Tuesday, 19 July 2011
EconTalk this week
John Taylor of Stanford University talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the state of the economy and the prospects for recovery. Taylor argues that the design of the fiscal stimulus was ineffective and monetary policy, so-called quantitative easing, has also failed to improve matters. He argues for a return to fiscal, monetary, and regulatory normalcy as the best hope for economic improvement. The conversation concludes with a discussion of the impact of the current crisis on economics education.
A land tax
TVHE's Matt Nolan has been arguing for a land tax. Why?
A land tax is appealing is that there is a fixed amount of land in New Zealand. As a result, if you tax land the price of land will fall, but the amount of land being used will not change. In contrast, a tax on labour income will lead to some people working less, and a tax on capital will lead to lower levels of investment in New Zealand. This attribute of a land tax means that it is more “efficient” than other taxes, implying that for any given amount of revenue the government wants to raise this tax will do it for a lower cost to the rest of us.So it is efficient. And economists love efficiency! But is it fair? There are two main questions with regard to fairness, or claims Matt: 1) How can we justify taxing people based on the land that they own? and 2) Is taxing people who own land instead of income fair?
With regard to the first question, there are a few basic government powers that limit the land owners right to absolute control of their land – and one of those is taxation. I would argue that this is akin to stating that society owns land while individuals that hold the land title are in effect given rent-free permanent leases and the right to use the land within certain conditions.Hopefully next week Matt will argue for a poll tax, which is also efficient!
The concept of permanent lease allows for clear property rights so that people have certainty when using the land for their own purposes, such as erecting or renovating buildings, growing crops, or farming animals. But it should also allow for the government to charge rent on the land on behalf of society, which in essence what a land tax would be.
Although this justification for a land tax appears a bit strange at first, it is in fact no different to one of the common justifications for income tax. Society helps individuals to develop their skills and ability to earn income by providing public hospitals, schools, and other infrastructure. A tax on individual labour income can in turn be seen as payment for these services and for the opportunity to develop skills and ultimately earn a greater income. If we accept this justification for income taxes, it would seem reasonable to also apply it to land taxes.
But is it fair to shift the burden of taxation from income to land?
There are winners and losers from any change in tax policy. If we were to introduce a land tax and reduce income taxes, people who hold a significant amount of land would lose out, while young people with their working lives ahead of them would gain. Furthermore, individuals that own land but have variable income year-to-year may suffer from cash-flow issues under a land tax. Finally, following a drop in land prices, financial institutions exposed to lending on land would also suffer loses.
However, changes in wealth as a result of the imposition of a land tax will only happen once. As a result, it would be possible for the government to compensate the immediate losers of the changes through lump-sum payments if it deems the adjustment to the new tax unfair.
For example, if we believe that a land-tax really hurts people who have retired but own their land freehold government could send them a one-off payment to make up for this.
By doing this society gets the gains of a land tax in terms of efficiency without hurting the worst off in society.
Monday, 18 July 2011
Britain's economic suicide
At the Rational Optimist blog Matt Ridley writes on energy policy in the U.K., and why its wrong.
The future belongs to countries that can get their electricity, heat and fuel supplied as cheaply and reliably as possible. That is the priority, not the carbon fetish.Ridley opens by noting,
British Gas is putting up the cost of heating and lighting the average home by up to 18 per cent, or about £200 a year. Indignation at its profiteering is understandable. But that can only be a part of the story: the combined profits of the big six energy supply companies amount to less than 1.5 per cent of your energy bill, according to the regulator, Ofgem.Demand for energy is rising around the world, so what does the U.K. government plan to do. The wrong things of course.
So what does the Government plan to do? This week it publishes a white paper on electricity market reform that will be predicated upon, indeed proud of, pushing up prices even faster. To meet its self-imposed green targets, the Government’s policy is to tax carbon, fix high prices for renewable electricity and load extra costs on to people’s electricity bills — but without showing them as separate items.In the past cheap energy has helped drive productivity increases and increased growth and thus created jobs. But
This policy is beyond foolish. While you might just get away with driving up energy bills in a boom, to add green stealth taxes on top of supply-driven price increases at a time of economic misery is asking for political trouble.
[...] a dear-energy policy destroys jobs. Not only does it drive energy-intensive business overseas; according to Charles Hendry, the Energy Minister, the average British medium-sized business will face an annual energy bill £247,000 higher by 2020 thanks to the carbon policy. That’s equivalent to almost ten jobs it must lose, or cannot create.So what are the questions facing the U.K. government,
So the hijacking of energy policy by carbon targets is mad. Far more urgent questions face us than that. How do we replace the one-third of coal-fired stations that will close by 2015? Not by renewables, that’s for sure. How do we replace the capacity of our nuclear power stations, all but one of which will close by 2023? How do we compete with China, where it takes five years, not 15, to build a nuclear power station? How do we compete with America, where companies are now swimming in cheap domestic natural gas, half the price it is over here, thanks to shale gas exploration?Ridley notes the advantages of market liberalisation and the problems of bureaucratic interference, ,
Gas already dominates the British energy market, providing about half of all joules. That dominance will only grow as abundant shale gas joins Russian and Iranian supplies. Given that renewables are an irrelevance in terms of supply, and that coal is being slowly phased out, the key question the Government needs to answer this week is where it wants to fix the price of nuclear electricity to ensure the long-term certainty nuclear investment requires.
Twenty years ago Britain liberalised its nationalised energy markets, introduced competition and the result was one of the cheapest and fairest regimes in the world. Gradually, the bureaucratic yearning to interfere and pursue ideology gained the upper hand again, especially with Tony Blair’s ludicrous “renewable obligation certificates” (ROCs) whose perverse consequences include the shipping of Californian native forest timber to Drax power station in Yorkshire at consumers’ expense.Ridley ends by noting the need for energy entrepreneurs,
Yet government has done very little to unleash energy entrepreneurs. We could have started the shale gas revolution here, as we started the fossil fuel revolution itself. We could still start the underground-coal gasification revolution here: according to a Newcastle firm called Five Quarter, huge amounts energy could be extracted from coal seams under the North Sea by partial combustion of the coal to make gas underground. We could push thorium reactors. But starting a business in Britain’s regulated economy and planning system is like swimming in treacle.A lesson for most countries is the importance of entrepreneurship in energy, and everywhere else in the economy.
Sunday, 17 July 2011
Social networks and finding a new job: evidence from Italy
If you lose your job, can you find a new one with a little help from your friends? A new column, by Federico Cingano and Alfonso Rosolia, at VoxEU.org presents evidence that displaced Italian workers with more employable friends and social contacts are unemployed for a shorter period of time. Cingano and Rosolia write,
How relevant are information networks for job search? In a recent paper (Cingano and Rosolia, forthcoming), we exploit a large matched employer-employee dataset covering all employment relationships in two northeastern Italian provinces over 20 years that allows us to assign to each individual at each point in time a specific social network, the one formed by his co-workers up to that point of his career. With this definition, a reasonable proxy for the amount of job-related information in the network is the proportion of employed social contacts at a given moment. We thus focus on workers displaced by firm closures and relate the length of their subsequent unemployment spell to his or her contacts’ employment rate when displacement occurs. Information spillovers are identified by comparing the performances of workers contemporaneously displaced by the same firm, while also controlling for a wide range of individual and group characteristics.So friends may be good for you in more ways than one.
We find that the proportion of employed contacts plays a significant role in shaping re-employment patterns. Increasing the employment rate of contacts by one standard deviation reduces the job-seeker’s unemployment duration by about 10%; this effect is only slightly less than the reduction associated to a one standard deviation increase in own wage at displacement, a proxy of individual ability. Contacts’ employment status plays a stronger role if they recently searched for a job, and thus collected useful and up-to-date information, and if their current employer is closer (spatially and technologically) to the unemployed. We rule out that this evidence reflects a referral mechanism, whereby employed friends and contacts are also more skilled and thus reliable and more successful when recommending a worker to a prospective employer, by showing that proxies of their ability are not related to the displaced duration into unemployment.
Our findings show that job-relevant information generated and disseminated by employed workers through informal channels is a prominent element of a frictional labour market. The employment fall in recessionary periods can thus be quite disruptive, determining a lasting loss of efficiency of the matching between job seekers and firms. Consistently, recent evidence shows that temporary hikes in the number of vacancies relative to unemployment are a persistent feature of post-recession periods when the relationship between vacancies and unemployment is looked at over a longer horizon (Tasci and Lindner 2011). Our findings suggest that this may result from imperfect information about job opportunities rather than from a mismatch between labour demand and supply characteristics. As a consequence, employment-oriented stimulus policies may have had spillover effects in helping restore the information facilitation process that have so far gone unrecognised.
