Yes I know its a day late, but I was in Wellington yesterday so am just catching up on things.
Todd Buchholz, author of Rush: Why You Need and Love the Rat Race, talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the ideas in the book. Buchholz argues that competition and striving for excellence is part of our evolutionary inheritance. He criticizes attempts to remake human beings into gentle creatures who long to return to an Eden-like serenity. He argues that it is action, creativity, and planning for the future that makes us happy. The discussion includes the implications of our interest in the future for theater and story-telling.
Wednesday, 15 June 2011
Sunday, 12 June 2011
The value of research
What is the value of the research we do? Can we workout the contribution we make to social welfare? The Economic Logician writes,
The abstract of the Hofmeister paper reads,
Robert Hofmeister tries to give research some value. The approach is to consider the scientific process through cohorts, where each wave provides fundamental research as well as end-applications based on previous fundamental research. A particular research results thus can have a return over many generations. It is an interesting way to properly attribute the intellectual source of a new product or process, but the exercise is of little value if it is not possible to quantify the social value of the end-application. Indeed, Hofmeister goes back to using citations in Economics for a data application, which is equivalent to evaluate research only within the scientific community. In terms of the stated goal of the paper, we are back to square one. In terms of getting a better measure of citation impact, this is an interesting application of an old idea. And the resulting rankings of journals and articles look very much like those that are already available.My guess would be that most research adds nothing to social welfare. I see no real social value in anything I've written or in most of what I read.
The abstract of the Hofmeister paper reads,
This paper proposes a generational accounting approach to valuating research. Based on the flow of scientific results, a value-added (VA) index is developed that can, in principle, be used to assign a monetary value to any research result and, by aggregation, on entire academic disciplines or sub-disciplines. The VA-index distributes the value of all applications that embody research to the works of research which the applications directly rely on, and further to the works of research of previous generations which the authors of the immediate reference sources have directly or indirectly made use of. The major contribution of the VA index is to provide a measure of the value of research that is comparable across academic disciplines. To illustrate how the generational accounting approach works, I present a VAbased journal rating and a rating of the most influential recent journal articles in the field of economics.
MacDoctor on student loans
KPMG has come up with the idea that only students doing courses that "benefit the economy" should receive interest-free loans, agriculture being a example of such a course. In response to this MacDoctor takes up the keyboard and writes,
While I have sympathy for the agribusiness sector, because it is increasingly difficult to interest young people in the sector, I have nothing but horror for the idea of government attempting to pick winners in education. Exactly how will politicians and educationalists determine which degrees would be “useful”? The very fact that both I and the sub-editor at Stuff need to place the word “useful” in inverted commas tells the story. Trying to determine what part of tertiary education will have the most economic impact is an exercise in gross stupidity. Governments are notoriously bad at picking winners.and
I have little problem with the current interest-free student loan scheme and believe that, in the long run, the large expense involved will prove to be worthwhile.Now on the first point he is right: governments can not pick winners, in education or anything else. Markets, by and large, do a much better job of sorting out the wheat from the chaff, sorting out the valuable or worthwhile and rejecting what is useless or worthless. But on the second point he is wrong. If markets are to do their sorting then prices must reflect opportunity costs. This is just as true for loans as it is for bread or cars or pens or ... There may be a case for the government providing loans to students, problems with borrowing against human capital, but pricing these loans at zero will missallocate resources. When taking out a loan one of the questions a student should ask is, How will I pay this back, including interest. If the returns to the education can not pay for the loan and interest then that loan could be better used by someone else.
Inflation Targeting Turns 20
Scott Roger writes in Finance and Development (March 2010, Volume 47, Number 1) that Inflation Targeting Turns 20. In the last 20 years a growing number of countries have been making a specific inflation rate the primary goal of monetary policy, with success. Roger writes,
TWO decades ago, New Zealand adopted a new approach to monetary policy, based on achieving a specific target for inflation. What made this approach new was the explicit public commitment to controlling inflation as the primary policy objective and the emphasis on policy transparency and accountability.This is one example where New Zealand lead the world in economic policy.
