilise the assets more efficiently. Why else would have pay more for them? And why does foreign ownership mean higher prices and fewer job? If prices can be raised and jobs cut then why wouldn't a New Zealand owner do exactly the same thing as a foreign owner? For point 6 see the comments for point 5. As to point 7, Why is this true? Where are these "tens of thousands of good green jobs"? And why would different ownership alter the incentives for companies to create these jobs if there really is an economic justification for such jobs? "Intergenerational theft"?!!! Given a sensible method of sale, the sale price will equal the present value of the future income stream and thus it not clear what future generations will lose. What is the empirical basis for point 9? How do companies make profits by not selling their product? Doesn't point 10 contradict point 9? Point 9 seems to say that private power companies will supply less power while point 10 says they will produce more! Both can't be true. What effect will ownership of the power companies have on point 11? Water ownership will be in dispute no matter who owns the power companies. And as to point 12,, privatisation will not solve all our economic problems, no one policy can, who it could help solve some of our problems by leading to a more efficient use of resources.
Some points you may wish to make in your submission:
- A majority of New Zealanders oppose the partial privatisation of New Zealand’s best state-owned assets;
- It makes no fiscal sense to sell assets earning 18% (capital appreciation and dividends) to pay down debt costing 4%;
- Treasury’s 2012 Budget Policy Statement says that in 2016 the lost dividends from privatisation are $94m greater than the savings in reduced interest payments;
- It is unfair to sell assets that currently belong to all New Zealanders to a small minority who will be able to afford to buy shares;
- Partial privatisation is an inevitable prelude to foreign ownership of a large chunk of our energy companies. That will mean high power prices, dividends flowing overseas, and fewer jobs;
- Individual energy assets, like Manapouri power station, can be sold off under the legislation into full foreign ownership and control;
- The renewable energy sector is growing rapidly internationally. We own the companies that have the critical mass, the expertise, and the capital to take advantage of that growth and create tens of thousands of good green jobs here in New Zealand. Privatisation will end that opportunity.
- Selling the assets is a form of intergenerational theft. One generation will sell the assets that past generations have built up and future generations will not have the fruits of that.
- Power cuts are more common with private energy companies – they are more concerned with profit than continual energy supply.
- Greenhouse gas emissions are likely to rise – privatised companies are incentivised to try and increase our energy use (and their profits). Which will hardly help us keep our commitments.
- Water ownership is in dispute – Maori are filing for customary rights to water. Mighty River may not have full rights to the Waikato River.
- Privatisation will not solve our economic problems.
Friday, 30 March 2012
Excessive risk-taking by banks
Many people have argued that risk-taking by banks played a critical role in the global crisis and Eurozone crisis. A new eReport released today by CEPR – edited by Mathias Dewatripont and Xavier Freixas – explores the origins of excessive risk-taking by banks. The book comprises four substantial chapters (in addition to the introduction that nicely summarises these four and puts the analysis into a broader context). From a column at VoxEU.org we get the following summaries of the chapters,
In principle, banks do what their managers decide and managers, in turn, are controlled by a board of directors. Excessive risk-taking must therefore involve a breakdown in control, or desire on the part of the board to encourage such activity. For example, strategic decisions by managers may be motived by consideration of their own bonuses, short-term stock price movements, or shareholders’ short-run interests (rather than stakeholders’ long-run ones). This line of reasoning directs attention to the structure of financial institutions’ corporate governance as one source of excessively risky behaviour.
- Corporate governance, by Hamid Mehran, Alan Morrison, and Joel Shapiro
Mehran, Morrison, and Shapiro argue that corporate governance may be especially weak due to the multiplicity of stakeholders (insured and uninsured depositors, the deposit insurance company, bond holders, subordinate debt-holders and hybrid securities holders), and the complexity of banks’ operations. Moreover the moral hazard created by the too-big-to-fail situation may have led boards to encourage risk-taking as they knew that big losses would be paid largely by taxpayers rather than stakeholders. The authors also look at banks’ executive compensation schemes and the composition of boards.
The boom-bust cycles in banking are at least in part caused by the procyclical availability of cheap funding and capital. In boom-times, funding is cheap and easy to get; in bust-times it is dear and scarce. This obviously procyclical nature of bank lending in the years before, during, and after the crisis has produced a consensus that banks should face anticyclical capital buffers to both reduce the size of the next boom and mitigate the damage during the next bust. The authors focus on one aspect of this, namely the question of whether and how much additional capital should be required during excessive credit growth phases, and how these excessive credit growth phases are to be identified. They study how the Basel III regulatory framework proposes to tackle the issue and the extent to which the rules accomplish their objectives.
- Procyclicality, by Rafael Repullo and Jesus Saurina
The Basel III countercyclical provisions require higher capital-to-loan ratios when the credit-to-GDP ratio deviates from its trend. Their analysis, however, shows this works the wrong way for a majority of nations; the deviations are negatively correlated with GDP growth. In short, banks that follow the deviation from trend rule may actually be pursuing a procyclical rather than a countercyclical capital policy. The authors propose a simpler rule – the credit growth rate.
Prior to the crisis, market discipline was thought to be the perfect complement to supervision – channelling funds to sound institutions while penalising excessive risk-takers. The crisis has changed that view; most regulators and academics now see market discipline as a weak force. The authors of this chapter consider various theoretical aspects of how imperfections could gum up the information transmission – the key ingredient of market discipline. In addition to systemic problems, the situation worsens during a crisis because both firms and issuers have incentives to hide bad information.
- Disclosure, transparency and market discipline, by Xavier Freixas and Christian Laux
The market’s main sources of information are firms’ financial reports and credit rating agencies and the authors address a number of reproaches levelled at both. On the financial reporting, the use of fair value analysis has come in for strong criticisms as it caused firms to write down asset falls as the markets collapsed with this leading to eroded capital and heightened uncertainty. The authors however argue that fair value is not much to blame as it only affects banks’ trading portfolios and there is substantial discretion for banks to suspend it if the losses are considered temporary. They are more critical when it comes to credit rating agencies, concluding that these profit-maximising firms are in an institutional setting that inadequately deals with conflicts of interests. They call for more regulation of credit rating agencies to redress this.
The last chapter addresses systems for taking banks into bankruptcy since beliefs about what happens when all goes wrong do affect risk-taking. If distressed bank are bailed out, risk-taking is never too risky for the bank. Banks are bailed out to avoid the high social costs of such failures. The first objective of regulation is therefore to reduce the cost of bankruptcies; this is the main focus of the last chapter.
- The banking resolution regime, by Xavier Freixas and Mathias Dewatripont
Banking resolution, according to the authors, should be thought of as a bargaining game between shareholders and regulators. Shareholders want to maximise the value of their shares while regulatory authorities’ main objective is to preserve financial stability at the lowest possible cost. Given this, time plays against the regulatory authority. The authors thus argue for bankruptcy rules that are specially crafted for the banking sector (and different from those applying to non-financial corporations).
The authors also argue that time is of the essence, even with the perfectly efficient bankruptcy procedure. Banks in distress should be quickly closed or quickly bailed out. The chapter’s examination of banking crises in different countries shows great variety in the procedures followed and conclude that theory has no clear-cut recommendations to offer.
Plainly the design of the bank resolution mechanisms is critical. One proposal is to add a layer of capital to prevent future crises, but the authors defend the possibilities opened by contingent capital (like contingent convertibles and capital insurance). They argue that these types of mechanisms would preserve the best characteristics of debt and therefore limit moral hazard. The authors conclude by considering cross-country resolution and the challenges it implies and discuss the recent changes in the European banking resolution framework.
Thursday, 29 March 2012
Contraception and the gender wage gap
From the Freakonomics blog:
The male-female wage gap narrowed considerably during the 1980s and 1990s, thanks to increased educational attainment among women and an influx of women into high-earning fields. Factors such as the Women’s Movement and the 1964 Civil Rights Act are often cited as the drivers of this shift, but economists are also narrowing in on another influence: the Pill. Economists have linked the Pill to “delays in marriage (among college goers) and motherhood, changes in selection into motherhood, increased educational attainment, labor-force participation, and occupational upgrading among college graduates.”Now in a new NBER working paper Martha J. Bailey, Brad Hershbein and Amalia R. Miller look at The Opt-In Revolution? Contraception and the Gender Gap in Wages:
Decades of research on the U.S. gender gap in wages describes its correlates, but little is known about why women changed their career paths in the 1960s and 1970s. This paper explores the role of “the Pill” in altering women’s human capital investments and its ultimate implications for life-cycle wages. Using state-by-birth-cohort variation in legal access to contraception, we show that younger access to the Pill conferred an 8-percent hourly wage premium by age fifty. Our estimates imply that the Pill can account for 10 percent of the convergence of the gender gap in the 1980s and 30 percent in the 1990s.The paper's results suggest that the Pill's power to transform childbearing from probabilistic to planned shifted women's career decisions and compensation for decades to come.
Wednesday, 28 March 2012
Too big to fail
This is from an interesting post by Jerry O’Driscoll at ThinkMarkets:
The issue of banks viewed as too big to fail has been taken up several times on this site. In its Annual Report, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas has weighed in on the topic with an essay on “Choosing the Road to Prosperity: Why We Must End Too Big to Fail – Now.”It is good to see that one of the banks that make up the Federal Reserve system is making the argument for ending TBTF.