- Cingano F and A Rosolia (forthcoming), “People I know: job search and social networks”, Journal of Labor Economics.
- Tasci, M. and J. Lindner (2011), “Has the Beveridge curve shifted?, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic Trends. 10 August.
Now here is an idea ........
There is a new working paper out by Peter T. Leeson, Peter J. Boettke and Jayme S. Lemke, all of George Mason University. The abstract reads:
For over a century English husbands sold their wives at public auctions. We argue that wife sales were indirect Coasean divorce bargains that permitted wives to buy the right to exit marriage from their husbands in a legal environment that denied them the property rights required to buy that right directly. Wife-sale auctions identified "suitors" - men who valued unhappy wives more than their current husbands, who unhappy wives valued more than their current husbands, and who had the property rights required to buy unhappy wives' right to exit marriage from their husbands. These suitors enabled spouses in inefficient marriages to dissolve their marriages where direct Coasean divorce bargains between them were impossible. Wife sales were an efficiency-enhancing institutional response to the unusual constellation of property rights that Industrial Revolution-era English law created. They made husbands, suitors, and wives better off.See here for a copy of the paper.
Remind me to email Alvin Roth and ask if this is an example of a repugnant market! Clearly it wasn't once. How did the market deal with problems of adverse selection?
What we don't know about free banking
At the Free Banking blog Kurt Schuler has put forward a list of what he thinks are gaps in our current knowledge of free banking. These should give you a few things to think about over Sunday:
Free banking and monetary equilibrium. George Selgin has provided the base on which future inquiry will be built. More remains to be said about the way that bank clearings signal banks to expand, hold constant, or contract credit.
Free banking in comparison to monetary systems. More work using balance sheets, models, or other tools of systematic description for comparing in depth the operational details of various monetary systems, especially in terms of how well they discover and respond to changes in the supply of and demand for savings.
The history of free banking. Much has been done, but much remains to do. As far as I know, nobody has published a book describing in detail a single episode of free banking. (Lawrence H. White’s Free Banking in Britain was a combination of theory, economic history, and history of thought, appropriate to the time because of its pioneering nature, but it was not simply a study of how the Scottish free banking system worked and how it evolved.) Ignacio Briones, a Chilean economist, wrote a good dissertation on Chile’s free banking period of the late 1800s, but he has not published it because he is busy in his current job as coordinator of international financial affairs in the Chilean Ministry of Economy. Moreover, he wrote it while studying in France and it is in French, a language that far fewer economists today read than read English or Spanish. Anders Ă–gren, a Swedish economist, has written a dissertation, published as a book, on the Swedish monetary system of the 1800s, but if he is to be believed, it was not a free banking system.
Returning to free banking. What are the steps, particularly with respect to financial regulation, that would re-establish free banking with the smoothest transition? Once re-established, are there any measures that would make free banking more politically durable than it proved to be the last time around? I understand that a student at George Mason University is working on issues such as these, advised by Larry White.
Rival monetary standards and free banking. Historically, free banking has been associated with the gold or silver standard. Other standards are conceivable, and have been proposed, such as Milton Friedman’s idea to freeze the existing monetary base or Early Thompson’s idea for a labor standard of value. How do different possible standards compare with respect to their theoretical properties? In the end, consumer choice would determine which was superior. People might choose gold again, in which case we would have to investigate what it is about gold that people find to be so appealing. Or competing standards might coexist without one ever gaining a decisive advantage.
Saturday, 16 July 2011
"The Standard" on Brash on CGT
An anonymous Guest Post at The Standard is entitled Don Brash: Hypocrite on CGT. They write,
But also note this comment from a 1998 Reserve Banks publication The Real Story – saving and investing now that inflation is under control:
I see Brash has put out a release headlined: “CGT Reactionary, Ruinous, Retrograde and Wrong – Brash”Let me add in more of what goes before the piece quoted by The Standard,
Is that the same Brash that put out a booklet when he was reserve bank governor, which said:
The absence of a capital gains tax, and the over-taxation of many types of productive investment (largely because of depreciation allowances based on historical cost), together mean that inflation creates a strong bias in favour of real estate investment and against investment in plant and equipment.
On the other hand, the interaction of inflation with the tax system penalises savers. As an illustration, assume inflation is zero and a saver is receiving 5 percent on his or her money. In that case, he or she pays income tax on that 5 percent. However, if inflation is 5 percent, then interest rates have to be 10 percent to ensure the real interest rate, after inflation, remains at 5 percent. Yet in that situation income tax is paid on the full 10 percent, even though the real interest rate has not increased at all. The real return hasn’t changed, but the tax bill has doubled, so the post-tax return has declined significantly. With inflation, this perverse tax effect penalises interest-bearing savings and investments. I strongly suspect that one of the reasons why we are still paying such high real interest rates in New Zealand is that for much of the seventies and eighties the after-tax-and-inflation return on interest-bearing savings was substantially negative. New Zealanders are still very wary of being caught with fixed-interest savings again.So the point Brash was making is that in a world of high inflation the lack of a capital gains tax is just one reason that could result in a basis in favour of real estate investment.
These biases against fixed-interest investment and in favour of borrowing, the absence of a capital gains tax, and the over-taxation of many types of productive investment (largely because of depreciation allowances based on historical cost), together mean that inflation creates a strong bias in favour of real estate investment and against investment in plant and equipment. Regrettably, real estate investment generally contributes little to increasing the economy’s output. (Emphasis highlights the part of the quote used by The Standard)
But also note this comment from a 1998 Reserve Banks publication The Real Story – saving and investing now that inflation is under control:
On the flip side, because New Zealand does not have a capital gains tax, when inflation was high capital gains were particularly attractive. With inflation now low, capital gains are much reduced. The lack of a capital gains tax no longer matters so much when people are making investment decisions.So a capital gains tax may have a place when inflation is high but is not an issue when it is low. Thus the obvious response to The Standard is that as we now we are in a low inflation environment a capital gains tax isn't the issue it was when inflation was higher. Thus is Brash really a hypocrite? Or is has just noticed a drop in inflation and changed his view accordingly?
Comments on Labour's tax policy
As far Labour's recently announced tax framework goes the key policies are
On the $5,000 tax exemption Hogan writes,
Former ACT Leader Rodney Hide comes out against a CGT, He argues at interest.co.nz that a CGT is effectively a double tax on business:
- zero income tax on the first $5,000 of income;
- an increase in the top marginal tax rate to 39% for incomes over $150,000;
- exempting fresh fruit and vegetables from the GST (technically, zero rating them);
- a 15% capital gains tax.
On the $5,000 tax exemption Hogan writes,
In principle, I don't mind the $5,000 tax-free policy. There are fixed costs to working compared to not working, which are not recognised when one has to pay tax from the first dollar earned. I could see a tax-free bracket having a non-trivial effect on decisions on whether to enter the workforce part time or not at all, particularly if the tax-free threshold could be lifted over time. A tax-free bracket is also a much more moral way of ensuring that workers receive a living wage than would be an increase in the minimum wage. I find it difficult to believe, however, that the other policies in the package could make up for the cost of exempting the first $5,000 of income from tax for every taxpayer. This is the unpleasant arithmetic of tax policy: Tax cuts at a particular income level only have an efficiency-relevant impact on the behaviour of those taxpayers whose marginal income is at that level, but they give a tax reduction to anyone whose income is at that level of higher; cuts in tax rates at the lower end, therefore come at a large fiscal cost for a only a small change in reduced disincentives.On the marginal tax increase Hogan says,
The proposed increase in the top rate is silly. There is such a small proportion of the country’s income earned at those levels that the policy can hardly be expected to bring in a significant amount of revenue, but will surely lead to the usual tax avoidance games. It is hard to escape the conclusion that this is a purely symbolic policy designed to make people with incomes less than $150,000 feel good that those with more income are being taxed more. If so, it is appealing to a rather ugly side of human nature.As to the fruit and veg tax cut Hogan says,
The zero-rating of fresh fruit and veg might just about be the most appallingly cynical election bribe the country has ever seen. I am not saying that it would be the most costly election-bribe policy enacted; that mantle would have to go to either National Superannuation or interest-free student loans. Rather, I suspect that this policy would have the highest cost relative to benefits, with benefits defined according to a policy’s proponents’ underlying preferences. Consider first the costs of the exemption: of relatively small importance is the lost revenue that will need to be made up elsewhere. More important, is the additional transactions costs in compliance, enforcement, and definitions that the policy would introduce. Much worse, is the erasing of the line in the sand that currently stands between a clean GST and one with messy exceptions; once we start on this slippery slope, there will be no clear line left to defend against creeping exemptions and tweaking of the GST system likely to be proposed in the future. Against this, are two putative benefits. First is the idea that the exemption will make the GST more progressive. I haven’t seen any data on this, but I would extremely surprised if taxing fresh fruit and were not a progressive tax; if one wanted to use the tax system to redistribute from poor to rich, I suspect the proposed exemption would rank second only to high cigarette taxes as a method for achieving that objective. The second supposed benefit is the health benefits from eating more fresh fruit and veg. The trouble is that nutritionists tell us there is no nutritional advantage to fresh over frozen or canned, so unless someone can show some convincing data giving a significant elasticity of demand for fresh fruit and veg that does not result from a substitution away from preserved fruit and veg, we would need to dismiss this benefit as well.As to comments on the CGT Hogan puts that off for another post. This is sensible given that there are good economic arguments on both the pro and anti sides of the debate. On issues like this the devil is in the details.
