Thursday, 29 September 2011

A failsafe way to end the Eurozone crisis (?)

That the Eurozone is in crisis comes as news to no one. But what to do about it? At VoxEU.org Charles Wyplosz has come up with a 3 step plan which he claims will end the crisis.
Three steps to a solution

The first step deals with the existing stock of public debts.

  • The ECB should set a floor on public debt values by offering a guarantee.

The guarantee should be partial to allow defaults for countries unlikely to serve their debts. A guarantee could cover each country’s debt up to, say, 60% of GDP.

  • Markets would promptly re-price debts. Greece’s debt would likely trade at 60% of its GDP, about 50 cents to the euro;
  • Others would trade higher all the way to Germany’s, which would stay at par.

The market price would offer a clear guide for governments to negotiate a restructuring. The ECB – and German taxpayers – would suffer no loss. The crisis would be over, moving to the resolution phase.

The second step is designed to shift from fiscal austerity to growth-enhancing action.

  • To allow governments to borrow again, the ECB should guarantee all future public debts – excluding the rollover of non-guaranteed debts.

Without complementary policies, this would obviously create endless moral hazard (ie temptation for Eurozone governments to issue cheap debt irresponsibly on the back of the guarantee).

To eliminate the moral hazard created by both guarantees, two conditions are needed.

  • First, each country would have to adopt domestic institutional arrangements (fiscal rules, independent fiscal councils, etc.) that lock in lasting fiscal discipline as a matter of national law. (Just as US states avoid the problem with state constitutions that require balanced budgets.)

To be credible to the domestic body politic, each nation’s arrangements must fit local political institutions – but the proposed change would be subject to approval by the European Commission and the ECB.

  • The second condition for the ECB’s guarantee would be that each country strictly enforces its own arrangement.

Access to the ECB guarantee on new issues will start only once an arrangement has been validated. It would be suspended if and when particular nations failed to respect their approved arrangement. Such suspensions would immediately raise the cost of further borrowing by the delinquent country, but it would not affect the guarantee already given to debt issued previously– that guarantee would be meaningless if the ECB could renege.

Step three addresses banks' vulnerabilities arising from the fact that sovereign defaults are likely to result in bank failures.

  • Given that some countries will default, the EFSF will have to recapitalise failed banks.

Here the ECB would act as lender of last resort with the EFSF guaranteeing its interventions. Well-crafted recapitalisations do no need to be costly. For example, the Swiss National Bank is now making profits on its creative recapitalisation of UBS during the global crisis.

Importantly, these schemes would be voluntary. No country would be forced to accept the ECB guarantees but any country could ask for it at any time.

Could the ECB suffer losses? A crucial element of this solution is that the ECB would spend almost no money if the guarantees are well-specified enough to be credible.
The only question is, Would it really work?

Wednesday, 28 September 2011

EconTalk this week

Alex Rosenberg of Duke University talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the scientific nature of economics. Rosenberg, a philosopher of science talks about whether economics is a science. He surveys the changes in economics over the last 25 years--the rise of experimental economics and behavioral economics--and argues that economics has become more scientific and that economists have become more aware of flaws in economic theory. But he also argues that economics is unable to make precise predictions about the effects of various changes in policy and behavior. The conversation closes with a discussion of the role the philosophy of science can play in the evolution of economics.

The impact of economics blogs

An issues so important that the World Bank has been researching it!

From the Bank comes a new Policy Research Working Paper on The Impact of Economics Blogs (pdf) by David McKenzie and Berk Özler. The abstract reads,
There is a proliferation of economics blogs, with increasing numbers of economists attracting large numbers of readers, yet little is known about the impact of this new medium. Using a variety of experimental and non-experimental techniques, this study quantifies some of their effects. First, links from blogs cause a striking increase in the number of abstract views and downloads of economics papers. Second, blogging raises the profile of the blogger (and his or her institution) and boosts their reputation above economists with similar publication records. Finally, a blog can transform attitudes about some of the topics it covers.
Can't say I have noticed any of these effects myself!

Wednesday, 21 September 2011

Economic freedom of the world: 2011

The index published in Economic Freedom of the World measures the degree to which the policies and institutions of countries are supportive of economic freedom. The cornerstones of economic freedom are personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to compete, and security of privately owned property. Forty-two data points are used to construct a summary index and to measure the degree of economic freedom in five broad areas:
  1. Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises;
  2. Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights;
  3. Access to Sound Money;
  4. Freedom to Trade Internationally;
  5. Regulation of Credit, Labour, and Business.
The top ten countries in this year’s index are
  1. Hong Kong 9.01 out of 10;
  2. Singapore (8.68);
  3. New Zealand (8.20);
  4. Switzerland (8.03);
  5. Australia (7.98);
  6. Canada (7.81);
  7. Chile (7.77);
  8. United Kingdom (7.71);
  9. Mauritius (7.67);
  10. and the United States (7.60).
The bottom ten countries in this year’s index are
  1. Zimbabwe (4.08);
  2. Myanmar (4.16);
  3. Venezuela (4.28);
  4. Angola (4.76);
  5. Democratic Republic of Congo (4.84);
  6. Central African Republic (4.88);
  7. Guinea-Bissau (5.03);
  8. Republic of Congo (5.04);
  9. Burundi (5.12);
  10. and Chad (5.32).
I don't think there are any real surprises in either list. That Hong Kong is at the top and Zimbabwe is at the bottom is not great surprise, but perhaps the most interesting point is that the U.S. is down to 10th. Over the last 10 yeasrs, the United States, has suffered one of the largest declines in economic freedom. Much of this decline is a result of higher government spending and borrowing and lower scores for the legal structure and property rights components.

Tuesday, 20 September 2011

EconTalk this week

Garett Jones of George Mason University talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the workers who were hired with money from the 2009 American Recovery and Re-investment Act--the stimulus package. Jones (with co-author Daniel Rothschild) recently completed two studies based on surveys and interviews with firms who received stimulus funds and workers who work at those firms. They found that 42% of workers hired had been unemployed. The remainder came from other jobs or from outside the labor force such as retirement or school. Is 42% a big number or a small number? Jones argues it is small and defends his conclusion. The conversation also includes a discussion of the labor market generally and why the stimulus spending may not have been effective.

Sunday, 18 September 2011

Innovation and foreign ownership

or why foreign ownership isn't bad. Studies have shown that foreign-owned firms are typically more productive. A new column from VoxEU.org presents evidence from Spain that suggests this is mainly due to foreign firms buying the most productive domestic companies.

In their column Maria Guadalupe, Olga Kuzmina and Catherine Thomas ask whether foreign owned firms superior productivity is due to Improvement or selection? That is, they ask Does the observed productivity advantage of the subsidiaries of foreign owned firms reflect improvements due to the multinational companies (MNCs) or acquisition by MNCs of the most productive domestic performers? They write,
Data from Spanish manufacturing firms reveal that up to two-thirds of the performance premium associated with multinational control is due to the fact that multinational firms acquire domestic firms that were initially more productive. The remaining one-third is due to changes made within the subsidiary after acquisition. Specifically, we show that acquired firms undertake more process innovation – simultaneously investing in new machinery and adopting new organisational practices.

We ask why multinationals acquire the best firms, and why these firms subsequently undertake more innovation once they are under multinational control. We find that the optimal amount of innovation is larger when an acquired firm is more productive to start with, because the benefits associated with technology upgrading are proportional to initial firm productivity.

We then show how these benefits are further amplified when the acquired firm accesses export markets through its multinational parent. Empirically, we find evidence for this mechanism. The extent of technology upgrading is significant in firms that use the foreign parent to increase their exports. Taken together, these results suggest that the multinational advantage that results from acquisition is not necessarily due to a transfer of technology from a sophisticated parent firm with lower costs of innovating to a newly acquired subsidiary. It can come about because acquired firms that are part of multinationals gain access to integrated global product markets, even when all firms have the same costs of innovating.
But what is the mechanism explaining both acquisition patterns and technology upgrading.
The mechanism explaining both acquisition patterns and innovation after acquisition relies on the simple assumption that a firm chooses to invest to upgrade its technology as long as the marginal benefits to the firm – in terms of future production profits – exceed the marginal cost of technology investment. The key insight of our paper is that the ownership structure can lower the costs of investment in technology, for example, because a foreign parent firm has proprietary production processes, but can also affect the benefits of technology investment. If the parent firm has large-scale sales and marketing operations, perhaps in other countries, then this may increase the incremental profit from technology upgrading since it increases the average per-unit production profit for a larger volume of sales. In either case, a firm will make more profits from a given improvement in technology under foreign ownership, and will also choose to upgrade technology to a higher level. The additional value created by any technology upgrade is positively related to the initial productivity of the firm. This means that the value-added of foreign ownership relative to domestic control is increasing in initial productivity and, hence, multinationals will opt to acquire the best-performing domestic firms in an economy.
The implications of this?
What are the implications of the findings for the evolution of the distribution of productivity within industries? Our key result is that foreign firms are more likely to acquire the most productive firms within industries, and acquired firms start to innovate more on acquisition.