It is authored by Harvey Rosenblum, the bank’s Director of Research. Since Richard Fisher, the bank’s president, signed off on the annual report, one presumes he endorses the substance of the essay.
It is a very hard-hitting piece, arguing that “the vitality of our capitalist system and the long-run prosperity it produces hang in the balance.” It explains why TBTF is “a perversion of capitalism,” which undermines faith in markets. Rosenblum quotes Allan Meltzer on point: “Capitalism without failure is like religion without sin.”
More bloggers really are needed
Over at Groping towards Bethlehem the point is made that a blog really becomes a blog when other blogs link to /recognise it. That is, when a blog becomes part of a conversation. But as has been noted before conversations on New Zealand blogs on specialised bits of economic policy, or even more so economic theory, are limited because few of those economists who blog are working in the same area. Thin markets don't help create a blogosphere. The overlap in expertise/interests of Anti-Dismal, Offsetting Behaviour, TVHE, Groping towards Bethlem and Fair Play and Forward Passes is too thin to generate the interplay of ideas and opinions needed to create and sustain ongoing conversions.
In short, we just need more New Zealand economics blogs!
In short, we just need more New Zealand economics blogs!
Tuesday, 27 March 2012
Public Choice - A Primer
There is a new short book out from the IEA on Public Choice - a Primer by Eamonn Butler.
'Market failure' is a term widely used by politicians, journalists and university and A-level economics students and teachers. However, those who use the term often lack any sense of proportion about the ability of government to correct market failures. This arises from the lack of general knowledge - and the lack of coverage in economics syllabuses - of Public Choice economics.
Public Choice economics applies realistic insights about human behaviour to the process of government, and is extremely helpful for all those who have an interest in - or work in - public policy to understand this discipline. If we assumes that at least some of those involved in the political process - whether elected representatives, bureaucrats, regulators, public sector workers or electors - will act in their own self-interest rather than in the general public interest, it should give us much less confidence that the government can 'correct' market failure.
This complex area of economics has been summarised in a very clear primer by Eamonn Butler. The author helps the reader to understand the limits of the government's ability to correct market failure and also explains the implications of public choice economics for the design of systems of government - a topic that is highly relevant in contemporary political debate.
Easterly on Acemoglu and Robinson
Bill Easterly reviews Acemoglu and Robinson new book "Why Nations Fail" in the Wall Street Journal. He writes,
Far too much intellectual firepower regarding the global poor these days focuses on the (small) things Westerners can do to help—obsessing about, say, how much money to spend on mosquito-blocking bed nets to fight malaria. The bigger questions—about why some societies prosper and others don't, about how to improve the lot of an entire impoverished class—are left by default largely to uncritical admirers of China's growth. The arrival of "Why Nations Fail" is thus a hugely welcome event, since economists Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson take on the big questions and in doing so present a substantial alternative to the dominant thinking about global poverty.and
"Why Nations Fail" also offers this crucial insight: Experts cannot engineer prosperity with the right advice to rulers on policies and institutions. Rulers "get it wrong not by mistake or ignorance but on purpose." Change happens only when a broad coalition revolts, forcing the elite to allow more pluralistic political competition (e.g., the Glorious Revolution in England, the Meiji overthrow of Japanese feudalism and Botswana's democratic ouster of British colonizers).A couple of interesting points that Easterly raises are a challenge to the current methodological fad of randomized controlled experiments in development economics and a methodological objection to the use of comparative historical case studies. He is concerned about "cherry picking" on the one hand, and "ex post rationalization" on the other.
EconTalk this week
Don Boudreaux of George Mason University talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the nature of public debt. One view is that there is no burden of the public debt as long as the purchasers of U.S. debt are fellow Americans. In that case, the argument goes, we owe it to ourselves. Drawing on the work of James Buchanan, particularly his book Public Principles of Public Debt: A Defense and Restatement, Boudreaux argues that there is a burden of the debt and it is borne by future taxpayers. Boudreaux argues that all public expenditures have a cost--the different financing mechanisms simply determine who bears the burden of that cost. Boudreaux discusses the political attractiveness of debt finance because the taxes lie in the future and those who will pay for them may not be clearly identified. The conversation closes with a discussion of the role of expectations in both politics and economics of debt finance.
Monday, 26 March 2012
Should governments regulate monopolies?
In this video from Learn Liberty Lynne Kiesling talks about government regulation of monopolies, essentially laying out Schumpeter’s argument that when entry costs are low, monopolies do not persist because monopoly profit serves as a lure to entice entrepreneurs and innovators to create new value propositions that break down market barriers and definitions.
More bloggers needed?
Eric Crampton makes the point that,
In some situations size really does matter.
Eric goes on to say,
None of this mean we don't want more economists blogging, more economists can only raise the standard of economic commentary here in New Zealand. The big question is how to get them to take it up. May be having a blog should be a requirement for getting a PhD in econ!!
The Economist says America's number one in EconBlogging. Why? They have a blogosphere, where Europe only has blogs. It's the links and the discussion that makes the whole thing worthwhile.He later notes that,
New Zealand's getting better. Paul Walker and the TVHE team drew me in, and together we dragged in Seamus (occasionally), Bill Kaye-Blake, and now Sam Richardson. Let's hope we can pull a few other folks into the conversation.One question worth asking is, What percentage of US economists blog as compared to New Zealand economists? I mean does the US have an economics "blogosphere" simply because it has the majority of economists? Even if New Zealand had the same percentage of economists blogging as the US we still wouldn't have an economics blogsphere simply because of the much smaller number of economists here.
In some situations size really does matter.
Eric goes on to say,
How did America make it work? The Economist's R.A.:If buy-in from important economists matters then we are in big trouble as we simply don't have any here. If on the other hand it is the "aggressive horde of strivers" that matters, then we are in trouble again because as noted above our horde is just too small. If Europe can't do it, what chance for NZ?
How did America's economics blogosphere develop the necessary density? Early buy-in by important economists mattered, but the growth of the community has been more driven, in my opinion, by an aggressive horde of strivers. Economists, journalists, and would-be pundits with less access to traditional outlets (newspapers, conferences, and journals) were attracted by the low barriers to entry of the web. This ready group of writers created sufficient "liquidity" of opinion to drive an effective conversation, the value of which has subsequently pulled in other respected voices.
None of this mean we don't want more economists blogging, more economists can only raise the standard of economic commentary here in New Zealand. The big question is how to get them to take it up. May be having a blog should be a requirement for getting a PhD in econ!!
Friday, 23 March 2012
Hutchison on Smith
The way Adam Smith evaluated the role of government in the economy is often misinterpreted. Recently I came across this comment by Terence Hutchison,
However, The Wealth of Nations was, as Viner emphasised, 'an evaluating and crusading book', which sharply criticised existing society and government, and argued strongly for changes in national policy' (1968, p. 326). Smith was crusading, of course, against the excessive activities of monarchical, aristocratic and highly nationalistic governments, and for a greatly expanding role for the invisible hand.This view seems to argue for anti-government view of Smith (or at least an anti-government-as-Smith-knew-it view). But Hutchison then adds,
At the same time Smith wanted to retain a wide-ranging economic agenda for government, the precise extent of which had to be decided by empirical, case-by-case studies. He would have rejected fundamentally any conjecture that the invisible hand, or any other system, could produce perfect efficiency for a real-world economy. In his ideas, thought and method, Smith -abhorred the perfection, or extremes, which 'the man of system' sought so eagerly to promote.Such a case-by-case method of evaluation looks somewhat like a Coaseian comparative institutional analysis approach.
Thursday, 22 March 2012
The costs of treating smokers, the obese and the healthy
From an interesting post from LifestyleReviews.
In 2008 the Dutch government looked into the cost of treating people from the age of 20 to death. They had three categories, the healthy, obese and smokers. The results were not what the health gurus were looking for, the paper says:This will make the healthists feel unwell.
“Until age 56 annual health expenditure was highest for obese people. At older ages, smokers incurred higher costs. Because of differences in life expectancy, however, lifetime health expenditure was highest among healthy-living people and lowest for smokers. Obese individuals held an intermediate position. Alternative values of epidemiologic parameters and cost definitions did not alter these conclusions.”
The lifetime costs were in Euros:
Healthy: 281,000
Obese: 250,000
Smokers: 220,000
EconTalk this week
Daron Acemoglu of MIT and author (with James Robinson) of Why Nations Fail talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the ideas in his book: why some nations fail and others succeed, why some nations grow over time and sustain that growth, while others grow and then stagnate. Acemoglu draws on an exceptionally rich set of examples over space and time to argue that differences in institutions--political governance and the inclusiveness of the political and economic system--explain the differences in economics success across nations and over time. Acemoglu also discusses how institutions evolve and the critical role institutional change plays in economic success or failure. Along the way, he explains why previous explanations for national economic success are inadequate. The conversation closes with a discussion of the implications of the arguments for foreign aid and attempts by the wealthy nations to help nations that are poor.
Monday, 19 March 2012
How not to argue against prison privatisation
From Stuff we learn that
I just wish Charles Chauvel had read my posts. If he has he would have have argued as follows,
The overall number of jobs in the economy will not be much affected by the privatisation plan. There will be fewer jobs in some sectors of the economy and regions of New Zealand, but there will be more jobs in other sectors and other regions. Also seeing prisons as some sort of regional development plan seems weird, it makes imprisoning people look like a good thing that should be encouraged!