Former ACT Leader Rodney Hide comes out against a CGT, He argues at interest.co.nz that a CGT is effectively a double tax on business:
A business generates $100 a year. The going discount rate is 10 percent. The value of the business is $1,000. That’s if there’s no tax.
Introduce a tax of, say, 30 percent, and the business now yields only $70 a year. The business is worth only $700. The tax liability is capitalised into the value of the business.
Now let’s say I buy the business and fix it up. I double its income to $200. In the absence of any tax the business is now worth $2,000 and I can sell the business and pocket a $1,000 capital gain. However, if there’s an income tax of 30 percent the increase in the business’s value is from $700 to $1,400. My capital gain is now only $700.
My gain is not tax free even though I appear to pay no tax on my gain.
That’s because the capital value reflects the extra tax the extra income the business generates.
A capital gains tax of 30 percent reduces my gain from $700 to $490. I am doubly taxed.
Capital gains aren’t tax free and a capital gains tax doubly tax savings and investment.
UK privatisation – proceeds of over £100 billion up for grabs
This is the heading of a post at the IEA blog in which Nigel Hawkins talks the future of privatisation in the U.K. He writes,
The point to note is that the advantage of privatisation is that it will depoliticise the firm. The aim is to have the greatest possible "distance" between the government and the firm. Government interference in the running of a firm is impossible to eliminate completely but a good privatisation plan will result in a situation where any government interference is as obvious and politically costly as possible.
For successful privatisation it is more important to get the regulatory environment right so that competition can breakout in the industry than it is to maximise the price for which the asset is sold. Basically I'm arguing we should have lexicographic preferences, with price low on the list. Worrying about whether or not the ‘family silver’ was sold too cheaply misses the point, the price received can only be see as too high or low relative to the market structure the firm finds itself it. Just arguing that a higher price could be obtained with a different market structure is only useful if the new market structure improves welfare.
In recent decades, the IEA has been in the vanguard of those advocating widespread privatisation.The point I wish to argue here isn't that privatisation shouldn't be carried out, it should, the problem is thinking about privatisation in terms of the money raised. The reasons for privatisation can hold even if you get nothing from the privatisation programme. Talking about maximising the return from privatisation misses the whole point of privatisation which is to improve the efficient and productivity of the economy. If we just worry about how much we will get for the sale of assets then we should sell all of the state assets with the firms being monopolists. But that's unlikely to do much for welfare.
This stance bore fruit during the 18 years of Conservative Government (1979-97) when large swathes of state-owned businesses were privatised, including telecoms, gas, water, electricity and many forms of transport.
However, as the IEA’s latest publication - Sharper Axes, Lower Taxes - makes clear, the privatisation cupboard is far from being bare.
Indeed, over £100 billion of proceeds could accrue if a renewed programme of privatisation were undertaken.
A substantial part of these putative proceeds arise from the government’s two major bank shareholdings – an 84% stake in Royal Bank of Scotland – the recipient of an unbelievable £45.5 billion of taxpayers’ money – and a 41% stake in Lloyds, which received over £20 billion of public funding.
With the worsening EU financial crisis, shares in both banks are currently weak so immediate action to reduce these stakes is unlikely.
However, when their share prices recover, a progressive selling down of the government’s bank shareholdings should be undertaken.
Aside from these shareholdings, there is a raft of other major businesses that should be transferred to the private sector. Prominent amongst this category are Network Rail, the Royal Mail and Scottish Water.
Furthermore, many smaller state-owned businesses would benefit from the disciplines of the private sector.
Importantly, there remains considerable scope for the government to sell off parts of its vast property estate, which could raise a considerable sum.
In particular, the Ministry of Defence owns an extensive portfolio of land and building assets, some of which are outside its core operations – and could be readily sold off.
Whilst the raising of funds from privatisation is a major benefit of the policy, it is not the only one.
The point to note is that the advantage of privatisation is that it will depoliticise the firm. The aim is to have the greatest possible "distance" between the government and the firm. Government interference in the running of a firm is impossible to eliminate completely but a good privatisation plan will result in a situation where any government interference is as obvious and politically costly as possible.
For successful privatisation it is more important to get the regulatory environment right so that competition can breakout in the industry than it is to maximise the price for which the asset is sold. Basically I'm arguing we should have lexicographic preferences, with price low on the list. Worrying about whether or not the ‘family silver’ was sold too cheaply misses the point, the price received can only be see as too high or low relative to the market structure the firm finds itself it. Just arguing that a higher price could be obtained with a different market structure is only useful if the new market structure improves welfare.
The problem with Nudge
Over at the Adam Smith Institute blog Tim Worstall writes about The problem with Nudge.
The basic idea is that people aren't all that good at making choices of judging risks: therefore they should be nudged into taking the right decision.and
There is however a real problem with the whole idea: the things that we get nudged to do will inevitably reflect the prejudices of those setting up the nudges. OK, maybe opt out rather than opt in will increase organ donations, maybe opt out will increase pensions savings. And it's an article of faith in certain circles that more organ donations, more saving for pensions, is a good idea. Maybe they are, maybe they're not (and I could put up decent rejections of both propositions).The basic idea comes down to if we're all bad at making decisions, and it seems we are, then why should we enshrine in law one set of wrong prejudices rather just letting everyone follow their own?
However, as Eric Falkenstein points out, the nudges will only be in favour of those things which the groupthink of the limited circle thinking them up already regard as obviously desirable goals.
Take something like irradiating eggs, something almost all scientific people agree is good (kills bacteria, no residual radiation). Why not make them the default eggs? They never would argue for that, because it's contrary to the Luddite-leftists who hate technology but love government.Why isn't GM the default? Why isn't the presumption that planning permission has been granted? Why, under EU law, must I seek permission to make and sell apricot marmalade (yes, really!)?
Friday, 15 July 2011
Seeking asylum: trends and policies in the OECD
From VoxEU.org comes this audio in which Tim Hatton talks to Viv Davies about his new book on asylum policy, which assesses what asylum policies have achieved and argues that policy towards asylum seekers should be based on historical insight, quantitative evidence and a realistic view of the political economy of asylum policy. Hatton presents the case for a fully integrated Europe-wide asylum policy.
For more see Tim Hatton's recent summary of Seeking Asylum: Trends and Policies in the OECD also at VoxEU.org.
For more see Tim Hatton's recent summary of Seeking Asylum: Trends and Policies in the OECD also at VoxEU.org.
"Administrative blight" plagues universities
Who would have guessed?
This news is comes via Mark Perry writing at the Carpe Diem blog. He says,
This news is comes via Mark Perry writing at the Carpe Diem blog. He says,
Inside Higher Ed reports today on a new book "The Fall of the Faculty: The Rise of the All-Administrative University and Why It Matters" (Oxford University Press), by Benjamin Ginsberg, Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University.and
Professor Ginsberg "takes stock of what ails higher education and finds a single, unifying cause: the growth of administration." Here are some excerpts of the review:
"Ginsberg bemoans the expansion over the past 30 years of what he calls "administrative blight" as personified by what he characterizes as an army of "deanlets" and "deanlings." By virtue of their sheer number and their managerial rather than academic orientation, Ginsberg argues, these administrators have served to marginalize the faculty in carrying out tasks related to personnel and curriculum that once sat squarely in their domain."