Today 26 countries use inflation targeting, about half of them emerging market or low-income economies. Moreover, a number of central banks in more advanced economies—including the European Central Bank, the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, and the Swiss National Bank—have adopted many of the main elements of inflation targeting, and several others are in the process of moving toward it.
This article examines how inflation targeters have performed over the past 20 years—including during the commodity price shocks of 2006–08 and the global financial crisis that began in 2007. The article also highlights some especially important issues inflation targeters are likely to face in the next few years.
Saturday, 11 June 2011
Sir Walter Scott, advocate of free banking
They say you learn something new everyday. Well here is something I didn't know until today. This bit of somewhat useless information is from Kurt Schuler at the Free Banking blog; free banking counts among its advocates Scotland’s most famous novelist, Sir Walter Scott.
Under the pen name of Malachi Malagrowther, Scott wrote "letters" — more accurately, short essays — defending the Scottish system of bank note issue. A banking crisis in England in 1825-26 led to a search for remedies, and some people argued that raising the minimum denomination of bank notes, then £1, would reduce the risk of future crises. Today, £1 is so little that there is no note for it, just a coin, but back then it was more than two week’s wages for many workers. Scott and other advocates of the £1 note pointed out that Scotland’s banking system had withstood the crisis much better than the more heavily regulated English system. They were successful in making their case: the British Parliament raised the minimum denomination of notes to £5 in England but kept it at £1 in Scotland. Although Scottish free banking ended in 1844, Scottish banks continued to issue notes under regulations that made them more or less Bank of England notes with distinctive designs. Fittingly, Sir Walter Scott’s portrait today adorns all notes issued by the Bank of Scotland.Today another Scotsman, Mr A. Smith, appears on the English £20 note. The first Scotsman to do so.
Tim Harford video
This is edited highlights from a RSA Event video: "Why success always starts with failure". It is Tim Harford discussing some of the ideas behind “Adapt”.
Friday, 10 June 2011
Charter cities
Interesting blog bits
- Eric Crampton suggests that you Check my sources
If the Government said that the minimum price for a new car were $50, nobody would expect it to affect sales. Neither would an increase to $65. But it would certainly start mattering if the Government applied a minimum price of $5000 to all cars, new and used. This is the situation in New Zealand with youth minimum wages, which were abolished in 2008 in favour of adult rates for all workers over 16 years old. This increased the youth minimum wage by 25 per cent.
- Al Roth has a few Misc. repugnant transactions: marijuana, camel meat, and concealed carry on campus.
- Raghuram Rajan on Money Magic
Some Americans view Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke as a modern-day wizard, able to revive the economy through a swish of his monetary wand – first ultra-low interest rates, then quantitative easing, and perhaps eventually money-printing. If inflation is low, they want the Fed to use every spell it knows to revive the economy. Like the World War I generals who reacted to every slaughter of their men by sending even more over the top of their trenches in a vain attempt to overwhelm the enemy, “free money” types react with “More!” if their policy does not seem to be working.
- George Selgin on Those “Other” 100 Percent Reserve Banking Advocates
It was in response to this supposedly inherent drawback of fractional reserve banking that several prominent economists—including Henry Simons, Irving Fisher, Loyd Mints, and (eventually) Milton Friedman—began offering or endorsing proposals for “100 Percent Money,” meaning money consisting either of basic money itself or of bank deposits fully backed by basic money. Although these proposals closely resembled later proposals for 100-percent reserve banking forwarded by Murray Rothbard and his Austrian-School followers, they differed in treating either fiat or “commodity-bundle” central bank money rather than either gold or silver as the ideal form of basic money, and also in not basing their arguments on any appeal to ethics: unlike their Austrian counterparts, the “Chicago” 100-percenters (for want of a more accurate designation) did not claim that fractional-reserve banks swindled their customers. Instead they condemned them solely for contributing to monetary instability.