Taken together this implies that acquisition activity can lead to an increase in the dispersion of the productivity distribution.

Under this mechanism, foreign entry does not lead to productivity convergence, but, on the contrary, could lead to further divergence. Of course, there could be other reasons (such as spillover effects or other externalities) why multinational entry may improve less productive firms’ productivity, and their entry could drive out of business the least productive firms, thus increasing the minimum level of productivity in the industry. However, the direct effect of the foreign acquisition process is an increase in productivity heterogeneity.
A novel result in the paper is to show that an important underlying reason for this divergence in productivity in the Spanish data is not just that the newly acquired firms may have access to superior technologies, but that technology upgrading is also significantly related to firms’ differential access to new export markets.

One important policy implication of the findings, then, is that other channels that reduce the fixed cost of export-market access and open up markets for domestic-controlled firms could lead to some of the productivity improvements documented in foreign-acquired Spanish manufacturing firms.

Rationality, games and conflict

From VoxEU.org comes this audio in which the Nobel laureate Robert Aumann of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem talks to Romesh Vaitilingam about his work on ‘rule rationality’, the development of game theory and its potential for understanding conflict – from the Pax Romana to the modern day Middle East.

Tuesday, 13 September 2011

EconTalk this week

Robert Frank of Cornell University and author of The Darwin Economy talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about competition, government and the relevance of Darwin for economics. In a lively and spirited discussion, Frank argues that because people care about their relative standing with their neighbors, standard conclusions about the virtues of competition are misleading. He argues that competition is often wasteful and he suggests directions for tax policy and other forms of government intervention to take these effects into accounts

Saturday, 10 September 2011

Incentives matter: the firm file

Antti Kauhanen, “The Perils of Altering Incentive Plans: A Case Study”, Managerial and Decision Economics, 32(6) September 2011: 371-384.
This paper studies a retail chain that introduced a sales incentive plan that rewarded for exceeding a sales target and subsequently cut the incentive intensity in addition to increasing the target. Utilizing monthly panel data for 54 months for all 53 units of the chain the paper shows that the introduction of the sales incentive plan increased sales and profitability, whereas the changes in the plan lead to a marked drop in sales and profitability. Thus, modifying the incentive plan proved costly for the firm. The results are consistent with the gift-exchange model of labor contracts.
(HT: Organisations and Markets)

Tuesday, 6 September 2011

EconTalk this week

Clifford Winston of the Brookings Institution talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the market for lawyers and the role of lawyers in the political process. Drawing on a new co-authored book, First Thing We Do, Let's Deregulate All the Lawyers, Winston argues that restrictions on the supply of lawyers and increases in demand via government regulation artificially boost lawyers' salaries. Deregulation of the supply (by eliminating licensing) would lower price and encourage innovation.

In defence of Regime Uncertainty

Craig Pirrong at the Streetwise Professor blog argues that Regime Uncertainty can be seen in terms of a real options argument. Pirromg writes,
But this focus on expectation (itself flawed–more below) is to misstate completely the essence of the regime uncertainty argument, which, believe it or not, is about uncertainty–variation around the expectation. It can be conceived best as a real options argument. Hiring is like an investment: there is a cost of hiring–and firing–workers. This cost is not immaterial. This cost is like the strike price of an option on the right to hire a worker and receive a stream of benefits from employing her.

This stream of benefits is uncertain. Moreover, policy uncertainty is a major driver of the variability of this stream of benefits. Nobody knows how Obamacare is going to play out. Nobody knows what the actual costs of compliance are going to be. If the burden turns out to be very high, the stream of benefits from hiring a worker (or investing in a new machine or a new product) could be quite low, and even negative. If the burden turns out to be low, the stream will be commensurately higher.

Options pricing theory basically implies that in the face of such uncertainty, it is often optimal to defer paying a sunk cost (the strike price) until the uncertainty is resolved. This is why it is usually better to defer the exercise of an option as long as possible, unless there is a stream of benefits (e.g., dividends, interest on the strike price) that can be obtained only after the option is exercised. When to exercise the option–including exercising the option to hire somebody–depends on a trade-off between getting some benefits immediately, and waiting for the resolution of uncertainty about the value of those benefits in the future.

An immediate implication of this is that the greater the uncertainty about the future, the costlier it is to exercise an option early. In the present context, higher uncertainty about the future means that firms will hire less today, all else equal. Hiring a worker today (or investing in a machine or product) generates a stream of benefits for the employer in the short term, but if there is considerable uncertainty about the future value of that stream, it is often wise for potential employers to defer incurring the strike price (the cost of hiring) until some of that uncertainty is resolved.

In the investment literature, the option value of waiting for the resolution of uncertainty drives a wedge between the rate at which firms discount risky expected cash flows and the discount rate implied by something like the CAPM. It helps explain why firms frequently use very high hurdle rates in capital budgeting decisions–and high hurdle rates tend to discourage investment, relative to those that would be undertaken using CAPM. In other words, real optionality tends to reduce investment.

The same effect is at work here. The Burtless argument endorsed by Thoma focuses on expected future benefits. But since these future benefits are risky, and a cost must be sunk to achieve these benefits, there is a cost wedge–the option value of waiting–that is attributable to uncertainty. The more the uncertainty, the greater the wedge.

Saturday, 3 September 2011

Is fractional-reserve banking inflationary?

A question asked by George Selgin at the Free Banking blog. Some members of the Austrian School, with the larest group being followers of Murray Rothbard, see three reasons for opposing fractional reserve banking:
  1. They claim that banks resorting to it defraud people,
  2. that they bring about business cycles, and
  3. that their activities cause inflation.
Selgin's article addresses the last point. Selgin writes,
The “Rothbardians,” as I’ll refer to them, recognize two distinct meanings of the word “inflation.” One meaning—which they prefer—defines it as any increase in the nominal stock of money, including fractionally-backed bank deposits and notes (which they, following Ludwig von Mises, prefer to call “money substitutes”). The other, which is in common use today, defines it as any ongoing increase in the general level of prices, that is, as a positive rate of change in one or more broad price indexes, such as the CPI. In calling fractional reserve banking “inflationary” Rothbardians often seem to have the latter, more conventional definition of inflation in mind, and my arguments are mainly aimed at responding to their complaint so interpreted. However, in doing so, I also hope to clarify the extent to which fractional reserve banking does or doesn’t promote “inflation” in the less conventional and more strictly Rothbardian sense of encouraging growth in the (broad) money stock.

Perhaps the simplest way to assess the price-level consequences of fractional reserve banking is to first imagine an economy in which such banking is prohibited, as many Rothbardians insist it ought to be. Such an economy would admit 100-percent reserve or “warehouse” banks only. To simplify the comparison further, let’s assume that all exchanges are conducted using warehouse bank certificates: in other words, the reserve medium itself—let’s assume it’s gold—doesn’t circulate. The price level adjusts so as to equate the supply of and demand for gold, including bank reserves.

Assuming fixed levels of demand for both money and non-monetary gold, there can be no inflation in this system, in either sense of the term, so long as the gold stock also remains unchanged. That stock could increase, however, as a result of gold mining. For the sake of argument, though, let’s assume that available gold mines have all been exhausted, and that no new discoveries are forthcoming. By assuming that available gold is not consumed—in the sense of being gradually used up—by industry, we can rule out deflation as well.

Suppose next that fractional reserve banking is legalized and that, Rothbardian warnings notwithstanding, it becomes so popular that all the old warehouse banks embrace it. Will inflation result? Of course it will—but only for a time. As fractionally-backed notes (or deposit credits) take the place of their 100-percent reserve predecessors, the demand for monetary gold, and hence the demand for gold in general, declines, causing the value of gold to decline with it. Because prices are expressed in terms of an (unchanged) gold unit, the price level has to rise. But as the demand for gold doesn’t drop to zero—banks still hold some reserves, and there is still a non-monetary demand for gold—the price level eventually reaches a new equilibrium. All this assumes, by the way, that the switch to fractional reserves is worldwide: if the switch was limited to a single, small country, then banks in that country would export their unneeded gold reserves to the rest of the world, and worldwide price level changes would be negligible.