"The larger result, he [Ginsberg] argues, is that universities have shifted their resources and attention away from teaching and research in order to feed a cadre of administrators who, he says, do little to advance the central mission of universities and serve chiefly to inflate their own sense of importance by increasing the number of people who report to them."The review also says,
"Armies of staffers pose a threat by their very existence," he wrote. "They may seem harmless enough at their tiresome meetings but if they fall into the wrong hands, deanlets can become instruments of administrative imperialism and academic destruction."
"Ginsberg lays at administrators’ feet a host of perceived ills: the increased curricular focus on vocational education instead of one grounded in the liberal arts; an emphasis on learning outside the classroom in lieu of core academic disciplines; the transformation of research from an instrument of social good and contributor to human knowledge to an institutional revenue stream; and the limiting of tenure and academic freedom."But may be the best comment in the review is,
"Generally speaking," he [Ginsberg] writes, "a million-dollar president could be kidnapped by space aliens and it would be weeks or even months before his or her absence from campus was noticed.”There is an interesting question and answer section with Ginsberg at the bottom of the review. Well worth a read.
The economy can’t grow with debt
A point made by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff in an article at Bloomberg.
Public debt in advanced countries is reaching levels not seen since the end of World War II and thus asking: Is this level of debt a problem? seems sensible.
Reinhart and Rogoff write,
They end by saying,
For comparison, this webpage ranks countries by public debt as a percentage of GDP, (source: CIA World Factbook - unless otherwise noted, information in this page is accurate as of January 1, 2009, so the figures are a couple of years old.). Japan comes in first at 194.4%, Zimbabwe second at 189.9% and Lebanon is third at 188%. At the other end of the list is Luxembourg at 2.6%. Australia is at 15.2%.
Public debt in advanced countries is reaching levels not seen since the end of World War II and thus asking: Is this level of debt a problem? seems sensible.
Reinhart and Rogoff write,
Our empirical research on the history of financial crises and the relationship between growth and public liabilities supports the view that current debt trajectories are a risk to long-term growth and stability, with many advanced economies already reaching or exceeding the important marker of 90 percent of GDP.and they continue,
Several studies of financial crises show that interest rates seldom indicate problems long in advance. In fact, we should probably be particularly concerned today because a growing share of advanced country debt is held by official creditors whose current willingness to forego short-term returns doesn’t guarantee there will be a captive audience for debt in perpetuity.And for the big question: At what point does indebtedness become a problem? Reinhart and Rogoff argue,
Those who would point to low servicing costs should remember that market interest rates can change like the weather. Debt levels, by contrast, can’t be brought down quickly. Even though politicians everywhere like to argue that their country will expand its way out of debt, our historical research suggests that growth alone is rarely enough to achieve that with the debt levels we are experiencing today.
In our study “Growth in a Time of Debt,” we found relatively little association between public liabilities and growth for debt levels of less than 90 percent of GDP. But burdens above 90 percent are associated with 1 percent lower median growth.Reinhart and Rogoff's conclusions are based on a data set of public debt covering 44 countries for up to 200 years. The annual data set incorporates more than 3,700 observations spanning a wide range of political and historical circumstances, legal structures and monetary regimes.
They end by saying,
Those who remain unconvinced that rising debt levels pose a risk to growth should ask themselves why, historically, levels of debt of more than 90 percent of GDP are relatively rare and those exceeding 120 percent are extremely rare [...]. Is it because generations of politicians failed to realize that they could have kept spending without risk? Or, more likely, is it because at some point, even advanced economies hit a ceiling where the pressure of rising borrowing costs forces policy makers to increase tax rates and cut government spending, sometimes precipitously, and sometimes in conjunction with inflation and financial repression (which is also a tax)?Now, just what is New Zealand's level of debt? According to this site New Zealand's public debt: 25.5% of GDP (2010 est.). There is of course the issue of what exactly is being measured here. But while debt is rising this estimate is well below the 90% mark noted above.
Even absent high interest rates, as Japan highlights, debt overhangs are a hindrance to growth.
The relationship between growth, inflation and debt, no doubt, merits further study; it is a question that cannot be settled with mere rhetoric, no matter how superficially convincing.
In the meantime, historical experience and early examination of new data suggest the need to be cautious about surrendering to “this-time-is-different” syndrome and decreeing that surging government debt isn’t as significant a problem in the present as it was in the past.
For comparison, this webpage ranks countries by public debt as a percentage of GDP, (source: CIA World Factbook - unless otherwise noted, information in this page is accurate as of January 1, 2009, so the figures are a couple of years old.). Japan comes in first at 194.4%, Zimbabwe second at 189.9% and Lebanon is third at 188%. At the other end of the list is Luxembourg at 2.6%. Australia is at 15.2%.
Thursday, 14 July 2011
Interesting blog bits
- Peter Klein asks an interesting question: Is the Internet “Transforming” Business?
In the 1990s and early 2000s there was a huge debate about the impact of information technology on productivity. Robert Solow famously quipped, “You can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics.”
- David Henderson Consumer Surplus from the Internet: Remember the Producers
Tyler Cowen challenges me to engage "with the academic literature" on consumer surplus from the Internet. Fair challenge.
. - Philip Cook and John MacDonald on Public safety through private action
In the US, more people work in private security than in all police forces combined, yet public debate about crime prevention typically looks at the use of public resources to deter, incapacitate, or rehabilitate criminals. This column calls for more discussion of how private action can make policing more effective and reduce the profitability of crime. One such experiment – “business improvement districts” in Los Angeles – has generated remarkable social benefits.
- Winton Bates asks Should politicians be required to meet competency standards?
As a discussion starter, Shona suggests that politicians should be required to have a Master of Politics – something like an MBA for politicians. The degree would include practical work and be politically unbiased. It would cover a range of topics including political science, debating and language skills, law, economics and presentation.
- Art Carden on Price Controls Make A Statement About Society
The last refuge of the interventionist defeated at every turn by the laws of supply and demand is to say that while his or her program might have unintended consequences, it “makes a statement about the kind of society we live in.”
- Carlo Favero asks Is Europe an optimal currency area?
Is the euro doomed? This column argues that economic differences within Europe, clearly exposed by the current crisis, are reasons to doubt the sustainability of the single currency.
- Chidem Kurdas on Soros and Open Society in America
As a young man Soros studied with Popper, who in his 1945 The Open Society correctly identified the defects of socially engineered systems. Hayek was a friend and supporter of Popper. Perhaps Mr. Soros needs to revisit both Hayek and Popper.
- Roger Kerr on The Treasury's Living Standards Document: New Wine or Old Bottle?
In May the Treasury published a paper Working Towards Higher Living Standards for New Zealanders. It’s not immediately obvious what’s new in the Treasury’s thinking.
An honest author
Peter Lewin writing at the Organizations and Markets blog
As part of the Routledge series on the Foundations of the Market Economy I wrote a book entitled Capital in Disequilibrium which was published in 1999. It is still available, but it is very expensive ($200) — certainly not worth that price! (Emphasis added.)But the good news is,
Routledge recently released their copyright to me exclusively and I have just got through revising the book for a second edition to be published very soon by the Mises Institute. I had hoped to have some copies available at the upcoming AOM meetings in San Antonio, but this seems very unlikely now. Still, it will be easily available on their website and an open source version will also be there. The price of the book will be $15 I believe.From $200 down to $15. Even accounting for lower production costs for the Mises version, a price that is less than 10% of the original means there was some serious price discrimination going on by Routledge. Is the library markets for books really so strong, and the general market so weak, that Routledge could solely aim for the library market and ignore the "general reader"? The general group seems to be the target audience for the Mises Institute.
Wednesday, 13 July 2011
Cost and benefits of trade
Mark Perry at the Carpe Diem blog writes
From a WSJ article today "China Boosts Lead in Global Exports" about China's exports setting several new records in June:While at Cafe Hayek Don Boudreaux writes,
"China's critics, including members of the U.S. Congress, say an undervalued currency unfairly helps Chinese exporters."
You report that “China’s critics, including members of the U.S. Congress, say an undervalued currency unfairly helps Chinese exporters” (“China Boosts Lead in Global Exports,” July 11).and
Indeed. If Beijing truly is pursuing such a policy, that government is beyond doubt unfairly enriching some people at the expense of others. And the people unfairly enriched do include a few Chinese exporters. Overwhelmingly, though, the beneficiaries are non-Chinese consumers (including Americans) of China’s subsidized exports. In contrast, the people unfairly burdened are exclusively Chinese citizens – both as consumers forced to pay higher prices at home, and as taxpayers forced to fund Beijing’s practice of purchasing U.S. dollars in order to depress the price of the yuan against the dollar.