- John Taylor is Comparing 2011 with 1937
He explores reasons for the current weak recovery, and in particular whether there is an analogy with what happened in the recession of 1937-38 which interrupted the recovery from the Great Depression. Several charts elaborate on numbers provided there which argue against such an analogy.
- Don Boudreaux on More on the Economic Irrelevance of Political Borders
Writing about the economically unjustified Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program in today’s Washington Post, George Will gets it exactly right about the nature of that lamentable program. Here’s the heart of the column.
- Shimelse Ali, Uri Dadush and Rachel Esplin Odell ask Is protectionism dying?
The limited resort to protectionism during the financial crisis is often attributed to the WTO or to sensible macroeconomic policy. This column argues that there is more to the story. The combination of national laws, regional agreements, and powerful interest groups has worked to stop protectionism in its tracks.
- Holger Görg and Christiane Krieger-Boden note that Trade protection backfires on FDI
The global financial crisis has raised the threat of protectionism. This column argues that the worst offenders will suffer a drop in foreign direct investment inflows.
Grossman and Hart at 25
In a previous post I asked Is the theory of the firm big business and answered no for New Zealand. Well there may be little interest shown in it here but not so overseas. There is an upcoming conference on "Grossman and Hart at 25". This year marks the 25th anniversary of the publication of Grossman and Hart's seminal paper “The Costs and the Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration."
In the years that have followed, we have witnessed an explosion of literature on incomplete contracts. Just how large an explosion is shown by the areas cover by the conference: Incomplete Contracts and Boundaries of the Firm, Incomplete Contracts and Internal Organization of the Firm, Incomplete Contracts and Corporate Finance, the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization, Incomplete Contracts and International Trade, Incomplete Contracts, Public Ownership, and Cooperatives, Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy and New Directions of Incomplete Contracts and Experiments. We just have to hope someone publishes the papers from the conference.
A useful (and surprisingly readable) survey article on some of these areas can be found in the Spring 2011 issue (Vol. 25, No. 2) of the "Journal of Economic Perspectives": “Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?” by Philippe Aghion and Richard Holden. The introduction outlines the paper as:
In the years that have followed, we have witnessed an explosion of literature on incomplete contracts. Just how large an explosion is shown by the areas cover by the conference: Incomplete Contracts and Boundaries of the Firm, Incomplete Contracts and Internal Organization of the Firm, Incomplete Contracts and Corporate Finance, the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization, Incomplete Contracts and International Trade, Incomplete Contracts, Public Ownership, and Cooperatives, Incomplete Contracts and Political Economy and New Directions of Incomplete Contracts and Experiments. We just have to hope someone publishes the papers from the conference.
A useful (and surprisingly readable) survey article on some of these areas can be found in the Spring 2011 issue (Vol. 25, No. 2) of the "Journal of Economic Perspectives": “Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years?” by Philippe Aghion and Richard Holden. The introduction outlines the paper as:
In the first section of this paper, we spell out Grossman and Hart’s argument using a simple numerical example, then then we show how the incomplete contracts approach can be extended beyond the firms’ boundaries issue to analyze firms’ internal organization; firms’ financial decisions; the costs and benefits from privatization; and the organization of international trade between inter- and intrafirm trade. In the second section, we discuss several criticisms of the incomplete contracts/property rights methodology, especially what we call the “implementation criticism,” and then we briefly review some recent developments of the incomplete contracts approach.How long before a Nobel gets given for incomplete contracts?