The questions Chauvel should be asking are to do with what can be contracted upon. The issues with prison privatisation arise because of the incomplete nature of the contract the government will sign with the prison provider.
Prime Minister John Key has confirmed old regional prisons are set to close and be replaced with a new privately-built prison at Wiri, in South Auckland.I have written on prison privatisation before, see for example here, and have pointed out the good and bad points of prison privatisation.
I just wish Charles Chauvel had read my posts. If he has he would have have argued as follows,
Labour's justice spokesman Charles Chauvel said Wiri was expected to cost the taxpayer about $1 billion over 25 years but its "indirect" costs were becoming clear and were "disturbing".Indirect costs? And how are these "costs" disturbing?
"National seems to have made a decision that, rather than refurbish many regional state-owned institutions, it will simply close them. Prison closures will be a big blow to regional economies. Job losses will be significant."
The overall number of jobs in the economy will not be much affected by the privatisation plan. There will be fewer jobs in some sectors of the economy and regions of New Zealand, but there will be more jobs in other sectors and other regions. Also seeing prisons as some sort of regional development plan seems weird, it makes imprisoning people look like a good thing that should be encouraged!
The questions Chauvel should be asking are to do with what can be contracted upon. The issues with prison privatisation arise because of the incomplete nature of the contract the government will sign with the prison provider.
Friday, 16 March 2012
Hold-up or stupidity?
Or both? Over at his blog Fairplay and Forward Passes Sam Richardson writes on one of the all time great hospital passes, the bailout of the Otago Rugby Football Union (ORFU) in large part by the Dunedin City Council (DCC).
Sam writes,
But is it hold-up? After all for hold-up to occur you need a contract to renegotiate but do the ORFU and the stadium have a contract for the Otago ITM Cup team to play there? The answer may be no. Richardson continues,
So the DCC put a lot of ratepayer money into a stadium without having contracts in place to make sure that the only big revenue stream they have would in fact be available. Without rugby the stadium is finished, even with rugby the stadium's future isn't great, but without it the stadium is a gone burger and yet there were no contracts for any rugby at the stadium. What were people thinking?!
And what incentives does the bail out give for the Highlanders? As Sam puts it,
Sam writes,
[ ... ] the tipping point wasnt't due to money being coughed up by a benevolent benefactor, rather it was the Forsyth Barr Stadium, the fear of losing a tenant and what it would do to facility revenues.Is this a classic example of hold-up? The problem is with relationship specific assets. The DCC put money into a stadium which badly needs rugby to be played there for the stadium to have any chance of being viable and now they have had to write off $480,000 of debt to ensure that rugby is played there. Looks like the ORFU has renegotiated things to capture a good share of the available quasi-rents.
After a seven and a half hour meeting yesterday, the Dunedin City Council has agreed to 'forgive' a $480,000 debt from the ORFU to ensure that professional rugby remained in the city, and more importantly, guaranteed the new stadium at least one rugby tenant.
But is it hold-up? After all for hold-up to occur you need a contract to renegotiate but do the ORFU and the stadium have a contract for the Otago ITM Cup team to play there? The answer may be no. Richardson continues,
[ ... ] the DCC have painted themselves into a corner, the story gets murkier yet. Why? Because of this juicy tidbit, revealed later in the article:Yes stupidity now looks like a big player in all of this.
Cull said it had been discovered that there were no agreements in place for either the Otago ITM Cup team or the Highlanders to play at the stadium.I'm sorry? I didn't just hear that. There are NO agreements in place for ANY local rugby teams/franchises to play at the new stadium?
''Whether the ORFU went into liquidation or not, DVML was left with a very risky situation, as there were no contracts in place guaranteeing an income stream from professional rugby in our region. DVML had taken on the running of the stadium under the impression that those contracts were in place, underpinning that revenue stream.''
So the DCC put a lot of ratepayer money into a stadium without having contracts in place to make sure that the only big revenue stream they have would in fact be available. Without rugby the stadium is finished, even with rugby the stadium's future isn't great, but without it the stadium is a gone burger and yet there were no contracts for any rugby at the stadium. What were people thinking?!
And what incentives does the bail out give for the Highlanders? As Sam puts it,
I can just imagine them [the Highlanders] saying: "Now, Mr Cull, you've just helped out the ORFU. How much do you want to pay us for to play at your swanky new stadium? You need us. Your figures show you'll have a very hard time without us, in fact. There is nothing stopping us from hightailing it elsewhere to other parts of the country for a better deal. Show us the money!".If you want to know why public money shouldn't be put into sports stadiums just go ask a Dunedin City ratepayer.
EconTalk this week
Emanuel Derman of Columbia University and author of Models. Behaving. Badly talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about theories and models, and the elusive nature of truth in the sciences and social sciences. Derman, a former physicist and Goldman Sachs quant [quantitative analyst], contrasts the search for truth in the sciences with the search for truth in finance and economics. He critiques attempts to make finance more scientific and applies those insights to the financial crisis. The conversation closes with a discussion of career advice for those aspiring to work in quantitative finance.
Friday, 9 March 2012
New Zealanders do not own them
Liberty Scott makes the point that New Zealanders do not own SOEs.
Awhile back Madsen Pirie at the Adam Smith Institute blog had a nice posting on the topic of public ownership being a misnomer. As Pirie puts it
In fact as Pirie points out, paradoxically,
Why then do we not include the right to be a residual claimant as part of ownership as Liberty Scott does. Well it is not always true that control rights and income rights go together and when they don't the question has to be asked who is the owner? It is not clear in Liberty Scott's definition who the owner would be. In the Grossman/Hart definition it is whoever has the control rights. Note that income rights can be contracted away in a way control rights can not. If for example you are the manager of a firm with a performance based pay package, say you receive a percentage of your firm's profits. Now assume that all the firm's workers are on such deals and the deals take up 100% of the profits of the firm. Who owns the firm? Not the workers, despite the fact that they get all the profits. The owner will be whoever has the control rights, that is, whoever signed the performance contracts with the workers. Note the owners get zero income.
This does raise the question of why do we normally see control and income rights being held together. In short this is because income rights give you the incentive to use assets wisely while control rights give you the ability to do so. Having only one of the rights means assets will not be used efficiently.
New Zealanders do not own SOEs by any standard definition of what ownership of property means.And he is right. His argument is that an owner has two basic rights: 1) the right of alienation and 2) the right to dividends from profits. Liberty Scott writes:
First and foremost is the right of alienation. You can sell, gift or surrender that stake to whoever is willing to buy or receive it. You are not forced to own it. After all, if you were, you'd be forced to bear liabilities as well as receive proceeds from profits.Liberty Scott goes on the note that New Zealanders have neither of these rights in relation to SOEs and thus are not owners of the SOEs. I agree with the conclusion but I get to it via a different argument. In particular I don't use the right to be a residual claimant as part of the definition of ownership.
Secondly, ownership bears the ability to gain dividends from profits and capital gains from appreciation of the assets. Conversely, it also means you bear liabilities (in the form of your assets being devalued and shareholding able to be surrendered to creditors, or rendered worthless through the market).
Awhile back Madsen Pirie at the Adam Smith Institute blog had a nice posting on the topic of public ownership being a misnomer. As Pirie puts it
The state sector may have the name of the public filled in on the dotted line, but the public do not own it in any meaningful sense of the word. All of the attributes of ownership, such as control, the right to determine what use is made of it and under what conditions, is determined by the bureaucracy in command of it.This is an important point, without control you don't have ownership. As Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. put it,
But what are the rights of ownership? They are substantially the same as those incident to possession. Within the limits prescribed by policy, the owner is allowed to exercise his natural powers over the subject-matter uninterfered with, and is more or less protected in excluding other people from such interference. The owner is allowed to exclude all, and is accountable to no one. (The Common Law, p193, (1963 edn.))Clearly the "public" does not have the rights Holmes refers to. The government (or its bureaucracy) has these rights. Following Grossman and Hart ("The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", 'Journal of Political Economy', 94:691-719) economist's tend to define the owner of an asset as the one who has residual rights of control over the asset; that is whoever can determine what is done with the asset, how it is used, by whom it is used, when they can use it etc - note that ownership is not defined in terms of income rights. Under "public" ownership it isn't the "public" who has the control rights, its the government. The "public" can not determine what use is made of a "public" asset, rather its use is determined by the politicians and managers in command of it.
Because the public has no choice over whether to pay for state services, or to choose what quality of service is appropriate for them, they have no power over them. In their absence it is the managers and workforce who increasingly direct the services to meet their needs and convenience instead of those of the public.Just think of the "public" universities in New Zealand, there are no private ones, what control does the "public" have over them? Control rests with either the government or a complex system of academic and non-academic staff, executives, outside trustees and current and past students of the university. The university's "owners", the "public", have the least say of anyone in their running.
In fact as Pirie points out, paradoxically,
The public actually has more influence, via its choices and purchasing decisions, on private sector businesses than it can ever have over state industries and services.So private is more public.