The overall extent of the increase in prices, and of the underlying expansion of fractionally-backed bank money, will depend on the reserve ratio banks settle on. The lower the ratio, the higher the rise in prices. But whatever the ratio turns out to be, the system will eventually reach a point at which inflation ceases. The move to fractional reserves results, in other words, in a permanent, once-and-for-all price level change, but not in any permanent change in the inflation rate.

What’s to keep the banks from further reducing their reserve ratios? The answer is that, so long as they all compete on an equal footing, as in a free banking system, each will be inclined to routinely return claims, such as checks or banknotes, received from rival banks. The uncertain flow of such interbank “clearings” generates a demand for reserves for settlement, which (in the presence of positive costs of default) will vary with the volume of outstanding bank liabilities, even if bank customers never bother to withdraw gold. Although optimal reserve ratios are unlikely to remain perfectly constant over time, and may decline gradually as more efficient settlement procedures are discovered, for the most part the rate of inflation under an established and mature fractional reserve arrangement is unlikely to differ substantially from the rate that would prevail under 100-percent reserves.

Admittedly this conclusion depends on the assumption of an unchanged real demand for money. If the demand for money grows over time, as it does in most healthy economies, that growth will in fact have different implications for inflation under the two regimes. Yet it still won’t promote inflation in either case. On the contrary: in the 100-percent reserve case, growth in money demand must cause prices to decline at a roughly corresponding rate (“roughly” because there may be some shifting of available gold from non-monetary employments to bank reserves). Under fractional-reserve banking, in contrast, there will be greater scope for monetary expansion, depending on how free banks are from legal impediments. Under free banking, for example, banks can “stretch” their reserves somewhat as the demand for money increases, provided that the increase takes the form of a fallen velocity of money. This happens because the fall in velocity translates, ceteris paribus, into a fall in both the volume of bank clearings and the demand for reserves. In other words, in the presence of economic growth, a free fractional-reserve banking system, although it won’t promote inflation, will be somewhat less deflationary than a 100-percent reserve system.
Selgin ends by saying,
So it’s time to dump the rhetoric linking inflation to fractional reserves. Fractional-reserve banking may have its drawbacks, but a tendency to fuel inflation isn’t one of them, and the chief beneficiaries of claims to the contrary are none other than the world’s central bankers and their apologists.

Friday, 2 September 2011

The (bad) politics of asset sales

Over at Kiwiblog David Farrar writes,
My NZ Herald column is on the politics of asset sales. I look at the risks to the Government, and ask and answer the question about why they are doing it , despite the political risk.
Well bugger the politics, lets worry about what really matters, the economics of asset sales. On this point, I would argue, David does very badly. In his Herald column David writes,
I believe two factors have reduced the intensity of feeling on the issue of asset sales. The first is the fact they are very different to the asset sales done so enthusiastically by Roger Douglas and Phil Goff in the 1980s and Ruth Richardson in the 1990s. Those sales were for 100 per cent of the asset, often went direct to a private buyer with no opportunity for "Mum and Dad" investors, and the private buyers were often foreign.

National's policy of retaining 51 per cent in state control, floating them on the stock exchange rather doing a trade sale, giving New Zealand institutions first preference for purchases, and now inserting a maximum 10 per cent cap on any private shareholding reduce the fear factor around the share sales.

It is literally impossible for a foreign company to take control. In fact it will be impossible for a foreign company to have a share-holding in excess of 10 per cent.
As to the point that buyers of assets in the past have been foreign, this is not an argument against asset sales, xenophobia is not any kind of economic argument at all, for anything. Also having foreign bidders just means that the price the government gets for its assets is higher than it otherwise would be. A higher price is also paid for a controlling share in a firm, selling a partial share in a firm will lower the price paid. 51% is worth a lot more than 49%! Also having "Mum and Dad" investors - and a New Zealand investor bias - is not necessarily a good thing, this will also lower the price received, as will use of a stock market float. All the evidence on privatisations via a float on the share market shows a large amount of under pricing. Also these studies show that "Mums and Dads" sell out to other larger buyers very quickly. Having "Mum and Dad" investors could also affect the efficiency gains that having private owners can bring about. A single large, albeit partial, owner is more likely to be able to force efficiently enhancing changes on the firm.

In more general terms we already have insight on how partial private ownership is likely to turn out; not well. The SOE Act states that SOEs, basically, have to be run like normal non-government owned firms. In effect this requirement is the same as you could get if private owners have a stake in a firm. The private owners would, we assume, wish to maximise profits, but the government may not. And you see this with SOEs. The government often wishes to intervene in the running of SOEs to get them to carry out not profit maximising activities, just as it would if it had a partial stake in a mixed ownership firm. This problem of having SOEs (or mixed ownership firms) trying to serve two masters was noted more than 10 years ago by Spicer, Emanuel and Powell in their book "Transforming Government Enterprises: Managing Radical Organisational Change in Deregulated Environments" (The Centre for Independent Studies, 1996). They warned that there are two pressures on SOE's: the first being towards privatisation since the productivity and efficiency gains achieved by SOE are in danger of being eroded over time. Privatisation is a way of both cementing in the commercial orientation of enterprises and wringing out further gains resulting from the high powered incentive and control mechanisms which can be bought to bear in privately owned and publicly traded companies. The second pressure on SOEs is towards being pulled back into the public sector where social and political objectives can be more readily be meet. What we saw under the Clark government was the second of these pressures being very strong. But not for socially useful reasons. Most interventions seem to be more politically motivated.

These pressures would also be there for a mixed ownership firms and help explain why they don't do as well as fully privately owned firms. For example, Aidan Vinning and Anthony Boardman in "Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises", Journal of Law and Economics vol. XXXII (April 1989) conclude 'The results provide evidence that after controlling for a wide variety of factors, large industrial MEs [mixed enterprises] and SOEs perform substantially worse than similar PCs [private corporations].' The basic problem is that full or partial government ownership politicises the firm.

Farrar also writes that,
Turning to the economic issues, there are a mixture of reasons why National is risking some of its popularity for this issue. The strongest reason is probably a genuine belief that a company which is not 100 per cent Government owned will perform better over time. Not every private company is better performing than every public company. But overall, the evidence is that private ownership does lead to better performing companies.
See above for arguments and evidence on the relative effectiveness of partial private ownership on firm performance. If the government really does want to improve the performance of state owned firms, then as Vinning and Boardman show, full privatisation is the better answer.

Demographic change, retirement and healthcare

From VoxEU.org comes this audio in which Nobel laureate Peter Diamond of MIT talks to Romesh Vaitilingam about of the impact of improved longevity and the resulting demographic change on the retirement and healthcare systems of the advanced economies.

EconTalk for many weeks

Debra Satz, Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University, talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about her book, Why Some Things Should Not Be For Sale: The Moral Limits of the Market. Satz argues that some markets are noxious and should not be allowed to operate freely. Topics discussed include organ sales, price spikes after natural disasters, the economic concept of efficiency and utilitarianism. The conversation includes a discussion of the possible limits of political intervention and whether it would be good to allow voters to sell their votes.

David Brady of Stanford University talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the lessons of the election of 2010 and what we might expect from the elections of 2012. Brady draws on political history as well as survey results from work with colleagues Doug Rivers and Morris Fiorina to speculate about the elections of 2012. Along the way he discusses the power of the independent vote, how ObamaCare affected the election of 2010, and the prospects for the Republican nominee in 2012. Taped a few days before the deal on the debt was reached, Brady gives his thoughts on the politics of the negotiations. The conversation concludes with a discussion of whether Obama will have a primary challenger.

Brendan O'Donohoe of Frito-Lay talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about how potato chips and other salty snacks get made, distributed, and marketed. The interview follows an hour-long tour of a local supermarket where O'Donohoe showed Roberts some of the ways that chips and snacks get displayed and marketed in a modern supermarket. The conversation is a window into a world that few of us experience or are even aware of--how modern producers and retailers make sure the shelves are stocked and their products get noticed..

Eric Hanushek of Stanford University's Hoover Institution talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the importance of teacher quality in education. Hanushek argues that the standard measures of quality--experience and advanced degrees--are uncorrelated with student performance. But some teachers consistently cover dramatically more material and teach more than others, even within a school. Hanushek presents evidence that the impact of these differences on lifetime earnings for students can be quite large. The conversation closes with a discussion of school finance and the growth of administrators within school systems.

Thursday, 1 September 2011

Dying to be a manager?