It is, in fact, obscenely unfair for Beijing to oblige the Chinese people to hand over chunks of their wealth to Americans, even the poorest of whom is far richer than is the typical man or woman in China.
Protectionism does reduce U.S. exports. The resulting loss to Americans, though, isn’t the valuable goods and services that Americans don’t ship to foreigners; instead, it’s the valuable goods and services that foreigners don’t ship to Americans.So if China is undervaluing its currency, then long may it continues as we get the benefits and the Chinese pay the costs. And remember the up side of trade is the imports we get, not the exports we have to give up to obtain the imports.
Consider the U.S. exports that Mr. Norton mentions. Directly or indirectly, South Koreans purchase these exports with South Korean won. Of what use are won to Americans except as currency for purchasing goods and services from South Korea? If South Koreans refuse to pay for exports received from America – or insist on paying for these exports only with Monopoly money – no one would regard Americans’ failure to export to South Korea as a loss to America.
Americans’ losses from protectionist policies are measured exclusively in the value of the imports that those policies prevent us from receiving.
Tuesday, 12 July 2011
Regime uncertainty in New Zealand
Regime uncertainty is a concept developed by the economic historian Robert Higgs. The idea sets out to capture the uncertainty of investors in their private property rights with regard to their capital, and the income it yields, caused by government action. Put simply if investors don't believe that they will capture the returns to their investment, because of government policy, they will not invest. Uncertainty can be driven by many things ranging from simple tax-rate increases, to the imposition of new kinds of taxes, to outright confiscation of private property. Various kinds of regulation, of, for example, securities markets, product markets, labour markets, can also cause uncertainty for investors. The security of private property rights rests not so much on the letter of the law as on the character of the government that enforces, or threatens, presumptive rights.
Regime uncertainty is an issue I have often thought important for New Zealand. Life under Muldoon being the classic example. Given his use of budgets and mini-budgets and his control of bodies like the Reserve Bank no one was ever sure from one year to the next, or one month to the next, what changes to economic regulations, taxes, subsidies, and import and export controls were likely to occur. This did not make for a great environment for private investment.
Post 1984 things have improved however. But may be not as much as I had thought. In a recent article in the National Business Review, 8 July 2011, Roger Kerr reminded me just how threatened property rights in New Zealand still are. Kerr writes,
Regime uncertainty is an issue I have often thought important for New Zealand. Life under Muldoon being the classic example. Given his use of budgets and mini-budgets and his control of bodies like the Reserve Bank no one was ever sure from one year to the next, or one month to the next, what changes to economic regulations, taxes, subsidies, and import and export controls were likely to occur. This did not make for a great environment for private investment.
Post 1984 things have improved however. But may be not as much as I had thought. In a recent article in the National Business Review, 8 July 2011, Roger Kerr reminded me just how threatened property rights in New Zealand still are. Kerr writes,
And where breaches of property rights and contracts are concerned, the damage to a country’s reputation as a secure place for investment is much greater. New Zealand governments have often been cavalier in this regard. A review of just the last decade or so throws up numerous cases in which property rights were compromised without compensation:Creating regime uncertainty will do nothing to help with investment in New Zealand and thus with New Zealand's productivity problems and therefore with its economic growth. For the sake of future investment and well-being more needs to be done to make governments, at the very least, acknowledge and justify any incursions they wish to make against property rights and the rule of law.
Regrettably, there is no end in sight to this damaging pattern of behaviour.
- the cancellation in 2000 of the 1994 West Coast Accord which provided for the sustainable harvesting of rimu. Westco Lagan, which had invested in significant sawmilling business on the basis of this accord, was left out of pocket and uncompensated;
- the National government’s move to partially open up ACC to competition was repealed by its successor, leaving insurers which had raised large amounts of capital to enter the market with no prospects of new business;
- the 2004 Foreshore and Seabed Act which limited the jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court to hear customary rights claims;
- the forced unbundling of the local loop, which allowed Telecom’s competitors the right to place equipment in its roadside cabinets (likened to giving a neighbouring farmer a right to use your milking shed), which shaved some $3 billion off Telecom’s share price.
- the initial proposal to allow public access to private land (with the possibility of stock loss through open gates and biosecurity risks) without the consent of the landowner;
- the operation of the Resource Management Act which can involve major regulatory takings of property (without triggering the compensation provisions of the Public Works Act); and
- the intervention in the bid by a Canadian pension fund for a shareholding in Auckland International Airport, which stymied the bid and cost shareholders some $300 million. The Regulations Review Committee of Parliament upheld a complaint by the Business Roundtable and the Wellington Regional Chamber of Commerce that the intervention was in breach of Standing Orders. This action reverberated around the international investment world.
Recently the Labour Party has stated that it “reserved the right” if returned to office this year to overhaul both the government’s broadband legislation and government contracts with Telecom. There was no suggestion of negotiation over changes or compensation for losses.
The Business Herald has also reported that Labour may repeal legislation it had previously supported governing leases of Crown land to farmers. Labour is again threatening to reverse any move to open up ACC to competition.
EconTalk this week
Abhijit Banerjee of MIT talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about Banerjee's book (co-authored with Esther Duflo), Poor Economics. The conversation begins with how randomized control trials (a particular kind of social experiment) have been used to measure the effectiveness of various types of aid to the poor. Banerjee goes on to discuss hunger, health, and education--the challenges in each area and what we have learned about what works and what does not. The conversation closes with a discussion of the role of the labor market in the private sector.
Monday, 11 July 2011
An economist's life in not a happy one (updated)
From the Wall Street Journal:
This issue also highlights why you want the national statistics agency to be independent of the the government. One thing the government should not be doing is replacing "longtime civil servants with political appointees" just to get the inflation figures to look better.
Update: Tim Worstall asks But *Why* is Argentina Charging Economists? He notes
BUENOS AIRES—Argentina's government has filed criminal charges against the managers of an economic consulting firm, escalating its persecution of independent economists.Not a good look. Economists, just like anyone else, should be free to comment on issues important to an election, whether or not the government likes what they say. And if the official inflation figures are wrong then the public needs to know this. Especially if inflation is twice what the official figures claim.
[...]
The government is charging MyS Consultores with "publishing false information about inflation data" to benefit themselves and their clients. The criminal complaint alleges that MyS's data also lead to speculative behavior in Argentina's bond market.
MyS Managing Partner Rodolfo Santangelo described the charges as "ridiculous" and said the firm's inflation data do not affect financial markets.
Consumer prices rose 9.7% in May from a year ago, according to the national statistics agency, Indec. But virtually all economists say annual inflation surpasses 20%—one of the world's highest rates—angering government officials who dismiss inflation as a problem.
The criminal complaint, initiated by the Commerce Secretariat, is the harshest in a series of legal measures against economists. The credibility of Indec's data has been questioned ever since former President Nestor Kirchner replaced longtime civil servants with political appointees in early 2007.
So far this year, the Secretariat has fined at least nine economic research firms 500,000 pesos ($122,000) each. This week, the Secretariat also slapped a second fine on Orlando J Ferreres & Asociados.
"They fine us for saying how much prices have risen," Mr. Ferreres, director of his eponymous firm, said. "They could seek criminal charges against all of us. We don't know how far they're willing to go."
Mr. Ferreres said the legal actions are part of a strategy to prevent independent economists from publishing potentially negative information during an election year.
This issue also highlights why you want the national statistics agency to be independent of the the government. One thing the government should not be doing is replacing "longtime civil servants with political appointees" just to get the inflation figures to look better.
Update: Tim Worstall asks But *Why* is Argentina Charging Economists? He notes
About a quarter of Argentina’s debt is indexed to inflation.and comes to the obvious conclusion,
Aha!
The official rate is just under 10%, which is the rate that the bondholders get. The real rate….no, sorry, the rate calculated by those private sector economists which of course may or may not be correct….is over 20%.
This argument over the numbers is worth real money then: possibly worth a bit of oppression of private sector economists in the eyes of the Argentine Government.
Sunday, 10 July 2011
Do academic oral historians have the same legal protections as journalists?