Why then do we not include the right to be a residual claimant as part of ownership as Liberty Scott does. Well it is not always true that control rights and income rights go together and when they don't the question has to be asked who is the owner? It is not clear in Liberty Scott's definition who the owner would be. In the Grossman/Hart definition it is whoever has the control rights. Note that income rights can be contracted away in a way control rights can not. If for example you are the manager of a firm with a performance based pay package, say you receive a percentage of your firm's profits. Now assume that all the firm's workers are on such deals and the deals take up 100% of the profits of the firm. Who owns the firm? Not the workers, despite the fact that they get all the profits. The owner will be whoever has the control rights, that is, whoever signed the performance contracts with the workers. Note the owners get zero income.
This does raise the question of why do we normally see control and income rights being held together. In short this is because income rights give you the incentive to use assets wisely while control rights give you the ability to do so. Having only one of the rights means assets will not be used efficiently.
Thursday, 8 March 2012
Can public sector wage bills be reduced?
An interesting, and relevant, question asked by Pierre Cahuc and Stephane Carcillo in a new NBER working paper. The abstract reads:
This paper analyzes the relation between public wage bills and public deficits in the OECD countries from 1995 to 2009. The paper shows that fiscal drift episodes, characterized by simultaneous increases in the GDP shares of public wage bills and budget deficits, are more frequent during booms and election years, but not during recessions, except for the 2009 exceptionally strong recession. The emergence of fiscal drift episodes during booms and election years is less frequent in countries with more transparent government, more freedom of the press, as well as in countries with presidential regimes and less union coverage. Inversely, fiscal tightening episodes, characterized by simultaneous decreases in the GDP shares of public wage bills and budget deficits, occur less often during booms than during recessions. The emergence of fiscal tightening episodes during recessions and election years is less frequent in countries with more union coverage.The last point about union coverage may be relevant to New Zealand given the power of state sector unions.
Wednesday, 7 March 2012
The "Wealth Of Nations" turns 236
On March 9 that is.
Smith’s 1776 book marked the beginning of the Classical school of economic thought and thus is normally considered to be the beginning of economics in general. The "Wealth of Nations" was also a most aggressive attack on the mercantilist economic policies that had come to characterise England’s economic policy during that era. But mercantilist policies still seem to be with us, which is one reason why we need to remind ourselves of Smith's arguments.
Smith’s 1776 book marked the beginning of the Classical school of economic thought and thus is normally considered to be the beginning of economics in general. The "Wealth of Nations" was also a most aggressive attack on the mercantilist economic policies that had come to characterise England’s economic policy during that era. But mercantilist policies still seem to be with us, which is one reason why we need to remind ourselves of Smith's arguments.
There is not need for a debate
There has been a Call for TV cathedral debate. We are told,
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. made it clear as to what ownership means,
The only group who need to "hear all the facts in an "open and transparent" forum" are the owners and I assume, given that they have made their decision, they already know the facts.
Aaron Keown, or anyone else, doesn't have control rights over the Cathedral and if he wants said rights then he can get them by buying the Cathedral from its current owners. Using HIS money I should add. I'm guessing he could get it cheap right now!
The decision as to the future of the Cathedral belongs to the Anglican church, as they are its owners and only to them. If the church wishes to ask for Mr Keown's opinion that is up to them, but Mr Keown certainly has not right to try to usurp the church's property rights.
A televised debate on the future of Christ Church Cathedral needs to be held, a city councillor says.and
Cr Aaron Keown today emailed New Zealand's news networks asking for one to ''host the biggest debate in the earthquake recovery of Christchurch''.
He said the public needed to hear all the facts in an "open and transparent" forum before the "symbol of our city" was lost forever.
Keown said last week the cathedral would be demolished "over my dead body".Actually no. "We" don't need a debate because it isn't up to "us" whether or not the Cathedral is demolished. It is up to the owners of the building. They have the property rights over the building, which include the right to bring it down, if they so wish, and Mr Keown-or anyone else-gets no say in the matter.
"I would be in there chaining myself to the building to stop that and I know lots of other volunteers would come in to do that," he said.
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. made it clear as to what ownership means,
But what are the rights of ownership? They are substantially the same as those incident to possession. Within the limits prescribed by policy, the owner is allowed to exercise his natural powers over the subject-matter uninterfered with, and is more or less protected in excluding other people from such interference. The owner is allowed to exclude all, and is accountable to no one. (The Common Law, p193, (1963 edn.))The Anglican church has these rights and their rightful exercising of them means that the cathedral will be demolished and that decision is to be "uninterfered with" and Mr Keown and his supporters must be excluded "from such interference".
The only group who need to "hear all the facts in an "open and transparent" forum" are the owners and I assume, given that they have made their decision, they already know the facts.
Aaron Keown, or anyone else, doesn't have control rights over the Cathedral and if he wants said rights then he can get them by buying the Cathedral from its current owners. Using HIS money I should add. I'm guessing he could get it cheap right now!
The decision as to the future of the Cathedral belongs to the Anglican church, as they are its owners and only to them. If the church wishes to ask for Mr Keown's opinion that is up to them, but Mr Keown certainly has not right to try to usurp the church's property rights.
Small firms are a big problem for Europe’s periphery
Or so claims the Economist. They write,
Also how are they measuring productivity here? There are problems in productivity measurement in areas like the service sector of the economy.
I mean do you really think having a law firm of 250 people is going to be more efficient than one of 5 people? For a start how do you get 250 partners to agree on anything?! The time and effort it would take just to make decisions would be huge and would make the firm inefficient.
So size may not be the problem, it may be the result of deeper problems in the troubled economies of Europe. Size and low productivity may be correlated without any causation. A third problem may lead to both small size and low productivity.
A bias to small firms is costly. The productivity of European firms with fewer than 20 workers is on average little more than half that of firms with 250 or more workers (see right-hand chart). The deeper roots of the euro-zone crisis lie with the loss of competitiveness in the region’s trouble spots. This problem owes more to dismal productivity growth in the past decade than to rapid wage inflation. If the best small firms were able to grow bigger, Greece and the rest might solve their competitiveness problems without having to cut wages or leave the euro.But why is small bad? Isn't firm size, like so many of the characteristics of firms, dependent on the situation of the firm? Don't we need some comparative institutional analysis here? Any display of inefficiency simultaneously represents an opportunity for mutual gain, the parties to such transactions have an incentive to relieve inefficiencies (in cost-effective degree). What are the obstacles? What is the best feasible result?
Also how are they measuring productivity here? There are problems in productivity measurement in areas like the service sector of the economy.
I mean do you really think having a law firm of 250 people is going to be more efficient than one of 5 people? For a start how do you get 250 partners to agree on anything?! The time and effort it would take just to make decisions would be huge and would make the firm inefficient.
So size may not be the problem, it may be the result of deeper problems in the troubled economies of Europe. Size and low productivity may be correlated without any causation. A third problem may lead to both small size and low productivity.
EconTalk this week
Charles Calomiris of Columbia University talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about corporate debt, capital requirements, and financial regulation. This is an in-depth conversation about how debt works on a firm's balance sheet and the risks that debt vs. equity pose for the survival of the firm. Calomiris applies these insights to financial regulation--how it works in practice and the firm's choices in responding to various interventions including bailouts and capital requirements. The conversation closes with a discussion of some of the government interventions in the financial crisis.
Sunday, 4 March 2012
What makes a charter school effective?
An interesting question given that charter schools have been in the news recently. From the latest NBER Digest comes this note by Laurent Belsie:
Traditional measures of what makes a good school - small class size, high per pupil spending, and a large share of teachers with advanced degrees but a small share with no certification - don't necessarily determine student achievement, according to a new study of 35 New York charter schools by Will Dobbie and Roland Fryer. Instead, they find that five policies that rarely get measured systematically - frequent teacher feedback, data-driven instruction, intensified tutoring, increased instructional time, and high expectations - can explain roughly half of the variation between more effective and less effective schools. In Getting Beneath the Veil of Effective Schools: Evidence from New York City (NBER Working Paper No. 17632), the authors conclude that these five policies also do a better job of predicting student success than indicators for whether schools offer wrap-around services that serve the "whole child," whether they focus on finding and keeping the best teachers, and whether they use a "No Excuses" approach to teaching.
For this analysis, Dobbie and Fryer amassed a large data base on 35 charter schools that vary widely in their approach to teaching and learning. For example, the Bronx Charter School for the Arts focuses on the arts, while the KIPP Infinity School uses a "no excuses" approach, emphasizing instructional time, parental involvement, and a concentrated focus on math and reading. When the authors study these varied approaches, they find that schools with a larger share of certified teachers actually scored lower in math gains among pupils than other schools. They also find a slightly negative effect on test results for schools with smaller class sizes, higher per pupil expenditures, and a relatively smaller share of uncertified teachers. However, schools that offered feedback ten or more times every semester, and those that tutored students at least four days a week in small groups (six or less), had annual math and English gains that were higher than those of other schools without such programs.
This study comes with two important caveats. First, the five factors that predict student success might be the results rather than the causes of school effectiveness. The authors didn't study other potentially important inputs, such as the principal's skills, or the effects of the lottery system in selecting students. Second, this study didn't examine all of New York City's charter schools, so there may be other dynamics at work that make it hard to generalize the results for other charter schools or public schools.
The authors summarize their findings by writing that: "While there are important caveats to the conclusion that these five policies can explain significant variation in school effectiveness, our results suggest a model of schooling that may have general application."