The never ending supply of administrators
Malcolm Harris writes about Bad Education at the n+1 website:
As faculty jobs have become increasingly contingent and precarious, administration has become anything but. Formerly, administrators were more or less teachers with added responsibilities; nowadays, they function more like standard corporate managers—and they’re paid like them too. Once a few entrepreneurial schools made this switch, market pressures compelled the rest to follow the high-revenue model, which leads directly to high salaries for in-demand administrators. Even at nonprofit schools, top-level administrators and financial managers pull down six- and seven-figure salaries, more on par with their industry counterparts than with their fellow faculty members. And while the proportion of tenure-track teaching faculty has dwindled, the number of managers has skyrocketed in both relative and absolute terms. If current trends continue, the Department of Education estimates that by 2014 there will be more administrators than instructors at American four-year nonprofit colleges. A bigger administration also consumes a larger portion of available funds, so it’s unsurprising that budget shares for instruction and student services have dipped over the past fifteen years.Mark Perry at the Carpe Diem blog notes,
And before you ask the situation in New Zealand isn't that much different. We also seem to have a never ending supply of administrators, doing I don't know what. One thing is for sure they aren't teaching or doing research, which is what I thought universities are there for.
Hey, where I teach (University of Michigan-Flint), we're way ahead of the national trend - the administrative/professional ranks outnumbered the full-time faculty (tenured, tenure-track and full-time instructors/lecturers) years ago, starting in 2005 (see chart above).
Thursday, 9 June 2011
Treasury: drop all screening of foreign investment
That is the headline from an article from the NBR last week.
Acting Secretary to the Treasury Gabriel Makhlouf has hit out at critics of foreign investment in New Zealand, saying Treasury has consistently recommended removing all screening.The article continues by noting that Makhlouf made the obvious point that,
The British civil servant who arrived in this country 15 months ago told the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs that lowering foreign investment would be counter-productive to growth ambitions.
Small, high productivity economies relied heavily on international connections of people, capital, trade and ideas, he said.
He advocated the reduction of costs and distortions associated with capital inflows, particularly tax.
"If we are to continue to screen foreign investment, and Treasury has consistently recommended removing all screening, it needs to be kept to a minimum and under constant review," he said.
[...] it had become fashionable to question foreign direct investment, arguing there was a loss of control of land assets and profits were exported.And for the Canadian economist whose name I forget, I note that Makhlouf used the following example,
The issue was really how the land was used, rather than who owned the land, Mr Makhlouf said.
Regulatory mechanisms governing land use applied to all land owners irrespective of nationality.
"Some of you might have followed the story of the big Swedish furniture outlet called IKEA, and its attempts to find a site for a store in the North Island," Mr Makhlouf said.Not the kind of outcome that will attract foreign investment, and New Zealand needs foreign investment to cover the gap we have between national savings and national investment. Otherwise we will have to reduce investment, which will not help the economy or our growth, or cut consumption, which people don't seem too keen on.
The company ran into so many obstacles that it eventually abandoned its plans to establish a New Zealand branch. Domestic policy settings relating to roading infrastructure, the Environment Court process and the approach of the local council managed to sink IKEA’s plans.
Lessons from the financial crisis for teaching economics
John Taylor discuses this topic at his blog Economics One. He writes,
I emphasized that one’s view of how economics teaching should change depends greatly on one’s view of the crisis. For example, Alan Blinder and I have different views of the crisis and the policy response, so naturally we have different views about how the crisis should affect teaching.Taylor goes on the argue that the good news for teaching from the financial crisis is that we now have many more examples to illustrate basic economic principles including that incentives matter, the permanent income hypothesis, regulatory capture, and the money multiplier. And you can never have too many examples to drive home the importance of basic economics.
In my view the problem was that economic policy deviated from basic economic principles which had worked well. The result was a great recession, a financial panic, and now a very weak, nearly nonexistent, recovery. The deviations included a monetary policy which set interest rates too low for too long and a regulatory policy which failed to enforce existing rules. The deviations from sound principles continued when government responded with an ad hoc bailout process and temporary fiscal stimulus programs. The good news for the economy is that economic growth and stability can be restored by adopting policies consistent with basic economic principles.
A correction
In an earlier post I said with reference to the New College for the Humanities (NCH)
As far as I know this will be only the second private university in the U.K.Looks like I was wrong. At the Adam Smith Institute blog Anna Moore writes
Once opened, the NCH will be the UK’s third private university, the latest in a trend that began with the University of Buckingham in 1976.A quick bit of research suggests to me that the third private university will be Richmond University. There are several other private degree awarding bodies including BPP University College, Ashridge Business School, ifs School of Finance, The College of Law and Regent's College.