No, according to the U.S. Department of Justice. This is from Peter Klein at the Organizations and Markets blog. He writes,
With the filing, the U.S. government has come down firmly on the side of the British government, which is fighting for access to oral history records at Boston College that authorities in the U.K. say relate to criminal investigations of murder, kidnapping and other violent crimes in Northern Ireland. The college has been trying to quash the British requests, arguing that those interviewed as part of an archive on the unrest in Northern Ireland were promised confidentiality during their lifetimes.This is from Inside Higher Ed via Zachary Schrag, who notes that the DOJ brief
There are a lot of interesting issues here to do with informed consent, academic freedom, confidentiality, etc. One wonders what effect this could have on oral history if the British government gets the information it wants. Clifford M. Kuhn, a historian at Georgia State University who is also a past president of the Oral History Association, noted that,suggests that the Boston College researchers are mere academics, and seizing information from them should be easier than prying it from reporters “because the Constitution and the courts have long recognized the unique role which news reporters play in our constitutional system. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268-71 (1964). The limited protections afforded news reporters in the context of a grand jury subpoena should be greater than those to be afforded academics engaged in the collection of oral history.”
"Trust and rapport are at the very core of the oral history enterprise," he said in his brief. As part of the process of "informed consent," interview subjects request certain levels of confidentiality, and researchers approve them. "The reason for this protocol is to foster candor and openness in the interview itself, so as to most fruitfully and fully enhance the historical record."People respond to incentives, and confidentiality is a big incentive in things like oral history,
If researchers can't make such pledges, Kuhn said, they may face "self-censorship during the interview." He added that "if promises made by a repository are not kept to narrators, there might be a damaging ripple effect on potential future oral history interviews and projects."
Broadband helps arrest rural decline
Or so Homepaddock points out in a recent post. She writes,
Homepaddock later says,
Getting broadband into rural areas could help arrest the urban population drift, findings from a recent survey conducted by Professor Geoff Kearsley from Otago University’s Department of Media, Film and Communication, show.Department of Media, Film and Communication? Why do I have a bad feeling about this? Anyway, my first question is, Why do we care if getting broadband into rural areas could help arrest the urban population drift? Such movements may not be a bad thing.
Homepaddock later says,
In terms of productivity at least fast broadband may not make as much difference as you think. If fact it may not may any difference at all. Recent work, see “The Need for Speed: Impacts of Internet Connectivity on Firm Productivity" by Arthur Grimes, Cleo Ren and Philip Stevens (Motu Working Paper 09-15 Motu Economic and Public Policy Research October 2009), argues that“The Internet has enhanced their social lives, created and enhanced business opportunities, replaced lost services and is helping rural people to stay where they would most like to live. One or two people have even been able to go and live in the country because of broadband facilities.We’ve got broadband which works at a similar speed as mobile using a T-stick. It’s considerably better than dial-up but a long way from ultra-fast. Improved speed and connectivity would make a big difference.
“When ultra-fast broadband becomes available to all rural households, then these benefits are likely to be greatly enhanced.”
Fast internet access is widely considered to be a productivity-enhancing factor. Internet access speeds vary regionally within countries and even within cities. Despite articulate pleas for network upgrades to accelerate internet access, there is little rigorous research quantifying benefits to individual firms that arise from upgraded internet connectivity. We use a large New Zealand micro-survey of firms linked to unit record firm financial data to determine the impact that differing types of internet access have on firm productivity. Propensity score matching is used to control for factors, including the firm’s (lagged) productivity, that determine firms’ internet access choices. Having matched firms, we examine the productivity impacts that arise when a firm adopts different types (speeds) of internet connectivity. Broadband adoption is found to boost productivity but we find no productivity differences across broadband type. The results provide the first firm-level estimates internationally of the degree of productivity gains sourced from upgraded internet access.The paper's conclusion reads, in part,
After estimating our prediction models for connectivity choices, we match each “treated” firm with a set of like “control” firms (both in terms of their estimated propensity to have broadband and on their observable characteristics). Two types of matching (kernel and stratified) are adopted to check robustness of results. We then estimate the average treatment effect for treated firms (ATT) across a range of samples. We focus on ATTs relating to shifts from: (i) broadband versus no broadband, (ii) slow versus no broadband, and (iii) fast versus slow broadband. We find a (levels) productivity effect of broadband relative to no broadband of approximately 10% across all firms. The estimates indicate a marginally stronger impact on firm productivity for firms in rural (low population density) relative to urban (high density) areas but the differences are not significantly different. Our estimates show that all of these productivity gains can be attributed to adoption of slow relative to no broadband, with no discernable additional effect arising from a shift from slow to fast broadband. (Emphasis added)Thus we can conclude that a shift to broadband connectivity (from dial-up) appears to raise firm's productivity but a move from slow to fast broadband may have no effect on productivity at all.
Saturday, 9 July 2011
Pirates and football teams
What do pirates and football teams have in common? It may not be obvious, but I would argue they are both examples of human-capital based "firms". Each of these types of "firms" is based upon the skills of their members. What is interesting about them, and what needs to be explained, is the very different organisational forms each of them takes.
Consider first the case of the (illegal) pirates, and compare them with their (legal) counterpart privateers. While both pirates and privateers practiced maritime plunder they had very different organisational forms. What they had in common, apart of their business, was the need for human capital in the form of a crew and the need non-human capital in the form of a ship. However an important difference between privateers and pirates is that although they were both in the same business, privateers were state-sanctioned while, by definition, pirates were not. That is, governments would commission privateers to attack and seize enemy nations' merchant shipping during times of war. As already noted the most obvious piece of non-human (physical in this case) capital for both the pirates and the privateers was their ship.
The role of investors in providing this capital was important to the organisational form that pirates and privateers developed. Pirates had no investors; they simply stole the capital they needed. Privateers, on the other hand, as legal enterprises could not just go out and steal the capital they required, they needed external financiers to supply their capital requirements. This difference in capital supply resulted in very different organisational forms: the privateers having a more autocratic management system than pirates. Pirate crews were equal contributors and equal part owners of the "firm" they worked for. Given they had no investors the pirate's "firm" was based around the relatively homogeneous human capital of the crew. Having no need for investors, pirates did not need to develop mechanisms to protect the interests of the firm's financiers as the privateers needed to. This meant that incentive problems could be dealt with by developing a "worker-owned firm" with the crew (usually) sharing equally in "profit" and electing its leaders and having power dispersed among multiple members of the crew such as the captain and the quartermaster. In contrast the privateer had investors and a management system designed to protect their investments. The investors appointed privateer captains and developed an organisational scheme that in some important respects mirrored the managerial organisation of (also investor backed) merchant ships.
So the relative importance of human capital is an important determinant of organisational form, as long as the human capital is homogeneous. An issue the football team example speaks to.
So what of footballs teams? Here we have a situation where human capital, talent at playing football, is the basis for the "firm" but unlike the pirates, ownership by the human capital, i.e. the players, is extremely rare since, I would argue, a worker-owned team would be at a disadvantage relative to a player-as-employee based team. There are many forms of ownership of football teams, from teams having shareholders and being traded on the stock exchange, to teams being owned by an individual, but one form of ownership not seen (as far as I know -a counter example would be great!) is a labour (in this case, player) owned firm.
Heterogeneity among playing talent and thus earning potential acts as a disincentive to the formation of a worker cooperative, which involves (rough) equality in payment1, since those players with the greatest earning potential, the largest outside options, will transfer away from the cooperative to maximise their income stream.2 Differential payment schemes can occur, especially within partnerships, but they require that the individual employee productivities are sufficiently easy to measure so that a relatively objective method of productivity related pay is possible. Given the team production nature of team sports productivities are difficult, if not impossible, to estimate and thus payment by productivity is not feasible, which argues in favour of equality in payments. Thus a worker-owned team would have few, if any, star players, a handicap in the winner-takes-all world of professional sports.3, 4
Another issue for a cooperative sports team is that while the star players may leave the team too soon, the "average players" may stay too long. The average players will have smaller outside options and thus less incentive to leave but as they are also owners of the team it would be more difficult to get rid of those who are not performing. It would be easier for an employee-based team to remove under performing players as they are not owners of the firm.
Also to the degree that exit barriers are entry barriers a worker-owned organisation is at a disadvantage. Such an organisation could hinder rapid transfers between clubs. Problems with transfers could arise, for example, if the terms of the exit have to be negotiated with the remaining player-owners at the time of exit. Or the remaining owners may be unable or unwilling to buy out the exiting player - under a "right of first refusal" or "right of first offer" scheme - or any of them could veto an incoming replacement player-owner. Also there is the question of the value of a player's interest in the team as well as the question of the time period over which an agreed upon value would be paid. These costs make exit more difficult than it would be under an employment contract and thus tend to lock-in the player/owner to the team. Such lock-in is a disincentive to forming, or joining, a labour-owned firm, especially for the best players.5 Many of these problems can, to a degree, be contracted around but this imposes additional negotiation costs at the time of entry into the team, which again is a disincentive to forming an worker-owned team. Utilising a worker-owned organisation results in additional haggling costs, either ex ante or ex post, relative to a player-as-employee team.