Economic conditions have an effect on CEOs
Lester Picker writing in the latest NBER Digest says,
In Shaped by Booms and Busts: How the Economy Impacts CEO Careers and Management Style (NBER Working Paper No. 17590), authors Antoinette Schoar and Luo Zuo find that economic conditions at the start of a manager's working life have lasting effects on his or her career path. Those CEOs who begin their careers during recessions take less time to become CEOs, but end up heading smaller firms, receiving lower compensation, and being more likely to stay with a given firm, rather than to move across firms and industries. Managers who start in recessions also have more conservative management styles once they become CEOs: they spend less on capital expenditures and R and D and show more concern about cost effectiveness.
Early economic conditions also affect the career path of a manager along the way to becoming CEO, according to the authors. The number and speed of outside offers, and industry switches during the career, increase when the manager starts his or her career in better economic conditions.
The authors also find that accepting a first job at a firm that is one of the ten firms that are most likely to be a source of CEOs is associated with favorable outcomes for a manager. Those CEOS end up heading larger companies and receiving higher compensation. However, it may be that people with certain skills self-select into jobs early on, and that the firms that are sources of CEOs attract particularly talented workers in the first place. In either case, the effects of a good start on the career path are quite persistent: they are related to the managers' career choices even twenty years later.
Saturday, 3 March 2012
Greece and the Eurozone: political leaders should get off their high horses
In this audio from VoxEU.org Willem Buiter talks to Viv Davies about Greece and the Eurozone. Buiter believes that Greece’s public debt should be written off, it’s banks recapitalised and that the country be provided with sufficient conditional support to grow its economy. They discuss the LTROs and the risks of loss of control over the aggregate size of the balance sheet and potential national central bank insolvencies. Buiter suggests that now is not the time for self-righteousness amongst European policymakers.
Thursday, 1 March 2012
Economists lie more
From the Economic Logic blog comes this comment on some recent research.
Also shouldn't journalists learn not interview anyone who has an incentive to lie? Of course this would mean they would have no one to interview!
Raúl López-Pérez and Eli Spiegelman performed some experiments where lying could be a winning strategy. While religiosity or gender does not impact the propensity of lying, one's undergraduate major matters, and the Business and Economics students fare the worst. And this does not come from selection into the major, it is acquired. So economists do lie more, because they see incentives to do so. Hence journalists should learn to interview economists that have no incentives to lie.So non-economists don't lie because they are not smart enough to workout there is an advantage to doing so? So they are honest but dumb. If you point out the incentive to lie, do non-economists then lie? If the result is due to training, they should. If they don't then is the result really due to training?
Also shouldn't journalists learn not interview anyone who has an incentive to lie? Of course this would mean they would have no one to interview!
Too little reform
There has been much talk about the government's reforms of welfare recently. One issue I have with the reforms is that they don't go far enough. Reforms aimed at getting people into work need to have jobs available for these people to go to. That is, if the government is serious getting people into jobs then it needs to reform the labour market at the same time it reforms welfare.
An unreformed labour market will have trouble adjusting to having a new intake of people looking for work. Given the level of unemployment we have at the lower skill/experience end of the labour market having a whole bunch more people entering it isn't going to end well.
So if the government is serious about reform, rather than just pulling a political stunt, then it needs to reform the labour market if it wants its welfare reforms to work.
An unreformed labour market will have trouble adjusting to having a new intake of people looking for work. Given the level of unemployment we have at the lower skill/experience end of the labour market having a whole bunch more people entering it isn't going to end well.
So if the government is serious about reform, rather than just pulling a political stunt, then it needs to reform the labour market if it wants its welfare reforms to work.
Wednesday, 29 February 2012
Not good thinking
From Stuff comes the news that:
Or good players head to professional teams overseas. Or the good players play only in the professional leagues (Super Rugby and the ABs) and we never see them at the provincial level.
Or some combination of the above. All in all not a good outlook.
All Black great Chris Laidlaw believes the crisis in Otago rugby highlights the need for provincial rugby to return to its amateur roots.Not good thinking. Either Otago (and other amateur teams) will lose all its good players to (semi-)professional teams or we will see all teams being amateur and we are back to the bad old days of under the table payments to these "amateur players", which was one of the reasons for going pro in the first place.
Or good players head to professional teams overseas. Or the good players play only in the professional leagues (Super Rugby and the ABs) and we never see them at the provincial level.
Or some combination of the above. All in all not a good outlook.
Tuesday, 28 February 2012
Is China’s economic future a rosy one?
So asks Gary Becker. He writes,
A major problem for China is its efforts to maintain growth may be political rather than economic. Economic growth will come at the price of political power. As people become wealthier, they have more to lose to the grabbing hand of government. People will want, and will demand, protection from the state and this means the Communist Party in China will lose power. Limits on the arbitrary power of the state are needed if growth is to continue at the rate it is now. The incentives are wrong for growth if people are not sure they will keep the rewards of their efforts. Even in the West we see an example of this problem in the effects of Regime Uncertainty. People don't invest when they fear the loss of any return to their investment.
A related problem is that the party will also have to give up its economic power. As an example of this problem look at the SOEs in China. As Becker notes
Starting with the opening of agriculture to private incentives in the late 1970s, China has experienced faster and more prolonged economic growth than any other country. In a mere three decades China has moved from a very poor nation to a middle-income level country, a development that pulled hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty. China’s aggregate GDP is now second in the world only to that of the US. While its per capita income is still much smaller than that of America’s, many are predicting that even China’s per capita GDP will surpass that of the US in a few decades.But as Becker points out, good economic growth today doesn't always mean good growth tomorrow. At different times the Soviet Union and Japan had faster growth than any country in the West but they didn't manage to become the world's economic superpower. We know what happened to the Soviet Union and Japan's rapid growth stopped abruptly during the early 1990s, and Japan has largely stagnated economically for the past two decades.
A major problem for China is its efforts to maintain growth may be political rather than economic. Economic growth will come at the price of political power. As people become wealthier, they have more to lose to the grabbing hand of government. People will want, and will demand, protection from the state and this means the Communist Party in China will lose power. Limits on the arbitrary power of the state are needed if growth is to continue at the rate it is now. The incentives are wrong for growth if people are not sure they will keep the rewards of their efforts. Even in the West we see an example of this problem in the effects of Regime Uncertainty. People don't invest when they fear the loss of any return to their investment.
A related problem is that the party will also have to give up its economic power. As an example of this problem look at the SOEs in China. As Becker notes
The China 2030 report argues that the SOEs must operate more like commercial companies, but that is not easy since officials from the Communist Party usually have high positions in these enterprises, and many of the larger SOEs are closely related to the Communist Party and the military. The ideal solution would be to privatize most SOEs, but that does not seem likely in the near future. This is partly because government officials would lose power if SOEs were privatized, and partly because the government fears that privatized companies would greatly cut employment and increase social unrest.Unfortunately for China, it would not be possible to close rapidly the per capita income gap with rich countries as long as a large fraction of manufacturing output in China is produced in over-manned and inefficient state enterprises.So for growth to continue at anything near its current rate, at some point, the Communist Party in China will have to give up some, if not all, of its political and economic power. And its unlikely they will be too keen on that.
EconTalk this week
David Weinberger of MIT and author of Too Big to Know, talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the ideas in the book--how knowledge and data and our understanding of the world around us are being changed by the internet. Weinberger discusses knowledge and how it is attained have changed over time, particularly with the advent of the internet. He argues the internet has dispersed the power of authority and expertise. And he discusses whether the internet is making us smarter or stupider, and the costs and benefits of being able to tailor information to one's own interests and biases.
Education and economic development: evidence from the industrial revolution
In this short audio from VoxEU.org Sascha Becker of the University of Warwick talks to Romesh Vaitilingam about his research on the important role that formal education played in facilitating industrialisation in nineteenth century Prussia. They also discuss the relationship between education and fertility, and historical evidence in support of ‘unified growth theory’.
Boundedly rational dynamic programming
A new NBER Working paper on Boundedly Rational Dynamic Programming: Some Preliminary Results by Xavier Gabaix
The abstract reads
The abstract reads
A key open question in economics is the practical, portable modeling of bounded rationality. In this short note, I report ongoing progress that is more fully developed elsewhere. I present some results from a new model in which the decision-maker builds a simplified representation of the world. The model allows to model boundedly rational dynamic programming in a parsimonious and quite tractable way. I illustrate the approach via a boundedly rational version of the consumption-saving life cycle problem. The consumer can pay attention to the variables such as the interest rate and his income, or replace them, in his mental model, by their average values. Endogenously, the consumer pays little attention to interest rate but pays keen attention to his income. One consequence of this is that Euler equations will be biased, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution will be biased toward 0, in a manner that is quantitatively important.Now who says economists don't do super-cool stuff!!
Saturday, 25 February 2012
A relationship between income and freedom
There is a new working paper by Derek Stimel out on The Short-Run Relationship between Income and Freedom: Evidence from 128 Countries. The abstract reads:
The relationship between income, economic freedom, and political freedom is often examined over the long-run but recently, there is increased interest in the short-run. From a review of the literature, I develop possible short-run relationships between a country’s income per capita, economic freedom, political rights, and civil liberties while taking into consideration broad institutional differences across countries. The empirical strategy is to estimate a structural panel vector autoregression where each equation is estimated using the dynamic panel general method of moments procedure of Arellano and Bover (1995). I then estimate impulse responses for the full sample of 128 countries between 1994-2009 as well as key sub-samples. From this relatively a theoretical approach, results indicate that improvements in economic freedom benefit more developed countries relative to less developed countries, as do improvements in income per capita. Improvements in political rights improve economic freedom in highly developed countries and low developed countries but improve income the most in countries with medium development. Improvements in civil liberties have somewhat the opposite effect as political rights. Implications of these results are discussed with an eye toward their practical relevance for business as well as policymakers.