Wednesday, 8 June 2011
If only it would happen in New Zealand
Over at Marginal Revolution Tyler Cowen blogs on The new British university model?
The Guardian reports,Well, it’s certainly star-studded. A new private university in London, devoted to the humanities, will have the philosopher and public intellectual A.C. Grayling as its “master.” Richard Dawkins will teach evolutionary biology, Niall Ferguson economic history, Steven Pinker psychology, and Ronald Dworkin the philosophy of law.[...] Daniel Davies notes correctly that few if any of these illustrious names will be resigning their normal academic posts. That is the real innovation of this business model. Why not rent illustrious names rather than paying the whole set of fixed costs? Then hire excellent teachers — mostly not top researchers — to provide most of the actual instruction.
A new private university in London staffed by some of the world's most famous academics is to offer degrees in the humanities, economics and law from 2012 at a cost of £18,000 a year, double the normal rate.As far as I know this will be only the second private university in the U.K. Starter for 10, name the other one.
The Oxbridge-style university college aims to educate a new British elite with compulsory teaching in science literacy, critical thinking, ethics and professional skills on top of degree subjects taught in one-to-one tutorials.
Its first master will be the philosopher AC Grayling, and top teachers from Harvard, Princeton, Oxford and Cambridge will include Richard Dawkins teaching evolutionary biology and science literacy, Niall Ferguson teaching economics and economic history and Steven Pinker teaching philosophy and psychology.
New College of the Humanities, based in Bloomsbury, is being backed by private funding and will aim to make a profit. It will offer some scholarships, with assisted places being granted to one in five of the first 200 students.
Grayling said he was motivated in part by fears that government cuts to university humanities and arts courses could leave "the fabric of society poorer as a result".
"Society needs us to be thoughtful voters, good neighbours, loving parents and responsible citizens," he said. "If we are to discover and inspire the next generation of lawyers, journalists, financiers, politicians, civil servants, writers, artists and teachers, we need to educate to the highest standards and with imagination, breadth and depth."
The college aims to attract candidates with at least three A grades at A-level with the promise of more direct teaching than at traditional universities. The student-teacher ratio will be better than 10 to one and there will be 12 to 13 hours' contact with teachers each week.
More on ticket scalping
CBC Vancouver interviewed Mike Munger, and some Canadian economist whose name I forget, last week about the prices for tickets to the Vancouver Canucks's Stanley Cup Finals games and ticket scalping. The program can be listened to here. It lasts about 8 minutes.
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Goolsbee to step down
Reuters reports,
WASHINGTON, June 6 (Reuters) - Top White House economist Austan Goolsbee said on Monday he was stepping down, marking the exit of one of President Barack Obama's top aides at a time when new signs of weakness have emerged in the U.S. economy.I guess the only real question is, Why do you step down from such a job after less than 1 year into a 3 year term? What is the signal here?
Less than a year after he was named chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, Goolsbee plans to return to his teaching job at the University of Chicago, the Obama administration said in a statement. He will be back in Chicago in time for the start of the next school year.
Tuesday, 7 June 2011
JS Mill on compensation to slave owners
In a previous posting I asked under what situations should compensation be paid for changes in government policy. One case I asked about was,
Consider the situation of salve owners at the time the British government declared slavery illegal. The salve owners previously legal business was just shut down by an arbitrary decision by the government. The slave owners suffered a very large loss because of the government's decision. Should they have been compensated?John Stuart Mill wrote this on the topic in his text "Principles of Political Economy":
[Ilniquitous as ... [“property in human beings”] is, yet when the state has expressly legalized it, and human beings, for generations, have been bought, sold, and inherited under sanction of law, it is another wrong, in abolishing the property, not to make full compensation.So what was Mill's argument for compensation? The following comes from a paper "Reparations for Emancipation: Mill's Vindication of the Rights of Slave Owners" by Dale E. Miller, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Summer 2005, Volume 43, Issue 2, pages 245-65:
3.1. Mill’s ArgumentSo there is an argument for the compensation of (ex)slave owners, a "takings" argument, which may sound strange - especially as it comes from a well known anti-slavery campaigner, but as Miller notes if the argument fails its not obvious where. Actually the next section in Miller's paper considers objections to Mill's argument.