Put simply, an employee can leave a organisation more quickly and easily than an owner and in the case of professional sports, transfers between teams, or at least a credible threat to transfer, are particularly valuable to the best players. Therefore a player-owned team would be at a competitive disadvantage compared to teams comprised of employee players.
What this suggests is that a labour-owned, human-capital only, firm with heterogeneous human capital, as in the football example, is likely to be unstable and thus a long lasting human-capital only firm which is labour owned will consist of homogeneous human capital, e.g. the pirate example. Thus the "types" of human capital in a firm is an important determinant of the organisational form the firm will take. This doesn’t mean you cannot have a firm which involves heterogeneous human capital but such a firm will require some “glue”, in the form of non-human capital of some kind, to remain viable. Given the importance of this glue to the firm, ownership of the firm by the owner of the non-human capital is likely. Hart (1995: 56) notes that such non-human capital could be as simple as “[ ... ] patents, client lists, files, existing contracts or the firm's name or reputation.” Or it could be a good location for carrying out the firm's business or a contract preventing the non-owner from working for competitors, etc
So overall we get two basic organisational forms for human-capital based firms: 1) a homogenous human capital firm which could be a labour owned firm and 2) a heterogeneous human capital firm which is owned by the owner of the "glue" that keeps the human capital in place.
Notes:
(1) Some worker cooperatives do require all staff to be paid the same wages while others have a limit on the range of pay offered. Such limit is normally expressed as a ratio of the highest paid worker to the lowest paid, e.g. 3:1 or 4.5:1. Also an owner's allocation of the "profits" of the firm will be proportionate to that owner's labour input, so for similar labour inputs, owners receive a similar allocation of "profits". Thus overall compensation is commonly roughly equal.
(2) Ricketts (1999: 20) explains the problem as ``[f]urther, to minimise antagonism a rough equality in the division of the residual will be necessary and this may conflict with outside opportunities. Those with high transfer earnings reflecting high productivity elsewhere will desert the co-operative. It is for these reasons that control of the firm by its labour force is usually found in circumstances which permit a high degree of common interest." Jossa (2009: 709-10) explains the basic issue in terms of the management of capitalistic versus co-operative firms: ``[g]iven the tendency of cooperatives to distribute their income equitably among all the members, it is difficult to deny that few cooperatives are in a position to pay the high salaries that able managers can expect to earn in capitalistic firms. Whenever a group of people resolve to work as a team-we may add-the member who outperforms the others in initiative and organizational skills will inevitably take the lead. The crux of the matter is that such a person has no incentive to establish a cooperative and share power and earnings with others. He or she will prefer to found a capitalistic firm, where he or she will hold all authority and, if sole owner, appropriate the whole of the surplus [references deleted]
(3) Scully (2008) notes that there is a relationship between a team's finances and a team's success since better financed teams can buy the best players: ``[h]ow good a professional sports team is depends, of course, on the quality of its players. Because teams compete for better players by offering higher salaries, the quality of a team depends largely on how strong it is financially. The financially stronger teams will, on average, be the better teams."
(4) One way around he problem is to pay all players the amount necessary to retain the best player. But this implies paying most players more than their productivities and has obvious implications for the teams budget constraint. This would also aggravate the problem of non-performing average players-owners not wanting to leave the team.
(5) There are also problems such as those which could arise between the manager or coach and the player/owners in their roles as players and as owners. In addition to this there is the problem that if the players provide any financial capital the team needs themselves they risk being badly underdiversified. If the team goes bankrupt they lose not only their job but also (at least part of) their savings. Given the short time span that a player is likely to be a member of the team there is the issue of the return on any capital the player has invested in the team. To ensure a suitable post playing standard of living players are likely to place an emphasis on high returns on their investments.
Refs.:
Refs.:
- Hart, Oliver D. (1995). Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Jossa, Bruno (2009). `Alchian and Demsetz's Critique of the Cooperative Firm Thirty-Seven Years After', Metroeconomica, 60(4) November: 686-714.
- Ricketts, Martin (1999). The Many Ways of Governance: Perspectives on the control of the firm, The Social Affairs Unit, London.
- Scully, Gerald W. (2008). `Sports'. In David R. Henderson (ed.), Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, 2nd edn., available from http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Sports.html
Harnessing the potential of natural resource extraction for development
Friday, 8 July 2011
Social costs of alcohol 'are vastly inflated'
Or so says a Canadian economist whose name I forget.
Chris Kenny writes in The Australian that the social costs of alcohol in Australia have been routinely exaggerated by at least $10 billion. Kenny open his article by saying,
Chris Kenny writes in The Australian that the social costs of alcohol in Australia have been routinely exaggerated by at least $10 billion. Kenny open his article by saying,
THE alcohol and hospitality industries are countering the threat of increased taxation by promoting new academic research that claims the negative costs of alcohol to the community have been routinely exaggerated by at least $10 billion.The health fascists in Australia are pushing for higher taxes on alcohol and have consistently argued that the social costs of alcohol total $15bn, a figure from a 2008 paper by Australian academics David Collins and Helen Lapsley. Kenny continues,
This undermines a key argument used by the anti-alcohol lobby for increased excise, and represents an escalation of the robust national debate about alcohol-related health issues.
The research, conducted through the University of Canterbury in New Zealand and funded by the industry, claims that the net public costs of alcohol are lower than the amount of revenue raised in alcohol taxes.
But the new study by Eric Crampton, commissioned by the National Alcohol Beverage Industry Council, says most of the negative costs of alcohol are borne by private individuals and the public costs total just $3.8bn, which is less than the $4bn raised by alcohol taxes.Eric is right here, private costs should not be counted as social costs since social costs are the third party costs of an activity. That is, social costs are the costs imposed on others, not ourselves, of our activities.
Dr Crampton says his study simply applies "straight down the line, neo-classical economics" to the Collins/Lapsley work.
He argues that consumers of alcohol choose to drink for their own benefit, therefore any negative impacts on themselves, such as a shorter lifespan or accident and injury, are private costs and not public burdens.
Dr Crampton's study only counts the costs to third parties, such as victims of crimes or people killed and injured by drink-drivers, not the drivers themselves.
Dr Crampton's work, for instance, says it is wrong to count money spent by alcoholics buying drinks as a public cost.A point to keep in mind is that only costs are being considered here. The benefits of alcohol are being ignored but for policy making purposes both benefits and costs have to be taken into account.
Likewise, we should not count the lost wages of people incarcerated for alcohol-related crimes or the out-of-pocket medical expenses of abusers of alcohol. These, he argues, are all private costs, not borne by the public.
Dr Crampton has not studied the benefits of alcohol and says more work is required in that area to provide an accurate cost/benefit outcome.
"Consumer enjoyment forms the bulk of the economic benefit consumers receive from the consumption of alcohol and by allocating zero benefit to alcohol consumption, the earlier studies convert billions of dollars in private costs to policy-relevant social costs," he said.
Fiscal stimulus doesn't work
There is an interesting piece on Robert Barro in the U.K.'s Telegraph. Barro is reported as saying:
Stimulus packages, when they are needed, should only direct funds to programs that can be justified on their merits.
Stimulus packages, when they are needed, should only direct funds to programs that can be justified on their merits.
"The lesson is you want government spending only if the programmes are really worth it in terms of the usual rate of return calculations. The usual kind of calculation, not some Keynesian thing. The fact that it really is worth it to have highways and education. Classic public finance, that's not macroeconomics."and
But he said they [stimulus measures] should be delivered through necessary capital projects and tax cuts, to deliver required services and make the economy more efficient.On the U.S. stimulus package,
Turning to the $600bn (£373bn) to $800bn US package, he added it was "mainly a waste of money". Stimulus programmes, he said, offer little more than "rearranging the timing" of economic growth. "Possibly you could make an argument that it's worth it. But it's going to be a negative-sum thing overall, so you have to think it's a big benefit for boosting the recovery."On fiscal multipliers,
Mr Barro argued that, taken over the long term, for every £1 spent, the cost to the economy will be more than £1 – creating what he called a negative fiscal multiplier. Orthodox thinking is that current stimulus programmes have a positive multiplier effect by creating growth.
Manne on law and economics
Henry G. Manne, Dean Emeritus, George Mason University School of Law, discusses "The Power of Law and Economics."
Henry G. Manne on the Power of Law & Economics from MasonLEC on Vimeo.