This information is from Peter Klein at Organisations and Markets:
A somewhat disheartening report on US workplace safety: The Bureau of Labor Statistics has its fascinatingly morbid fatality census report out! Are you a manager of some sort? Watch your back, because the study says if you die on the job, there’s a 10% chance it’s murder. That’s correct. Out of the 4,547 workplace deaths in 2010, 10% of the kaput management was a direct result of homicide.
Should I point this out to the Head of Department?!

Saturday, 6 August 2011

Keynes Vs. Hayek

Here’s a link, from BBC Radio 4, to the debate between George Selgin and Jamie Whyte on Team Hayek and Lord Skidelsky and Duncan Weldon on Team Keynes on the virtues and vices of Keynesian economics.
What caused the financial mess we're in? And how do we get out of it? Two of the great economic thinkers of the 20th century had sharply contrasting views: John Maynard Keynes believed that government spending could create employment and longer term growth. His contemporary and rival Friedrich Hayek believed that investments have to be based on real savings rather than increased public spending or artificially low interest rates. Keynes's biographer, Professor Lord Skidelsky, will take on modern day followers of Hayek in a debate at the London School of Economics. Paul Mason, economics editor of Newsnight, is in the chair.

Foreign ownership may be good for you, if you are a firm that is

Foreign ownership of firms is one of those topics which, for reasons I have yet to workout, generates much heat and little light. There are those who just seem to oppose it for reasons that have little to do with the economics of the situation. A working paper by Francisco Pérez-González, of the Stanford business school, looks at "The Impact of Acquiring Control on Productivity". The abstract reads,
Empirical studies on the importance of control rights on efficiency are hindered by actual –presumably efficient– ownership patterns. Finding settings where the right owner does not own the right asset and where ownership arbitrarily changes is challenging. In this paper I aim at overcoming these problems by investigating the elimination of foreign majority ownership restrictions in Mexico. Specifically, I study the performance of affiliates of multinational corporations for which (1) ownership restrictions appeared to bind before they were lifted, and (2) parent ownership increased from minority to majority as the reform was implemented. Using detailed plant-level information, I find that multinational control leads to large improvements in total factor productivity, particularly in industries that rely on technological innovations from their parent companies. Control is also associated with higher investment –particularly in technology intensive forms of production–, and with an improvement in the skill profile of the labor force. Overall, I interpret the evidence as supportive of the property rights theory of the firm.
The conclusion says, in part
In this paper I study the impact of acquiring majority ownership on the performance of Mexican affiliates of multinational corporations (MNCs.) I use the elimination in foreign majority ownership restrictions as a plausible source of exogenous variation.

I find that the allocation of control does affect production decisions and production efficiency. The results show that ownership restrictions to foreign ownership harmed the production efficiency of affiliates of multinational corporations. Upon liberalization, a large fraction of minority owned affiliates became majority or wholly-owned by their parent companies. Plants for which foreign ownership translated into majority or full ownership experienced economically and statistically large productivity gains. Overall, the analysis shows strong evidence that the choice of organizational form affects productivity, particularly in technology intensive industries.

The evidence suggests that government policies directed to attract technological transfers should recognize the importance of residual control rights, particularly in countries with weak legal enforcement. Governments often limit foreign ownership to promote local interests or to prevent expropriation by multinationals. While domestic majority rules do shift the balance in favor of local partners, the impact on overall welfare is uncertain. Fear from expropriation by local partners deters foreign investors from sharing their technologies or making country specific investments, which does hurt economic performance.
In short what Pérez-González finds is that a movement to majority foreign ownership, via increased control by a foreign multinational, leads to large improvements in total factor productivity and to higher levels of investment .

For the geeks out there, Pérez-González interprets this evidence as supportive of the property rights theory of the firm as developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990).

“Keynesian Death Spiral”

Jerry O’Driscoll discuses the problem at the ThinkMarkets blog. He writes,
The more powerful one believes fiscal stimulus to be, the more adept the Keynesian policymaker must be. If the stimulus has powerful positive effects when added, it will have powerful negative effects when withdrawn. Hence, the application of stimulus and its withdrawal must be precisely timed. An economist would ask from whence the knowledge to do this would come.

As Hassett notes, however, stimulus has not two but three stages. It may boost growth when added, but must slow growth when withdrawn. The third stage comes when taxes (current or future) must be paid to fund the stimulus. That stage is always negative in its effects. Thus, Hassett concludes that “the total impact of the Keynesian policy is negative over its life.”
But politicians use an aggressive stimulus to avert what they see as near-term distress which has negative effects when removed or has to be paid for so they use another stimulus to avert another near-term set of problems which ..... and the cumulative effect of which can be ruinous.

The Eurozone crisis: Greek recovery and the challenges of asymmetric monetary union

At VoxEU.org David Vines talks to Viv Davies about the recovery prospects for Greece following the country’s second bailout. They discuss the challenges of asymmetric monetary union, Eurobonds, the peripheral economies and the current situation in Italy. Vines presents the case for stronger fiscal management and political leadership.

Friday, 5 August 2011

How minimum wages encourage discrimination

Yet another unfortunate consequence of minimum wages is the encouragement it gives for discrimination. Karthik Reddy writes on this point over at the IEA blog. She explains,
The free market is a powerful tool that forces market participants to pay for their discriminatory tendencies. In a free market system, for example, if a discriminatory employer would like to hire a worker to do some task, and the employer is, say, disinclined to hire blue-eyed workers, he must be willing to pay for the extra cost of brown-eyed labour if he follows his discriminatory tendencies; blue-eyed labourers faced with such discrimination may compete on the basis of price and lower the wage they receive.

A wage floor, however, prohibits workers from competing amongst one another on the basis of price, and removes economics from the discriminatory employer’s decision-making process. The employer must pay potential labourers, whether blue-eyed or brown-eyed, the same wage, and because the equal wage ensures that this employer will pay no price to discriminate against the blue-eyed worker, he is free to make his hiring decision on some basis other than price and productivity, and will hire the brown-eyed worker.
Such an outcome is in this day and age an unintended consequence of minimum wages but a consequence none the less.

Reddy continues,
This theoretical discussion is not without real-world evidence; there have been instances in societies with significant racial animosity of the use of wage floors as tools to deliberately diminish the labour participation of certain groups. In the early twentieth century southern United States, for example, racist activists trying to exclude black Americans from the workforce found minimum wages to be an effective tool to accomplish this insidious goal in a seemingly inoffensive way.

In 1909, the prejudiced Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen demanded that the Georgia Railroad fire all Black workers. Economist Walter Williams observes that instead of such a transparent and overtly discriminatory measure, the exclusion was accomplished through the imposition of wage controls: ‘Instead of eliminating blacks … the arbitration board decided that black firemen, hostlers, and hostlers’ helpers should be paid wages equal to the wages of white men doing the same job.’1 The strategy satisfied white unionists, who knew that when forced to pay an equal wage to blacks and whites, discriminatory employers would no longer pay any cost for their discrimination and would hire white workers at the expense of blacks. The union stated: ‘If this course of action is followed by the company and the incentive for employing the Negro thus removed, the strike will not have been in vain.’

Similarly, white supremacist groups in South Africa under apartheid pushed for minimum wage laws as a way to reduce black participation in the labor force. The overtly racist Mine Workers Union, for example, demanded a minimum wage to protect their dominance in the workplace and openly stated: ‘The real point on is that whites have been ousted by coloured labour. It is not because a man is white or coloured, but owing to the fact that the latter is cheap … when that [minimum wage] is introduced we believe that most of the difficulties in regard to the coloured question will automatically drop out.’ Similarly, the South African Wage Board, which set minimum wages in different sectors of that country’s economy beginning in 1925, ‘concentrated its wage determinations only on those areas of industry where nonwhites were in competition with whites, and made no wage determinations in areas where there was no such competition.’
As noted above, modern minimum wage laws are not, we hope, imposed with such underhanded or targeted intentions. But it still turns out that the use of minimum wages to achieve discriminatory ends is indicative of the ability of wage floors to erase the cost employers must pay to discriminate. And demand curves slope downwards, as something gets cheaper you get more of it. So whether or not it is intentional it has to be recognised that discrimination increases to the extent that minimum wages rise above the market wage.

Thursday, 4 August 2011

Incentives matter: blood file

In an article from VoxEU.org Joan Costa-i-Font, Mireia Jofre-Bonet and Steven Yen argue that paying some people to donate blood while others receive a cursory “thanks” has been shown to crowd out the altruistic donors. They write,
Individuals might undertake certain altruistic actions guided by an extrinsic motivation, including a “warm-glow” or moral satisfaction. Trying to answer the question of whether altruistic behaviour can be incentivised, in recent research (Costa-Font et al. 2011) we investigate whether different financial and non-financial incentives have the same effect on willingness to donate when other observed and unobserved factors are controlled for. In particular, we investigate whether crowding-out takes place with all kinds of rewards, or specifically with only monetary rewards. We answer this question by exploiting a large data set representative of 15 European countries containing information on whether or not an individual has been a donor in the past and her preferences towards monetary and non-monetary compensation for blood donation. This information allows estimation of two recursive equation systems and exploration of the relationship of preferences over different types of rewards and the probability of being a donor.