Friday, 24 February 2012
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson now have a blog
This is good news. You can find the blog here. The blog is related to their forthcoming book Why Nations Fail.
(HT: Marginal Revolution)
(HT: Marginal Revolution)
Economics is what exactly?
Reading the Prologue to Roger Backhouse's book "The Ordinary Business of Life: A History of Economics from the Ancient World to the Twenty-First Century" (a very readable book even for non-economists) I found a number of definitions of economics.
Backhouse offers us
Later Backhouse writes
Backhouse offers us
- Economics is the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses. (From Lionel Robbins)
- The study of mankind in the ordinary business of life. (From Alfred Marshall. Guess where the title of the book comes from!)
- Economics deals with the production, distribution and consumption of wealth. (I guess that would capture much of classical economics.)
- How production is organised to in order to satisfy human wants. (Surely economics is more than this. What of public choice for example?)
- The logic of choice. (But what about production?)
- The study of markets. (But what about all non-market institutions, like firms or clubs or farms or ....)
Later Backhouse writes
Is is possible, for example, to have societies in which money does not exit [...], in which production is not undertaken by firms, or in which transactions are undertaken without markets.I'm willing to accept this, apart from the no markets bit. I can't think of an example of a society without markets and I can't help thinking if there is such an example it would be a very poor, very small and very limited kind of society. As the division of labour is limited by the extent of the market, no markets means that the division of labour would be, basically, non-existent. This alone would make for a very poor society.
Tuesday, 21 February 2012
Management practices
A quick Look at the paper "Recent Advances in the Empirics of Organizational Economics" by Nicholas Bloom, Raffaella Sadun and John Van Reenen, Annual Review of Economics (2010) 2: 105–37, shows up a few interesting results with regard to management practices and decentralisation of firms. In particular the paper suggest that (a) Competition seems to foster improved management and decentralisation; (b) larger firms, skill-intensive plants, and foreign multinationals appear better managed and are more decentralised; (c) firms that are both family owned and managed appear to have worse management and are more centralised; and (d) firms facing an environment of lighter labour market regulations and more human capital specialise relatively more in people management. Decentralisation here means the degree to which lower levels of the hierarchy have power relative to upper levels of the hierarchy (e.g., a higher degree of autonomy of junior managers from senior managers, a higher degree of autonomy of shopfloor workers from management)
The point about foreign firms being better managed is one that more than a few politicians, and others, in New Zealand would do well to take on board. Also the importance of competition to management practices needs to be kept in mind. This is just one advantage of increasing competition via a well implemented program of deregulation.
The paper also argues that there is evidence for complementarities between information and communication technology, decentralisation, and management, but the relationship is complex, and identification of the productivity effects of organisational practices remains to be fully investigated. But it does raise a possible reason for New Zealand's poor productivity performance. How well have we integrated ICTs into our businesses?
The point about foreign firms being better managed is one that more than a few politicians, and others, in New Zealand would do well to take on board. Also the importance of competition to management practices needs to be kept in mind. This is just one advantage of increasing competition via a well implemented program of deregulation.
The paper also argues that there is evidence for complementarities between information and communication technology, decentralisation, and management, but the relationship is complex, and identification of the productivity effects of organisational practices remains to be fully investigated. But it does raise a possible reason for New Zealand's poor productivity performance. How well have we integrated ICTs into our businesses?
EconTalk this week
Adam Davidson of NPR's Planet Money talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about manufacturing. Based on an article Davidson wrote for The Atlantic, the conversation looks at the past, present, and future of manufacturing. Davidson visited an after-market auto parts factory in Greenville, South Carolina and talked with employees there as well as with executives at corporate headquarters. What is the future of factory work in America? Why are some manufacturing jobs in America while others are in China or elsewhere? The conversation looks at these questions as well as how well or poorly the U.S. education system prepares students for the world of work.
Monday, 20 February 2012
Just for fun: theory of the firm 12
A recent, but still relatively unknown, contribution to the theory of the firm which can be seen as outside, if related to, the mainstream of the economic approach to the theory of the firm is Daniel F. Spulber, "The Theory of the Firm: Microeconomics with Endogenous Entrepreneurs, Firms, Markets, and Organizations", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. If we think of the mainstream theory of the firm as being concerned with three basic issues to do with the existence, boundaries and internal organisation of the firm then Spulber's book is somewhat outside of the mainstream but the issues it deals with are related closely enough to those of the mainstream to justify a brief overview. (For criticisms of the Spulber approach to the firm from inside the mainstream see Hart (2011).) In addition Spulber offers insights into a number of important issues missing from the mainstream and thus lays the groundwork for future research in both the theory of the firm and industrial organisation more generally. Spulber "[ ... ] seeks to explain (1) why firms exist, (2) how firms are established, and (3) what firms contribute to the economy" (Spulber 2009: ix). These issues are clearly related to those of the mainstream but they are not the same. In particular the mainstream does not have a theory of the entrepreneur or market creation. Spulber's book in an attempt to create a general approach to microeconomics in which entrepreneurs, firms, markets, and organizations are all endogenous.
To start Spulber defines a firm "[ ... ] to be a transaction institution whose objectives differ from those of its owners. This separation is the key difference between the firm and direct exchange between consumers". (Spulber 2009: 63). Note that under this definition organizations such as clubs, basic partnerships, many family firms, worker cooperatives, non-for-profit organisations and public enterprises are not firms. The basic reason being that the objectives of these types of organizations cannot be separated from those of their owners. The separation of objectives between owners and firms also justifies the profit maximisation objective. Consumers who are the owners of the firm, obtain income via the firm's profits and thus want profit maximisation so they can maximise their consumption (utility).
Spulber has three additional players in his story: consumers, organisations and markets. Consumers are individuals who consume the goods and services generated within the economy. Organisations are transaction institutions whose objectives cannot be separated from those of their owners. Markets are transaction mechanisms that bring buyers and sellers together.
For Spulber the entrepreneur is important because it is their efforts that leads to the creation of firms. A combination of market opportunities interacting with the individual's preferences, endowments and other such characteristics leads the consumer to take on the role of entrepreneur. The individual is an entrepreneur for the time it takes to establish the firm. Assuming that the firm is successfully established, the entrepreneur's role changes to that of an owner of the firm. Ownership is valuable insofar as it provides returns to the (former) entrepreneur. This change from entrepreneur to owner is in Spulber's terms, `the fundamental shift'. (Spulber 2009: 152). The point is that before the change from entrepreneur to owner, the objectives of the organisation cannot be separated from those of the (then) entrepreneur. After the fundamental shift has occurred, the entrepreneur is now the owner and the firm's objectives are separate from those of the owner, which means a firm has been established.
Other organisations can be formed that allow consumers to take advantage of joint production. Such advantages include economies of scale, public goods, common property resources and externalities. Unlike the firm, the objectives of the organisation reflect the consumption objectives of the members of the organisation. A problem with an organisation is that it can experience inefficiencies due to free riding. Firms overcome such problems by separating the objectives of the organisation from the consumption objectives of its owners and thus inducing profit maximisation. Profit maximisation may not achieve full efficiency due to problems such as allocative inefficiencies that result from market power. Thus the comparison between a firm and an organisation depends on the trade-off between profit maximisation and free riding. When the number of consumers is small, free riding problems tend to be small and thus an organisation may be more efficient than the firm.
Given we have firms, firms can create markets. Firms can act as intermediaries and in doing so they increase the gains from trade and reduce transactions costs when consumers are separated by time, distance and uncertainty. Firms create markets by providing centralised mechanisms for matching consumers, in their roles as buyer and sellers, in a more efficient manner than decentralised exchange can achieve. Market making firms are required to buy and sell at any moment meaning that buyers and sellers avoid the costs involved with trading delays and the risk of being unable to find a trading partner. In the world of financial markets, market-making firms provide liquidity by being ready to buy and sell financial assets. Addition transaction efficiencies are bought about by market-making firms being able to consolidate trades which allows traders to reduce the costs involved with having to find multiple trading partners or with having mismatched trades. Firm can also avoid the problems inherent with complex bartering arrangements by simplifying the trading process vis the use of posted prices. Supply and demand can be equated in a market by firms adjust their buying and selling behaviour thereby reducing potential losses due to market imbalances. Thus market creation is endogenous.
Spulber offers insights into a number of issues that the mainstream theory of the firm does not deal with well, if at all. The discussion of issues such as the role of the entrepreneur and the creation of markets are important issues that lie outside of the mainstream of the theory of the firms, at least as far as the mainstream is conceived of here. Such issues do however raise questions for the future of the theory of the firm and industrial organisation.