Mill’s assertion that slave owners are owed fair compensation when their slaves are freed is no mere whim on his part. It appears not only in all seven editions of the Principles of Political Economy, a work that changes substantially over the years as his views evolve, but also in a number of his other writings. The idea did not appear so strange in his day as it might today. British slave owners in the West Indies were paid some twenty million pounds for their slaves in 1833. Some American slave owners were compensated as well; in 1862 Congress appropriated one million dollars for this purpose when it ended slavery in the District of Columbia. Abraham Lincoln’s “Preliminary Proclamation,” issued 22 September 1862, called for compensating all slave owners loyal to the Union who freed their slaves, and Congress passed a resolution that same year calling on the federal government to compensate any state that undertook a gradual abolition of slavery for the “inconveniences, public and private, produced by such a change of system”
Political support for compensating slave owners may have been motivated in part by an obvious pragmatic consideration; it may have looked like the easiest way for a nation to end slavery quickly and, at least in the United States, without bloodshed. Mill, in contrast, considers “emancipation without compensation” to be not merely inexpedient but a “flagrant injustice.” The fact that he does not argue for this contention suggests that his reasons for advancing it are not overly complicated or obscure. Although he never explicitly formulates it, he clearly subscribes to a principle of justice that calls upon the state to compensate citizens when it deprives them of property that they legally acquired and held. For example, at one point in the Principles Mill says that the division of large Irish estates, with cottier tenants being converted into landowning peasants, would only be acceptable subject to the proviso that those who lost land received “its pecuniary value, or an annual income equal to what they derived from it.” He seems to regard the state’s obligation to compensate slave owners when it abolishes slavery as one more straightforward consequence of this principle. Drawing on language from American constitutional law, we can call this the “takings principle.”
One may want to object immediately that the takings principle is irrelevant here because human beings are not in fact property. Mill would agree that, in the most profound sense, this is true. Yet apparently he interprets the takings principle so that it applies whenever the state has allowed people to treat something as if it were property. To understand why he interprets the principle in this way, it is necessary to examine his particular reasons for subscribing to it. In the framework of Mill’s utilitarianism, the obvious place to find theoretical support for the takings principle is an even more fundamental principle of justice, one that he does state explicitly.
[Ilt is confessedly unjust to break faith with any one: to violate an engagement, either express or implied, or disappoint expectations raised by our conduct, at least if we have raised those expectations knowingly and voluntarily....In other words, once one has freely encouraged others to form expectations about one’s future behavior and to base their plans around these expectations, one has an obligation to follow through. This might be called the “expectations principle.” Mill takes this to be one of the weightiest principles of justice, because violations of it have especially detrimental effects on our happiness.
The important rank, among human evils and wrongs, of the disappointment of expectation, is shown in the fact that it constitutes the principal criminality of two such highly immoral acts as a breach of friendship and a breach of promise. Few hurts which human beings can sustain are greater, and none wound more, than when that on which they habitually and with full assurance relied, fails them in the hour of need ....The expectations principle entails that if the government has knowingly and voluntarily encouraged citizens to expect to retain property they have acquired, then it has an obligation to let them do so. Two more premises are needed to get from this to the takings principle. The first is that by making it legal for citizens to own a certain type of property, the state is encouraging them to believe that this will remain legal into the future. The second is that when one violates another’s rights one must fairly compensate them. Mill takes both of these premises for granted-and while more may need to be said about the first, the second probably can be safely assumed. If the takings principle is derived from the expectations principle, then it comes into play whenever the state has knowingly and voluntarily encouraged citizens to rely upon something’s being legally regarded as property.