Importantly, we find that a monetary reward reduced the probability of donation consistent with the crowding out hypothesis, whilst a non-monetary reward consistently with a normal supply curve suggests a positive and significant effect on the donation probability.

These results are robust to different specifications and indicate that crowding out is a phenomenon linked to the introduction of a market-based rationale for non-market decisions, and that socially motivated individuals remain willing to donate when non-monetary rewards are offered.
and
Non-monetary rewards could potentially be used to incentivise blood donation as this kind of rewards seem not to remove, in the terminology of Andreoni et al. (2008), the warm-glow associated to blood giving.
So incentives matter, but the form the incentive takes may also matter.

But on blood donations and incentives compare the above with this study: Will There Be Blood? Incentives and Substitution Effects in Pro-social Behavior by Nicola Lacetera, Mario Macis and Robert Slonim, Discussion Paper No. 4567, November 2009, Institute for the Study of Labor. The abstract of the paper reads:
We examine how economic incentives affect pro-social behavior through the analysis of a unique dataset with information on more than 14,000 American Red Cross blood drives. Our findings are consistent with blood donors responding to incentives in a “standard” way; offering donors economic incentives significantly increases turnout and blood units collected, and more so the greater the incentive’s monetary value. In addition, there is no disproportionate increase in donors who come to a drive but are ineligible to donate when incentives are offered. Further evidence from a small-scale field experiment corroborates these findings and confirms that donors are motivated by the economic value of the items offered. We also find that a substantial fraction of the increase in donations due to incentives may be explained by donors substituting away from neighboring drives toward drives where rewards are offered, and the likelihood of this substitution is higher the higher the monetary value of the incentive offered and if neighboring drives do not offer incentives. Thus, extrinsic incentives motivate pro-social behavior, but unless substitution effects are also considered, the effect of incentives may be overestimated.
  • Andreoni, J, WT Harbaugh, L Vesterlund (2008), “Altruism in experiments”, in SN Durlauf and LE Blume (eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 134-138.
  • Costa-Font, Joan, Mireia Jofre-Bonet, Steven T Yen (2011), “Not All Incentives Wash Out the Warm Glow: The Case of Blood Donation Revisited”, CESifo Working Paper No. 3527.

Interesting blog bits

  1. rauparaha on Greens on poverty
    I like the idea of helping poor families but is the best plan really to:
    • raise marginal tax rates on them,
    • give them cheaper bachelor’s degrees,
    • increase the barriers to entering the workforce at the minimum wage; and,
    • increase the cost of rental properties?
  2. Eric Crampton explains Why I still can't take the Greens seriously
    I love the Greens on civil liberties, or at least relative to most other parties and with a big caveat on their nannying proclivities with respect to tobacco and fatty foods. And they're good on copyright. But their economic policy prescriptions...egads.
  3. Seamus Hogan gives us A Diatribe Against Capital Gains Taxes-Part I
    I noted in my post on Labour’s tax policy here that there were arguments on both sides for capital gains taxes. This was a euphimistic way of saying that there are economists who I respect who are in favour of capital gains taxes, so I wouldn’t want to dismiss the idea out of hand, but I have a hard time understanding how they could come to that conclusion. So I am going to lay out the case against in a couple of posts. Most of the points below are standard fare but a couple of them I haven’t seen before.
  4. Seamus Hogan gives us A Diatribe Against Capital Gains Taxes-Part II
    I noted yesterday that the main argument put by proponents of capital gains taxes is that they are needed to encourage savings into productive investments rather than into chasing capital gains. This sounds plausible on the surface, but I’m not sure that those making that argument have fully stated their implicit assumptions.
  5. Seamus Hogan gives us Capital Gains Taxes Redux
    A couple of comments on my previous posts have suggested two possible efficiency motivations for having capital gains taxes. Both are theoretically correct, but neither makes a convincing case for a real-world CGT, in my opinion.
  6. Freakonomics on Killer Cars: An Extra 1,000 Pounds Increases Crash Fatalities by 47%
    Ever since the SUV craze began in the late 1980s, we’ve all known that heavier vehicles are safer for those driving them, but more dangerous for others on the road. Which is why we all started driving them. Now, in a new working paper, a pair of Berkeley economists have quantified not only the fatality risks of heavier cars for other drivers, but also the costs associated with them.
  7. Quamrul Ashraf and Oded Galor on The “Out of Africa” hypothesis, human genetic diversity, and comparative economic development
    The reasons given for the vast divide in standard of living between different parts of the world are many, with some economic historians claiming the roots lie in the colonial period. This column goes back even further to the cradle of humankind in East Africa, suggesting that the genetic diversity of the tribes that dispersed to different parts of the globe determined their success many thousands of years later.
  8. David Starkie argues that Air Passenger Duty - damaging a major growth industry
    UK aviation has been a major growth industry in recent years, with high gross value added - just the sort of industry you might imagine the government would wish to encourage. Yet recent changes to Air Passenger Duty (APD) mean that it is the most highly taxed aviation industry in the world and it is showing serious signs of fatigue.
  9. Mark Pennington on Ha Joon Chang: Wrong on Free Trade, Markets and Development
    My first post on 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism addressed Ha Joon Chang’s dubious debating tactics when discussing ‘free market economics’. I turn now to some of Chang’s more specific critiques of economic liberalism to illustrate these tactics in greater detail.

Wednesday, 3 August 2011

EconTalk this week

Anat Admati of Stanford University talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about ways to make the financial system more stable. In particular, Admati explores the implications of higher capital requirements. She argues that current policies subsidize leverage--high levels of debt relative to equity--and that current levels of leverage increase the vulnerability of the system to swings in asset prices. She then gives her response to criticisms of higher equity levels. The conversation concludes with a discussion of the role of academic economists and finance professors as advocates for various policies.

The impact of Chinese imports on innovation, it, and productivity

Writing in the August 2011 issue of The NBER Digest Laurent Belsie notes:
In Trade-Induced Technical Change? The Impact of Chinese Imports on Innovation, IT, and Productivity (NBER Working Paper No. 16717), authors Nicholas Bloom, Mirko Draca, and John Van Reenen examine more than a half million firms in 12 European countries between 1996 and 2007. They find that every 10 percentage point rise in Chinese imports in a firm's industry was associated with an increase of: 3.2 percent in patents, 3.6 percent in IT spending, 12 percent in R and D spending, and 2.6 percent in total factor productivity (TFP). The authors observe that more innovative firms tended to grow while the less innovative ones tended to shrink or disappear altogether. In fact, they conclude, a surge in Chinese imports appears to have been responsible for about 15 percent of the technological upgrades at European firms between 2000 and 2007. At the same time , that surge led to decreases in employment, profits, prices, and skill share in the affected industries. Imports from other low-wage nations had a similar impact, but imports from developed nations did not.

"What may be happening is that trade is stimulating technical progress, which in turn is increasing the demand for skilled labor," the authors write. "It is not simply that patents per worker, or average TFP, increases -- total innovation in the affected firms and industries expands when they face more exogenous threats from Chinese imports." One explanation may be that companies already have certain "trapped factors," such as equipment or firm-specific skills, which they might as well try to use to develop new processes or products. Opening up to trade effectively lowers their opportunity cost of innovation.

At the same time, employment is being reallocated among firms. For every 10 percentage point increase in imports, employment falls 3.5 percent overall in the affected sectors, but this decline is not shared evenly. Highly innovative companies are more likely to grow; less innovative ones are more likely to shrink. A 10 percentage point increase in Chinese imports decreases the probability of survival of European firms by about 17 percent.

To correct for the possibility that unobserved technological shocks affected their results, the authors examine the effects of Chinese imports after China`s entry into the World Trade Organization, which led to the end of import quotas on textiles and apparel. This allows them to study industries that had widely different experiences after trade liberalization and to focus on textiles and apparel: although relatively low tech, they were still the source of more than 22,000 patents from European companies during the period they study. The authors also control for differential industry-specific time trends and exploit the fact that Chinese imports tended to increase where China already had established a "bridgehead" by the mid-1990s. The results support their main conclusion that Chinese trade spurred innovation.