To start Spulber defines a firm "[ ... ] to be a transaction institution whose objectives differ from those of its owners. This separation is the key difference between the firm and direct exchange between consumers". (Spulber 2009: 63). Note that under this definition organizations such as clubs, basic partnerships, many family firms, worker cooperatives, non-for-profit organisations and public enterprises are not firms. The basic reason being that the objectives of these types of organizations cannot be separated from those of their owners. The separation of objectives between owners and firms also justifies the profit maximisation objective. Consumers who are the owners of the firm, obtain income via the firm's profits and thus want profit maximisation so they can maximise their consumption (utility).
Spulber has three additional players in his story: consumers, organisations and markets. Consumers are individuals who consume the goods and services generated within the economy. Organisations are transaction institutions whose objectives cannot be separated from those of their owners. Markets are transaction mechanisms that bring buyers and sellers together.
For Spulber the entrepreneur is important because it is their efforts that leads to the creation of firms. A combination of market opportunities interacting with the individual's preferences, endowments and other such characteristics leads the consumer to take on the role of entrepreneur. The individual is an entrepreneur for the time it takes to establish the firm. Assuming that the firm is successfully established, the entrepreneur's role changes to that of an owner of the firm. Ownership is valuable insofar as it provides returns to the (former) entrepreneur. This change from entrepreneur to owner is in Spulber's terms, `the fundamental shift'. (Spulber 2009: 152). The point is that before the change from entrepreneur to owner, the objectives of the organisation cannot be separated from those of the (then) entrepreneur. After the fundamental shift has occurred, the entrepreneur is now the owner and the firm's objectives are separate from those of the owner, which means a firm has been established.
Other organisations can be formed that allow consumers to take advantage of joint production. Such advantages include economies of scale, public goods, common property resources and externalities. Unlike the firm, the objectives of the organisation reflect the consumption objectives of the members of the organisation. A problem with an organisation is that it can experience inefficiencies due to free riding. Firms overcome such problems by separating the objectives of the organisation from the consumption objectives of its owners and thus inducing profit maximisation. Profit maximisation may not achieve full efficiency due to problems such as allocative inefficiencies that result from market power. Thus the comparison between a firm and an organisation depends on the trade-off between profit maximisation and free riding. When the number of consumers is small, free riding problems tend to be small and thus an organisation may be more efficient than the firm.
Given we have firms, firms can create markets. Firms can act as intermediaries and in doing so they increase the gains from trade and reduce transactions costs when consumers are separated by time, distance and uncertainty. Firms create markets by providing centralised mechanisms for matching consumers, in their roles as buyer and sellers, in a more efficient manner than decentralised exchange can achieve. Market making firms are required to buy and sell at any moment meaning that buyers and sellers avoid the costs involved with trading delays and the risk of being unable to find a trading partner. In the world of financial markets, market-making firms provide liquidity by being ready to buy and sell financial assets. Addition transaction efficiencies are bought about by market-making firms being able to consolidate trades which allows traders to reduce the costs involved with having to find multiple trading partners or with having mismatched trades. Firm can also avoid the problems inherent with complex bartering arrangements by simplifying the trading process vis the use of posted prices. Supply and demand can be equated in a market by firms adjust their buying and selling behaviour thereby reducing potential losses due to market imbalances. Thus market creation is endogenous.
Spulber offers insights into a number of issues that the mainstream theory of the firm does not deal with well, if at all. The discussion of issues such as the role of the entrepreneur and the creation of markets are important issues that lie outside of the mainstream of the theory of the firms, at least as far as the mainstream is conceived of here. Such issues do however raise questions for the future of the theory of the firm and industrial organisation.
- Hart, Oliver D. (2011). `Thinking about the Firm: A Review of Daniel Spulber's The Theory of the Firm', "Journal of Economic Literature", 49(1) March: 101-13.
Thursday, 16 February 2012
To GE or not GE
That is the question. While looking on the web for material for a paper I'm working on, "The Past and Present of the Theory of the Firm", I came across a number of discussions on the evils or the non-evils of general equilibrium theory. Some people argue McKenzie, Arrow and Debreu et al are the great satans who are out to destroy economics - if not the world. Others believe GE theory is the greatest achievement in the history of economics. This interested me because I end my paper with the following observation (a couple of footnotes have been removed)
Things you ponder on a Thursday afternoon.
A final point about the models of the firm discussed in this essay is that they highlight a general issue to do with post-1970 microeconomics, that is, the movement away from the use of general equilibrium (GE) models. All the models considered above are partial equilibrium models, but in this regard the theory of the firm is no different from most of the microeconomic theory developed since the 1970s. Microeconomics such as incentive theory, incomplete contract theory, game theory, industrial organisation etc, has largely turned its back, presumably temporarily, on GE theory and has worked almost exclusively within a partial equilibrium framework. This illustrates the point made at the beginning of the paper that there is a close relationship between the economic mainstream and the theory of the firm; when the mainstream forgoes general equilibrium, so does the theory of the firm.Now what I'm wondering is, Is the problem with GE a problem with the idea of general equilibrium as such or a problem with the Arrow-Debreu approach to GE? I can't help thinking that the world is GE and thus to handle the "real world" we need general equilibrium models. But the way we model GE leaves much to be desired. The current generation of GE models don't deal well with things like information asymmetries, contractual incompleteness, strategic interaction and economic institutions. Thus do we need at new GE which doesn't just try to model the extreme decentralisation of the perfectly competitive framework? Not that it is obvious what such a form of GE would look like. How much, if any, of the current approach to GE can be saved? Or is the Arrow-Debreu framework the right way to go? Or should we just stay with partial equilibrium models and not worry about interactions between markets?
For the case of contract theory, a field closely related to that of the theory of the firm, Salanie (2005: 2) has argued,
``[t]he theory of contracts has evolved from the failures of general equilibrium theory. In the 1970s several economists settled on a new way to study economic relationships. The idea was to turn away temporarily from general equilibrium models, whose description of the economy is consistent but not realistic enough, and to focus on necessarily partial models that take into account the full complexity of strategic interactions between privately informed agents in well-defined institutional settings".As was noted in Section 4.1 the post-1970s literature on the firm can be classified into two general groups based on which of two of the standard assumptions of GE theory, namely symmetric information and complete contracts, is violated when modelling the firm. This requirement to violate basic assumptions of GE theory so that we can model the firm, suggests that as it stands GE can not deal easily with firms, or other important economic institutions. As Bernard Salanie notes,
``[ ... ] the organization of the many institutions that govern economic relationships is entirely absent from these [GE] models. This is particularly striking in the case of firms, which are modeled as a production set. This makes the very existence of firms difficult to justify in the context of general equilibrium models, since all interactions are expected to take place through the price system in these models". (Salanie 2005: 1).This would suggest that creating GE models that can account for information asymmetries, contractual incompleteness, strategic interaction and the existence of institutions is needed if GE theory is to be able to deal with the issues - including those related to the firm - that microeconomists wish to tackle.
Things you ponder on a Thursday afternoon.
Tuesday, 14 February 2012
Its ok to hate Valentine's Day
Let me repeat my posting from a few years back, it still applies.
The Times has a list, "20 reasons it's okay to hate Valentine's Day". Number 14 is
So next year, just give her the money guys.
The Times has a list, "20 reasons it's okay to hate Valentine's Day". Number 14 is
It's such a rip-off. With flowers, dinner and cabs, you’re looking at a hundred quid minimum. Wouldn’t she just prefer the cash instead?This has to be true, as any economist will tell you. Just giving her the cash must be Pareto improving. With the cash she can either go out and buy what you would have bought, so she and you are no worse off, or she can buy what she really wants, and you would not have bought, so you will both be better off.
So next year, just give her the money guys.
EconTalk this week
David Owen of the New Yorker and author of The Conundrum talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the ideas in his book. Owen argues that innovation and energy innovation have increased energy use rather than reduced it and similarly, other seemingly green changes do little to help the reduce humanity's carbon footprint or are actually counter-productive. Only large reductions in consumption are likely to matter and that prescription is unappealing to most people. Owen points out that New York City, ironically perhaps, is one of the greenest places to live because of the efficiencies of density. The conversation concludes with a discussion of how to best approach global warming given these seeming realities.
Friday, 10 February 2012
The past and present of the theory of the firm
There is a new paper available at SSRN that looks at The Past and Present of the Theory of the Firm.
The abstract reads,
The abstract reads,
In this survey we give a short overview of the way in which the theory of the firm has been formulated within the 'mainstream' of economics, both past and present. As to a break point between the periods, 1970 is a convenient, if not entirely accurate, dividing line. The major difference between the theories of the past and the present, as they are conceived of here, is that the focus, in terms of the questions asked in the theory, of the post-1970 literature is markedly different from that of the earlier (neoclassical) mainstream theory. The questions the theory seeks to answer have changed from being about how the firm acts in the market, how it prices its outputs or how it combines its inputs, to questions about the firm's existence, boundaries and internal organization. That is, there has been a movement away from the theory of the firm being seen as developing a component of price theory, namely issues to do with firm behavior, to the theory being concerned with the firm as a subject in its own right.
Tuesday, 7 February 2012
More MED mercantilism?
From Groping towards Bethlehem we learn that
I mean if we produce a widget here in Canterbury, does MED really mean that selling that widget to someone in Auckland doesn't help our economy, since it wouldn't increase the share of exports, but selling it to someone in Sydney does, since it does increase the share of exports in the economy?!!