Henry G. Manne on the Power of Law & Economics from MasonLEC on Vimeo.
Interesting blog bits
- Tim Worstall on Ban PowerPoint!
Here’s the answer to the European economic woes: ban PowerPoint.
Yes, really, that’s the suggestion from a Swiss political party. They’re collecting signatures to hold a referendum on the issue: under that country’s system they need 100,000 signatures to put a ban on PowerPoint and similar software to the nation in a national referendum. Such referenda are binding so it’s not an entirely idle threat. - Kenneth Rogoff on Technology and Inequality
There is no doubt that income inequality is the single biggest threat to social stability around the world, whether it is in the United States, the European periphery, or China. Yet it is easy to forget that market forces, if allowed to play out, might eventually exert a stabilizing role. Simply put, the greater the premium for highly skilled workers, the greater the incentive to find ways to economize on employing their talents.
- Kristian Niemietz on If the minimum wage cannot be scrapped, at least make it predictable
If scrapping the minimum wage is not politically feasible at the moment, then at least it should be made predictable. One way of doing this is creating an automatic uprating formula which cannot easily be changed. The rate could be pegged to hourly wages at some lower percentile (the 10th, say) of the regional wage distribution, thus effectively regionalising it and removing it from political discretion.
This would not solve the fundamental problem that some people are effectively banned from working. But for the borderline cases, it could still make a big difference. - Eamonn Butler on Paying professors not to teach
At Oxford Adam Smith was taught another lesson in economics – that if you pay people whether they work or not, they will invariably choose not to.
- Alberto Alesina, Paola Giuliano and Nathan Nunn on Women and the plough.
Gender inequality is an old story. This column presents new evidence to suggest it may be as old as the horse and plough. It says there is a robust negative relationship between historical plough-use and unequal gender roles today. Traditional plough-use is positively correlated with attitudes reflecting gender inequality and negatively correlated with female labour force participation, female firm ownership, and female participation in politics.
- Berk Ozler on Working Papers are NOT Working.
Working papers are the research equivalent of sweatshirts with pizza stains on them, but we wear them on our first date with our audience.
- Michael Giberson on Oil markets appear unfazed by announced release of oil from strategic reserves
On June 23 the International Energy Agency announced the release of 60 million barrels of oil from strategic reserves held by member governments. Oil prices dipped for a day or two, then recovered more or less to pre-June 23 levels. Overall, it seems, the release merited a collective yawn from the markets.
- Art Carden on Time to Close the Security Theater
The problem isn’t that the TSA is harassing the wrong people. The problem is that the TSA is harassing anyone. The TSA is encroaching on fundamental liberties and providing no discernable benefit.
- Lasse Lien on Productivity: The Mother of (Nearly) All Good Things
The mother of all good (material) things is productivity growth. Competitive advantage, firm level growth and survival, profits, economy-wide economic growth, job creation, and destruction, etc. are all outcomes that depend critically on relative productivity and productivity changes. So if you understood productivity really well, you would understand a lot about (material) outcomes across firms, industries and countries, too.
- Tim Worstall asks Who Makes Money From Windmills?
Well, for the UK, the answer to who makes money from windmills is quite easy: The Queen.
Thursday, 7 July 2011
The effects of 40 years of drug prohibition.
In this short video from the Cato Institute, Jeffrey A. Miron speaks about the effects of 40 years of drug prohibition.
The subprime lending debacle
From the Cato Institute comes "Policy Analysis no. 679" on The Subprime Lending Debacle: Competitive Private Markets Are the Solution, Not the Problem by Patric H. Hendershott and Kevin Villani.
The abstract reads,
The abstract reads,
The United States' market-government hybrid mortgage system is unique in the world. No other nation has such heavy government intervention in housing finance. This hybrid system nurtured the excessively risky loans, financed with too much leverage, that fueled the U.S. housing bubble of the last decade and resulted in the systemic collapse of the global financial system.Who guards the guardians is always a question with regulators. When regulators are subject on going political pressure which distorts the incentives they face, the outcome will never be good. Thus in housing, as in any other industry, maximising the "distance" between politicians and firms via privatisation without political stings attached is a necessary step to avoid a repeat of the subprime debacle.
The responsibility for the massive failures of the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, at the center of American housing finance and the private securitization system that supports housing finance, falls directly on regulators and indirectly on their political overseers. Private and GSE prudential regulators were given politically determined social lending goals that ultimately trumped prudential regulation, forcing the GSEs to fund subprime lending in competition with private label securitizers. The result was the extension of lower and lower quality loans, creating a race-to-the-bottom between the GSEs and private mortgage providers, all while regulators and politicians looked on approvingly. The financial crisis resulted when many of those loans turned sour in the latter part of the last decade.
We find no evidence that the United States housing market has unique characteristics requiring a hybrid GSE system, thus we conclude that the system and the political risks it is subject to are unnecessary. Any U.S. housing finance policy that does not safeguard prudential regulation from political influence by separating housing subsidy from finance and eliminating government- induced distortions will result in another systemic failure. To re-privatize the GSEs while maintaining their political goals, or to create new, specially chartered enterprises that pursue those goals, would exacerbate systemic risk. (Emphasis added.)
TVHE is alive again
Yes there is econ blogger life in Wellington again. Well as much as there is any form of real life in Wellington! At TVHE rauparaha covers the action at the recent NZAE conference noting the conference related activities of bloggers such as himself, Eric Crampton and Seamus Hogan.
Hopefully the rest of the TVHE crew will be back on-board ASAP.
Hopefully the rest of the TVHE crew will be back on-board ASAP.
Wednesday, 6 July 2011
EconTalk this week
David Skeel of the University of Pennsylvania Law School talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about bankruptcy and the government bailout of the auto industry. Skeel argues that the bailout damaged the rule of law by not allowing a bankruptcy procedure to take its course. Skeel speculates on how bankruptcy for GM and Chrysler might have proceeded. He also argues that the costs to the taxpayer of the bailout have been underestimated. The conversation concludes with a general discussion of the effects of bankruptcy.
Sending profits abroad is a good thing
At the CIS website, Oliver Marc Hartwich makes the point that the idea that sending profits overseas is somehow bad for the local economy is "just a protectionist fallacy". He writes,
Let's say the Australian branch of a US company is very profitable. What happens to these profits?Replace Australia with New Zealand in the above quote and the argument applies just as well to us. Profits don't go overseas, as New Zealand dollars are only useful in New Zealand so they have to come back.
First, the profits might stay in Australia to expand the business of the US company, creating more jobs and extra economic activity here. Even ardent nationalists would find it hard to argue against this.
If the parent company however decided to transfer the profits from its Australian branch to America, it would soon find out that Australian dollars are pretty useless outside Australia and change them into US dollars.
But what happens to the Australian dollars? Since Australian dollars don't buy anything abroad, they will return to Australia to buy Australian goods and services. Maybe a US company will use them to buy Australian minerals. Perhaps US tourists will come here to spend their holidays. Or the US might import Australian-made cars.
In any case, Australian dollar profits transferred abroad return to Australia sooner rather than later because outside Australia, our dollars are just printed paper that will not get you a cup of coffee.
This is where the 'Australian-owned' argument falls to pieces. For Australia's wealth and prosperity, it does not matter where the profits from Australian businesses end up. All that matters for the Australian economy is that Australia remains a place where business transactions take place – irrespective of who owns the business.
Friday, 1 July 2011
North Korea shuts down universities to send students to work
From Fox News we learn that,
North Korea has shut down its universities for the next 10 months so students can work in factories to help rebuild the country's depleted economy, according to the Daily Telegraph.Well that should be be a big step forward for the development of the "knowledge economy" and increasing productivity in North Korea.
The communist regime ordered all universities Monday to cancel all classes until next April 2012.
The Telegraph reports that North Korean students will be put to work on construction projects in major cities.
An MP makes sense
No, I'm not making this up.
Steven Baker is the MP for Wycombe in the U.K. and he writes,
Steven Baker is the MP for Wycombe in the U.K. and he writes,
I had the great pleasure last night of speaking to the Economic Research Council on the subject of Political Economy and the Crisis. I argued that:I wonder how many MPs in N.Z. have ever said such things!
Economics should become political economy, embracing the problem of knowledge in the social sciences, morality (think Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments) and public choice theory, in particular.
- Classical liberalism is the most robust political economy.
- The Austrian School offers important insights, particularly into business cycles and capital theory.
- The Austrian School predicted and intellectually survived the crisis.
- That reality is, or should be, a challenge to the contemporary paradigm.
- The implications for financial reform are profound.
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