The authors conclude that the surge in Chinese imports was responsible for about 15 percent of European technological change for the whole period from 2000 to 2007, but the impact now seems to be growing stronger. They write that "this effect appears to be increasing over time and may even be an underestimate as we also identify a role for offshoring to China in increasing TFP and IT adoption (although not for innovation). This suggests that increased import competition with China has caused a significant technological upgrading in European firms in the affected industries through both faster diffusion and innovation."
Yet another reason to fight for free trade. An increase of 10 percentage points in Chinese imports in a firm's industry is associated with an increase of: 3.2 percent in patents, 3.6 percent in IT spending, 12 percent in R&D spending, and 2.6 percent in total factor productivity (TFP). Under increased competition from imports the more innovative firms grow while the less innovative ones tend to shrink or disappear. Overall, competition from imports is significantly increasing technological upgrading. This is all to the good.

Monday, 1 August 2011

Economists thinking about sex

I came across this piece by (non-economist) Grover Cleveland at the Pileus blog. Cleveland writes,
I was stuck at the airport for much of last Saturday and so perused the magazine racks there at some length during breaks from the pain of trying to work in an airport chair. At one point, my eyes wandered over to the newest edition of Psychology Today - a pretty awful magazine - and noticed the front cover advertising an article titled something like: Why Smart People Have Less Sex. (Emphasis added)
Well, this just goes to proves I must be a genius! :-(

Cleveland goes on to note that
I instantly and without really thinking at all said to myself, “Well that must be due to their higher opportunity cost,” before I even processed anything on a more intellectual level or even picked up the magazine. I decided to see if the article did touch on this (obvious) possible explanation and was disappointed during a quick perusal to see it wasn’t really discussed as an alternative in anything more than a cursory fashion.
May be I should point out that the tile of the Cleveland's article is "I’m spending too much time around economists". Personally I don't see how that's possible, but may be that just me.

Friday, 29 July 2011

Consumer surplus of event 2

At Offsetting Behaviour Eric Crampton responds to my post on Consumer surplus of events by arguing that what I am missing is that there could be a market failure preventing the realisation of potential consumer surplus.

First I am yet to be convinced that there really are market failures of this type. There are many ways to get people to pay at least some of – enough of - their CS to have an event put on. Second its not clear to me that even if there is such a market failure the use of a government subsidy is the optimal policy response. Think of the argument for the use of tariffs to deal with problems of infant industries. Back in 1969 Richard Baldwin pointed out that even if some form of government action is need to protection infant industries tariffs were a bad way of providing such protection. He argues that what is needed to handle the problems of infant industries is a much more direct and selective policy measure than import duties. I wonder if a similar case cannot be made here. There has to be a better more direct, selective policy response to whatever market failure is occurring than the use of a subsidy. Is there really no way to address the market failure at its source rather than distort multiple markets via the use of subsidies and the taxes to fund them?

What role can trade policy play in the fight against malaria?

May be an odd sounding question, but at VoxEU.org Lucian Cernat argues for greater coherence between trade, foreign investment, and other malaria-related policy initiatives. In particular, technical assistance should prioritise the removal of "killer tariffs" on mosquito nets. He writes,
At first sight one would argue that trade policy cannot be called upon to contribute directly to this important public-health challenge. Yet, trade policy was seen as one additional tool to fight malaria by African leaders. In April 2000, at the African Summit on Roll Back Malaria in Nigeria, 39 African countries have pledged to remove taxes and tariffs on insecticide-treated nets and other malaria-related preventive materials and drugs (WHO 2003).

This was hailed as a quick and effective contribution that trade policy could make towards the eradication of malaria in Africa. But, more than a decade later, it turns out that quite a few countries severely affected by malaria still maintain tariffs on the importation of mosquito nets and other malaria-fighting products and drugs.

According to the information provided by the Malaria Taxes and Tariffs Advocacy Project (a joint project sponsored by the WHO and Gates Foundation), in August 2010, some 30 countries in Africa still maintained tariffs as high as 20% on ITNs.

Imposing a tariff on a life-saving product can be tantamount to a "killer tariff" for some poor African households who would have to choose between food or other essential products and a more expensive mosquito net.

Over 100 million people are living in malaria-endemic countries that still apply a tariff on mosquito nets. For the top African countries with the highest number of reported malaria cases in 2010, tariffs on mosquito nets are still between 5% and 35% and the mosquito net ownership ratios are very low, except in Gambia. The correlation is not very strong since ownership ratios are in some countries largely determined by (duty) free distribution of mosquito nets by donors and international agencies.

It should be noted that several countries (e.g. Kenya, Uganda, Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria) have taken the right steps and have eliminated tariffs on mosquito nets. Furthermore, countries like Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Madagascar have explicitly created several duty-free tariff lines for products including "mosquito net" in their descriptions (thus avoiding customs classification misunderstanding or abuse). Other countries have announced that, even if tariffs are still officially in place, they would waive the tariffs on mosquito nets.

But, as long as some double-digit tariffs persist, several malaria-endemic countries seem to import negligible amounts of mosquito nets in commercial terms, despite low coverage rates among vulnerable groups.
Another reason for free trade.

Yet another benefit of globalisation:

better management practices in firms.

Peter Klein at Organizations and Markets points us to this new paper:
The Land that Lean Manufacturing Forgot? Management Practices in Transition Countries
Nicholas Bloom, Helena Schweiger, John Van Reenen
NBER Working Paper No. 17231, July 2011
We have conducted the first survey on management practices in transition countries. We found that Central Asian transition countries, such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, have on average very poor management practices. Their average scores are below emerging countries such as Brazil, China and India. In contrast, the central European transition countries such as Poland and Lithuania operate with management practices that are only moderately worse than those of western European countries such as Germany. Since we find these practices are strongly linked to firm performance, this suggests poor management practices may be impeding the development of Central Asian transition countries. We find that competition, multinational ownership, private ownership and human capital are all strongly correlated with better management. This implies that the continued opening of markets to domestic and foreign competition, privatisation of state-owned firms and increased levels of workforce education should promote better management, and ultimately faster economic growth. (Emphasis added)
So more evidence that globalisation can be good for your growth.

Thursday, 28 July 2011

Consumer surplus of events

In my recent posting on World cup costs and benefits I made mention of the Ph.D. thesis of Sam Richardson from Massey University. Richardson’s thesis was on "Assessing the economic justification for government involvement in sports facilities and events in New Zealand".

On taking a quick look at the thesis the following comment stood out for me:
The final analytical contribution of this research involves the estimation of consumer surplus benefits from a demand model for representative rugby in Wanganui. The consumer surplus benefits are then compared to the cost of local government involvement in the upgrade of the playing facility to evaluate whether the council’s involvement was economically justified. (Emphasis added.)
What I don’t see is why you would compare consumer surplus (CS) to costs to evaluate the council’s investment.

Three question came to mind for me: 1) If CS is a reason for government involvement in a project then isn’t this a reason for government involvement in almost everything? I meant the CS generated by computer software, for example, must be huge and thus should the government not subsidise Bill Gates?! 2) If there really is enough CS to justify government involvement doesn’t this tell us that that real issue here is one of the pricing of the event? If the council priced in such a way as to capture the CS, e.g. some form of price discrimination, then evaluation of its investment would be easy, just look at the profits generated. 3) If there is a large amount of CS to be captured then why have the council involved at all? Why not just let the private sector run/build the event/stadium, pricing in such a way as to capture the CS, and let the event stand on its own economic feet? No government involvement is necessary.

Of course I could just be missing something obvious.