[...] MED in its Briefing to the Incoming Minister pointed out that the high exchange rate means we are all a little bit richer? Don’t be silly. ‘Cause, see, it’s all about the exports. The opening sentence:The question I would ask of MED is, But why does building a stronger economy require an increase in the share of exports? In simple terms, doesn't building a stronger economy just mean producing more - and thus increasing our real wealth - and who we sell our output to doesn't matter?
The Government’s aim of building a stronger economy will require a substantial increase in the share of exports in the economy.
I mean if we produce a widget here in Canterbury, does MED really mean that selling that widget to someone in Auckland doesn't help our economy, since it wouldn't increase the share of exports, but selling it to someone in Sydney does, since it does increase the share of exports in the economy?!!
EconTalk this week
William Black of the University of Missouri-Kansas City and author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank Is to Own One, talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about financial fraud, starting with the Savings and Loan debacle up through the current financial crisis. Black explains how bank executives can use fraudulent loans to inflate the size of their bank in order to justify large compensation packages. He argues that "liar loans" were a major part of the crisis and that policy changes made it easy to generate such loans without criminal repercussions.
Monday, 6 February 2012
Shleifer on the transition from communism
At VoxEU.org Andrei Shleifer tells us about the Seven things I learned about transition from communism. These seven things being:
First, in all countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, economic activity shrunk at the beginning of transition, in some very sharply. In many countries, economic decline started earlier, but still continued. In Russia, the steepness and the length of the decline (almost a decade) was a big surprise. Countries with the biggest trade shocks (such as Poland and Czechoslovakia) experienced the mildest declines. To be sure, the true declines were considerably milder than what was officially recorded – unofficial economies expanded, communist countries exaggerated their GDPs, defence cuts, and so on – but this does not take away from the basic fact that declines occurred and were surprising. These declines contradicted at least the simple economic theory that a move to free prices should immediately improve resource allocation. The main lesson of this experience is for reformers not to count on an immediate return to growth. Economic transformation takes time.
Second, the decline was not permanent. Following these declines, recovery and rapid growth occurred nearly everywhere. Over 20 years, living standards in most transition countries have increased substantially for most people, although the official GDP numbers show much milder improvements and are inconsistent with just about any direct measure of the quality of life (again raising questions about communist GDP calculations). As predicted, capitalism worked and living standards improved enormously. One must say, however, that for a time things looked glum. So lesson learned: have faith – capitalism really does work.
Third, the declines in output nowhere led to populist revolts – as many economists had feared. Surely reform governments were thrown out in some countries, but not by populists. Instead of populism, politics in many countries came to be dominated by new economic elites, the so-called oligarchs, who combined wealth with substantial political influence. From the perspective of 1992, this came as a huge surprise. Ironically, in some countries in Eastern Europe populism appeared 20 years after transition started, after huge improvements in living standards were absolutely obvious. Indeed, people in all transition countries were unhappy with transition: they were unhappy even in countries with rapidly improving quality of life (and this itself is another surprise and major puzzle – something for future reformers to keep in mind). But the lesson is clear: a reformer should fear not populism but capture of politics by the new elites.
Fourth, economists and reformers overstated both their ability to sequence reforms, and the importance of particular tactical choices, eg, in privatisation. In retrospect, many of the theories that animated the discussion of reform – whether institutions should be built first, whether companies should be prepared for privatisation by the government, whether voucher privatisation or mutual fund privatisation is better, whether case by case privatisations might work – look quaint. Reformers nearly everywhere, including in Russia, had a vastly overstated sense of control. Politics and competence frequently intervened and dictated to a large extent most of the tactical choices. Still, most countries, despite different choices, ended up with largely similar outcomes (notable and sad exceptions are Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan). In various forms, all had privatisation and macroeconomic stabilisation as well as legal and institutional reform to support a market economy. Lesson learned: do not over-plan the move to markets, but, more importantly, do not delay in the hope of having a tidier reform later.
Fifth, economists have greatly exaggerated the benefits of incentives by themselves, without changes in people. Economic theory of socialism has put way too much weight on incentives, and way too little on human capital. Winners in the communist system turned out not to be so good in a market economy. Transition to markets is accomplished by new people, not by old people with better incentives. I realised this and wrote about it in the mid-1990s, but the lesson both in firms and in politics in profound: you cannot teach an old dog new tricks, even with incentives.
Sixth, it is important not to overestimate the long-run consequences of macroeconomic crises and even debt defaults. Russia experienced a major crisis in 1997–98, which some extremely knowledgeable observers said would set it back by 20 years, yet it began growing rapidly in 1999–2000. Similar stories apply elsewhere, from East Asia to Argentina. Debt restructurings do not necessarily make permanent scars. This experience bears a profound lesson for reformers, who are always intimidated by the international financial community: do not panic about crises; they blow over fast.
Seventh, it is much easier to forecast economic than political evolution. Although nearly all transition countries have eventually converged to some form of capitalism, there has been a broader range of political experiences, from full democracies, to primitive dictatorships, to just about everything in between. There appears a strong geographic pattern in this, with countries further West, especially those involved with the European Union, becoming clearly democratic, and countries further East remaining generally more authoritarian. For countries in the middle, including Russia and Ukraine, the political paths over the 20 years have wiggled around. Lesson learned: middle-income countries eventually slouch toward democracy, but not nearly in as direct or consistent a way as they move toward capitalism.
Ricardo and comparative advantage 2
Thanks to an email from Jorge Morales Meoqui I have been alerted to his recent paper in the journal History of Political Economy on "Comparative Advantage and the Labor Theory of Value". The abstract reads,
With the famous numerical example of chapter 7 of the Principles (1817) David Ricardo intended to illustrate first and foremost the new proposition that his labor theory of value does not regulate the price of international transactions when the factors of production are immobile between countries. Unfortunately, later scholars have often omitted this proposition when referring to Ricardo's numerical example. Instead, they have highlighted only the comparative-advantage proposition, although Ricardo considered it as a corollary of the omitted proposition and therefore inextricably linked to it. This inexplicable omission has led to an incomplete understanding of the logical construction of Ricardo's numerical example, as well as to the misinterpretation of the four numbers as unitary labor costs. With an accurate understanding of Ricardo's numerical example and the logical relationship between the two propositions it meant to prove, it is relatively easy to refute the main objections that have been raised against the very same numerical example in the past. Moreover, it reaffirms the sustained relevance of Ricardo's two propositions as important insights for understanding the current process of economic globalization.Jorge also has a working paper "On the distribution of authorship-merits for the comparative-advantage proposition". The abstract reads,
Due to a better understanding of the logical interrelationships between the comparative- advantage proposition, the classical rule of specialization and the proposition regarding the non- appliance of the labor theory of value in international exchanges in Ricardo’s famous numerical example in the Principles, it is now possible to arrive to a definite conclusion regarding the longstanding academic debate about the true author of the comparative-advantage proposition. Torrens is not entitled to the same amount of merit as David Ricardo with regard to the comparative-advantage proposition since he fell short of formulating a full prove of it prior to the publication of Ricardo’s Principles. In the 1815 example of English cloth being traded for Polish corn, Torrens missed to apply the classical rule of specialization for Poland. For the featured international exchange to take place, though, there has to be gains from trade for both trading partners. More importantly, Torrens also failed to recognize the crucial role of Ricardo’s insight regarding the non-appliance of the law of value in international exchanges in proving the comparative-advantage proposition. Therefore, the bulk of the authorship-merit for this proposition rightly belongs to Ricardo.
Saturday, 4 February 2012
Ricardo and comparative advantage
David Ricardo is probably most famous because of his introduction of the idea of comparative advantage into economics. Today comparative advantage is the standard reason given as to why countries gain from trade. But is Ricardo the author of the famous pages in his "Principles of Political Economy"?
In a footnote on page 132 of the fifth edition of his "Economic Theory in Retrospect" Mark Blaug writes
A quick look at Douglas Irwin's book "Against the Trade: An Intellectual History of Free Trade" gives rise to another footnote, from page 91, which reads,
In a footnote on page 132 of the fifth edition of his "Economic Theory in Retrospect" Mark Blaug writes
Ironically enough, it is now been shown that the famous pages on comparative advantage in the chapter on foreign trade were almost certainly written by James Mill. Moreover, Ricardo's own conception of foreign trade never effectively went beyond the idea of absolute advantage; in short, he does not deserve the credit he has been given for the theory of comparative advantage.The basis for Blaug's claim is the paper, by William O. Thweatt, "James Mill and the Early Development of Comparative Advantage", History of Political Economy 8 (Summer 1976) 207-34.
A quick look at Douglas Irwin's book "Against the Trade: An Intellectual History of Free Trade" gives rise to another footnote, from page 91, which reads,
Thweatt's case is plausible because Mill worked closely with Ricardo on the Principles and commented extensively on drafts. Inconclusive evidence against his interpretation comes in a letter from Mill to Ricardo in which he states: "... that it may be good for a country to import commodities from a country where the production of those same commodities cost more, than it would cost at home: that a change in manufacturing sill in one country, produces a new distribution of the precious metals, are new propositions of the highest importance, and which you fully prove." See David Ricardo (1952, 7: 99). Futher, in his article on colonies Mill also credits Ricardo with the theory.I had known that Mill explained the idea of comparative advantage better in his "Elements of Political Economy", published after Ricardo's "Principles", but not that he could have been the author of Ricardo's original discussion.
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