EconTalk this week

Keith Hennessey of Stanford University's Hoover Institution talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the debt ceiling and the budget process. Hennessey, who worked for Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott on budget issues in the late 1990s, explains the politics of the debt ceiling and the budget process. Using his past experience as a staffer, Hennessey gives those of us on the outside a window into what is actually going on in the hallways, who has power, and how information flows up and down in the chain of constituents, members, party leaders. The conversation closes with Hennessey's best guess of which outcomes of the current negotiations are most likely and why

Interesting blog bits

  1. Karyn Scherer writes about Roger Kerr: The happy warrior
    Government indifference, public hostility, even cancer - despite it all, the Business Roundtable's Roger Kerr can't help being an optimist
  2. Mark Pennington on What Ha Joon Chang Doesn’t Tell You about ‘Free Market Economics’
    Professor Ha Joon Chang has become something of a hero to those who champion heterodox economic theory and who rail against the supposed intellectual hegemony of ‘neo-liberalism’. In a number of books such as Kicking Away the Ladder Chang sets out to overturn the alleged orthodoxies of mainstream economics by questioning the case for free trade as an appropriate development strategy in poorer countries and more widely making the case for a high regulation/big government agenda. These themes are vividly on display in Chang’s latest best seller 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism. Unfortunately, also on display in this book is Chang’s penchant for misrepresenting opponents, the use of straw man analyses and claims to theoretical innovation for what amounts to ‘re-inventing the wheel’.
  3. Tim Worstall notes that The Washington Consensus Works
    I know this isn’t what Dani Rodrik is trying to point out in this blog post but it is the lesson that I take away from it
  4. Art Carden has a few Thoughts on Liberty and Society
    I spent this week teaching at an Institute for Humane Studies “Liberty and Society” Summer Seminar. The weekend closed with a panel wherein the members of the seminar faculty answered questions about the importance of liberty, strategies for advancing liberty, our worldviews, and so on. Here are a few thoughts based on the questions that jumped out at me.
  5. Tony Wrigley on Opening Pandora’s box: A new look at the industrial revolution
    Before the industrial revolution, economists considered output to be fundamentally constrained by the limited supply of land. This column explores how the industrial revolution managed to break free from these shackles. It describes the important innovations that made the industrial revolution an energy revolution.
  6. Matt Nolan on Keeping NZ inflation in perspective
    Holy shit. Since I’ve started getting the chance to read opinion pieces again I’ve noticed one extreme theme running through them – a sharp and angry fear of inflationary pressures
  7. David Friedman on Austrian Fantasy
    Browsing the web, I came across the following claim by Lew Rockwell:

    " Need I note, as this article indirectly indicates, that the whole world is reading Rothbard, but that Friedman is almost a nobody outside of mainstream academic economics?"
  8. Eric Crampton on A public responsibility?
    When we have a public health system, and when folks worry about costs others impose through the health system, all kinds of private behaviours have external effects.
  9. James Otteson on Stiglitz on Deregulation and the Rich
    Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz argued recently that both the economic downturn of the last two years and the looming debt crisis are the fault of “a powerful ideology—the belief in free and unfettered markets,” whose “30-year ascendance” has “brought the world to the brink of economic ruin.”

    As an economist, I can’t hold a candle to Stiglitz. Still I am puzzled by a couple of Stiglitz’s claims.

Sunday, 24 July 2011

World cup costs and benfits

Eric Crampton at Offsetting Behaviour notes this piece about Massey University economist Sam Richardson who is taking about the benefits (or otherwise) of the rugby world cup.
Dr Richardson, who researched public spending on major sporting events for his PhD, says the $507m to $700m [in economic benefits] bandied about is a lofty and unrealistic figure.

[...]

“Maybe the Government shouldn’t talk about economic impact,” he says. “I do not think we should be using economic impact as a justification for hosting sporting events. Maybe we should forget the magic figures and focus on the long-term benefits.”

Dr Richardson is sceptical of any argument that suggests we are going to get something tangible out of hosting events. “The bottom line is yes, we are going to bring in visitors, and yes, they will spend money. We also know that the taxpayer will pick up a sizeable chunk of what is expected to be a loss of around $40 million.

[...]

He says research from the United States shows the real figure could be gained by moving the decimal point one place to the left.

“Based on the original figure, this would give us $50.7 million – there is an element of truth to that view,” he says. “But we cannot confidently say it is going to bring in so many dollars. If we are justifying government spending on these numbers, it tends to become a creative accounting exercise.”
Richarson's PhD thesis was done on, "Assessing the economic justification for government involvement in sports facilities and events in New Zealand". Perhaps the takeaway line comes from the abstract, where he writes,
Findings of the research suggest that the economic impact argument for government involvement in the construction of sports facilities and the hosting of internationally oriented events is generally not justified [...]
If only central and local government could understand this point as such an understanding it would save the taxpayers and ratepayers of New Zealand a lot of money.

Contemporary work in Austrian Economics

Contemporary work in Austrian Economics is the title of a new working paper by Anthony J. Evans, Associate Professor of Economics, ESCP Europe. The paper is based on a talk given as “Austrian Economics: Past, Present and Future”, The Adam Smith Institute, St Stephens Club London, September 23rd 2010.

The abstract reads,
This article provides a brief survey of contemporary developments in the Austrian school of economics, signalling that: (i) the amount of Austrian research and the number of Austrian researchers is growing exponentially; (ii) good Austrian economists are not being marginalised by the economics profession; and (iii) there have been significant advances in our understanding of economics made recently. Scholars can embrace the second revival of Austrian economics and look confidently hat the increasing academic credibility of the school.
When discussing Organisational culture & management Evans writes,
Paul Dragos Aligica (2007) uses Misesian notions of human action to explore the role of scenario-building as a tool for decision-making, whilst in Capital in Disequilibrium, Peter Lewin (1999) analyses the subjective nature of capital, how it fits into a firm’s organisational structure, and how capital is evaluated and allocated ina world of disequilibrium. Fred Sautet’s (2000) An Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm shows how firms flatten their organisation structure to benefit from entrepreneurial alertness, and Charles Koch (2007) creates an Austrian theory of management and shares the results of applying it to the world’s largest private company. Nicolai Foss and Peter Klein’s (forthcoming) book, The Theory of the Firm highlights an exposure to uncertainty and thus resource ownership as the key aspect of entrepreneurship, to develop an entrepreneurial theory of judgment.
This is interesting because I would argue that the Austrian theory of the firm, or theory of organisations in general, is one of the lest developed areas of Austrian economics. The Austrian approach to markets is much more developed than the their approach to the suppliers and demanders (firms and households) within those markets.

Evans ends on a positive note by saying,
Any half-decent economist should be able to quibble with my list, and I’m sure it reflects a bias towards my own research interests and background. I also recognise that I have missed out an even newer generation of Austrian economists. This all serves my point – Austrian scholarship is a spontaneous order and younger academics are constantly pushing out the boundaries of what can be accomplished. They are demonstrating that it is possible for Austrian school economists to take a seat at the top table of the professional debate without compromising their message - it just takes the right attitude and a lot of work. I’ve provided evidence of the remarkable progress that’s been made since the first revival, and will continue to be made. The academic wing of the Austrian school is flourishing, and the future of good economics is Austrian.

Saturday, 23 July 2011

Do parents matter? Q&A with Bryan Caplan

Reason's Nick Gillespie interviews Bryan Caplan about Caplan's new book "Selfish Reasons to Have More Kids: Why Being a Great Parent Is Less Work and More Fun Than You Think".

The youth unemployment scandal

Roger Kerr has blogged on the following graph from the recent New Zealand Institute publication "More ladders, fewer snakes: Two proposals to reduce youth disadvantage."


Kerr writes,
But the chart shows that it is New Zealand that stands out with youth unemployment being 45% of total unemployment, the worst outcome in the OECD.

Why are our political parties not talking about this appalling state of affairs? One reason is that many of them are complicit in bringing it about. The abolition of the youth minimum wage, sponsored by the Greens and Labour, is clearly a major contributing factor to the surge in youth unemployment. National in office has declined to reintroduce youth wages. The New Zealand Institute in its report also ducked the issue.
The Economist magazine has also noted that The ratio of youth to adult unemployment worsens. Their graph is


The Economist notes,
In New Zealand, Sweden and Luxembourg, the youth-to-adult unemployment ratio is more than four.
For the data used in the Economist graph the adult unemployment rate as around 5% with the youth rate at over 20%.

Kerr ends by noting that with regard to youth unemployment,
This conspiracy of silence on the subject is an indictment of New Zealand’s seeming inability to face up to grim social realities.

Protectionism rises in response to pessimistic prospects for growth

In the VoxEU.org audio Simon Evenett talks to Viv Davies about the 9th Global Trade Alert report that suggests that G20 governments’ resolve to resist protectionism has faltered since the Seoul G20 Summit. Evenett describes murky protectionism, the impact of the crisis on the BRICs and the least developed countries, and how WTO rules are being circumvented.

Friday, 22 July 2011

Growth and taxes – the evidence

At the IEA blog Patrick Minford takes a look at the ever controversial question of the relationship between taxes and growth. With reference to work done by Minford and Jiang Wang (see Sharper Axes, Lower Taxes) Minfords writes,
Our aim was to construct some simple tests of whether ‘activist’ policies (of government spending on R&D support or on investment subsidies) or ‘incentivist’ policies (reducing the barriers to business entry/exit and also taxes on business people’s incomes) are the cause of growth. We followed the standard practice of gathering data on growth rates of many countries (approximately 100) and many periods (three decades, the 70s, 80s, and 90s); and similarly gathering data on these candidate variables. We then asked whether growth was related to one or to the other, or to neither, using standard tests of statistical significance.

In this sort of study the data you gather is the key ingredient. We treated the gap between home real interest rates and world real interest rates as the measure of investment subsidy: the government can by a variety of interventions, especially exchange controls, keep down the cost of capital (basically because home savers have Hobson’s choice and foreign lenders’ money can be subsidised to keep it low). For R&D subsidies we had measures of how much governments spent on R&D. In some separate work we also looked at education spending and infrastructure, as other activist policies.

For the business tax rate we used two main elements: the rate of general tax (which we set equal to the share of government spending in GDP – this can be thought of as the underlying tax rate that must be levied, whether today or later when compounded by interest payments) and also the loading of costs onto business through restrictions on entry and exit. The first came from the Penn Tables, the second from the World Bank.

The resulting ‘business tax rate’ is an amalgamation of the two.
Results?
When you relate growth to this business tax variable you get a strong negative relationship. When you relate it to the activist measures, in no case do you find any relationship at all. These statements remain true however you ‘control’ for other possible factors driving growth.
This is a case of "so far, so good" for those who think incentives are important for growth. And who doesn't? But in Minford's view there is still work to be done to settle the matter. The problem is that you can get correlations between many variables, apart from measures relating to incentives or teaxes, if you are willing to work hard enough at gathering ‘helpful’ data.
For example, take the case for education or ‘human capital’ as the cause of growth: human capital is hard to measure and with not too much effort one can find a measure that is correlated with growth. The same goes for such things as the level of infrastructure, or R&D. How then to distinguish between these causal theories? Here is an example of the difficulty: do education levels cause growth and then growth cause barriers to business to come down? Or do barriers coming down cause growth and growth then cause there to be more education spending?

In further work we hope to refine these tests. Our basic idea is that you can set out each theory of the economy with its different growth mechanism and explanation of the other ‘factors’. Then you simulate the behaviour of each type of economy and see which comes closest in its simulated behaviour to the behaviour in the data. We are at a fairly early stage in this work. So we must conclude in the time-honoured academic way: ‘more work is needed’!
Of course if more work wasn't needed many academics would be out of a job!

Peer review: not what it once was

At the Organisations and Markets blog Dick Langlois writes,
Glenn Ellison has a paper in the new issue of Economic Inquiry called “Is Peer Review in Decline?” Here’s the abstract.
Over the past decade, there has been a decline in the fraction of papers in top economics journals written by economists from the highest ranked economics departments. This paper documents this fact and uses additional data on publications and citations to assess various potential explanations. Several observations are consistent with the hypothesis that the Internet improves the ability of high profile authors to disseminate their research without going through the traditional peer review process.
The explanation put forward is that this has to do with the relative costs and benefits of the review process. The argument is that the editors of the top field journals, in particular, have been wanting greater revisions more often. Because the costs of the review process are high and the benefits modest for prestigious authors, they increasingly avoid these journals.

So changes in technology, the internet in particular, has altered the relative costs and benefits of peer review for the top researches in such a way that they increasingly avoid it.

Interesting blog bits

  1. James Banks, Zoë Oldfield and James P Smith ask Do differences in childhood circumstances explain US-England health differences at older ages?
    How much of our health in adulthood and old age is determined by our childhood? Using decades of data from the US and England, this column shows that the US excess in disease is common throughout the age distribution of the population. Moreover, poor childhood health tends to worsen adult health more in the US.
  2. Amanda Goodall asks Physician-leaders and hospital performance: Is there an association?
    Are hospitals better run by former doctors or by specialist managers? This column looks at the top-ranking hospitals in the US and finds that hospital-quality scores are about 25% higher in physician-run hospitals than in the average hospital.
  3. Simon J Evenett warns us that Resolve against protectionism weakens since the Seoul G20 Summit.
    Despite the public commitments made at the Seoul G20 summit, this year protectionism has slipped off the work programme of G20 nations. The latest evidence published in the 9th Report of the Global Trade Alert, summarised here, shows that government resolve against protectionism has weakened as global economic prospects have dimmed. The global trading system is not out of the protectionist woods.
  4. Tim Worstall on African Free Trade Zone
    For some reason I’ve never really understood a certain sort of person gets all agitated if you suggest that free trade might solve some of Africa’s problems.
  5. Matt Nolan comes out In defence of government funded tertiary education
    As a young child I was told repeatedly that education was a right, and that society should pay for it – not just at the primary level, not just at the secondary level, but at the tertiary level as well. Being an argumentative child I disagreed repeatedly.
  6. Gavin Kennedy notes that the Repair and Renovation of Adams Smith's Panmure House Approved! (at last)
    It has just been announced (11.30 am this morning!) that the Scottish Government has approved the proposals from Edinburgh Business School (Heriot-Watt University) for the sympathetic renovation of ‘Panmure House’, just off old Edinburgh’s historic Royal Mile, where Adam Smith lived from 1778 up to his death in 1790.
  7. Kurt Schuler on Free banking and the historical gold standard
    Over at his recently established blog “Uneasy Money,” David Glasner has a post on “Gold and Ideology.” (He has started fast out of the gate, writing prolifically; I hope he doesn’t burn out, but there’s a lot to write about when the subject is money.) He claims that “the gold standard never managed itself; in its classical period from 1870 till World War I it was under the constant management of the Bank of England with the occasional assistance of the Bank of France and other major banking institutions.” I disagree.

Wednesday, 20 July 2011

Bruce Caldwell - why economics needs the history of thought

Unfortunately history of thought is a hard sell these days in economics. But if anyone can make the sale Bruce Caldwell can.

John Taylor as anti-keynesian

A Economics One John Taylor writes
In my view the essence of the Keynesian approach to macro policy is the use by government officials of discretionary countercyclical actions and interventions to prevent or mitigate recessions or to speed up recoveries. Since I have long been critical of the use of discretionary policy in this way, I think the Economist is correct so say that I am anti-Keynesian in this sense of the word. Indeed, the models that I have built support the use of policy rules, such as the Taylor rule for monetary policy or the automatic stabilizers for fiscal policy, which are the polar opposite of Keynesian discretion. As a practical prescription for improving the economy, the empirical evidence is clear in my view that discretionary Keynesian policy does not work and the experience of the past three years confirms this view.

TEDTalk – Trial, Error and the God Complex

This is a video of a TEDTalk by Tim Harford on Trial, Error and the God Complex

Tuesday, 19 July 2011

The "Out of Africa" hypothesis, human genetic diversity, and comparative economic development

This is the title of a new NBER working paper by Quamrul Ashraf, Oded Galor. The abstract reads:
This research argues that deep-rooted factors, determined tens of thousands of years ago, had a significant effect on the course of economic development from the dawn of human civilization to the contemporary era. It advances and empirically establishes the hypothesis that, in the course of the exodus of Homo sapiens out of Africa, variation in migratory distance from the cradle of humankind to various settlements across the globe affected genetic diversity and has had a long-lasting effect on the pattern of comparative economic development that is not captured by geographical, institutional, and cultural factors. In particular, the level of genetic diversity within a society is found to have a hump-shaped effect on development outcomes in both the pre-colonial and the modern era, reflecting the trade-off between the beneficial and the detrimental effects of diversity on productivity. While the intermediate level of genetic diversity prevalent among Asian and European populations has been conducive for development, the high degree of diversity among African populations and the low degree of diversity among Native American populations have been a detrimental force in the development of these regions.
If right, then this research suggests history - in terms of genetic diversity - really does matter!

Important for the Asharf and Galdor argument is that there exists an optimal level of genetic diversity for economic development which reflects the interplay between the conflicting effects of diversity on the development process. The adverse effect pertains to the detrimental impact of diversity on the efficiency of the aggregate production process of an economy. Heterogeneity increases the likelihood of mis-coordination and distrust, reducing cooperation and disrupting the socioeconomic order. Greater population diversity is therefore associated with the social cost of a lower total factor productivity, which inhibits the ability of society to operate efficiently with respect to its production possibility frontier. The beneficial effect of diversity, on the other hand, concerns the positive role of diversity in the expansion of society’s production possibility frontier. A wider spectrum of traits is more likely to be complementary to the development and successful implementation of advanced technological paradigms. Greater heterogeneity therefore fosters the ability of a society to incorporate more sophisticated and efficient modes of production, expanding the economy’s production possibility frontier and conferring the benefits of increased total factor productivity. Higher diversity in a society’s population can therefore have conflicting effects on the level of its total factor productivity. Aggregate productivity is enhanced on the one hand by an increased capacity for technological advancement, while simultaneously diminished on the other by reduced cooperation and efficiency.

May be the Productivity Commission should be researching New Zealand's genetic diversity.