So Mill apparently reasons from the abstract expectations principle to the more concrete takings principle. From the takings principle, then, he concludes that the state must compensate slave owners upon abolition. There is an inference involved in calling this Mill’s argument, since he never spells it out himself, but it seems like a safe one; he clearly accepts the argument’s premises, and it is thoroughly congruent with his utilitarianism. Perhaps neither step in the argument is as straightforward as he thinks, but if it fails then it is not obvious where. (p. 250-2)
EconTalk this week
Barry Eichengreen of University of California, Berkeley and author of "Exorbitant Privilege" talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the history and importance of the dollar as the dominant international currency. Eichengreen explains the advantages to the United States of the dollar's dominance, the historical circumstances that led to its dominance, and the likelihood that the dollar might be supplanted by a competitor. Along the way they discuss China's currency policy, the state of U.S. monetary policy, the causes of the crisis, the risk of inflation in the United States, and the future of the Federal Reserve.
Smith and Keynes share a birthday 2 (updated)
Previously I commented here at Anti-Dismal on a posting by Don Bouudreaux on the irony that Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes have the same birthdate. In a comment to Don Boudreaux's posting I said,
There is a second problem with Boudreaux's claim, the date 5 June is the date from the Julian calendar. Scotland continued to use the Julian Calendar until 1752. It was only then that the Gregorian calendar was commonly used. But Keynes's birth date is, of course, recorded using the Gregorian calendar and Smith's birth date under this calendar would be 16 June. So again the birthdays would not coincide.
Update: At his blog, Adam Smith's Lost Legacy, Gavin Kennedy author of "Adam Smith's Lost Legacy " and "Adam Smith: A Moral Philosopher and His Political Economy" writes,
Actually there is no irony here. We don’t know Smith’s date of birth. June 5 is most likely the date of his baptism.to which Don Boudreaux kindly replied
Not quite. Smith was born a sickly infant and, many historians believe, was likely baptized immediately rather than, as was the custom for more-healthy newborn babies, a few weeks later.Just how "sickly" would have Smith had to have been on the day of his birth for a baptism to be arranged the very same day? We know Smith was unwell as a child but how early this was manifested itself is, without further documentary support, speculative. And we have no evidence that he was baptised on the day of his birth. Ian Simpson Ross writes in his book "The Life of Adam Smith",
Here’s Nicholas Phillipson, on pages 16-17, of his 2010 biography of Smith entitled Adam Smith: “Smith was by all accounts a sickly child, and it may be that the slight confusion about his birth day arises from his having been baptized on the day of his birth – a common enough practice in the case of infants not expected to survive.”
The Fife seaport of Kirkcaldy, ten miles across the Firth of Forth from Edinburgh, was the scene of Adam Smith's baptism on 5 June 1723, in the Old Parish Kirk of St Brisse (Bryce). Possibly this was his birth-date, though there is no annotation on the 'Register of Baptismes in the Kirk of Kirkcalsie' (Bonar, 1932: 208), stating 'born this day', as there is in the case of Smith's great friend David Hume (Mossner, 1980: 6). It is reported, however, that as an infant Smith was 'infirm and sickly' (Stewart I.2), and understandable anxieties of the time about infant mortality and salvation may have hastened baptism (Flinn, 1977: 284). (Emphasis added)while Gavin Kennedy writes in his "Adam Smith: A Moral Philosopher and His Political Economy",
His son, the world-famous Adam Smith, was baptised on 5 June (his birth date is unknown; old calendar; Bonar, [1894] 1966, 208).So it is possible that Smith was baptised on the day of his birth but it is equally possible he was not. On the evidence I would go with Kennedy and say we know his date of baptism but his date of birth is unknown.
There is a second problem with Boudreaux's claim, the date 5 June is the date from the Julian calendar. Scotland continued to use the Julian Calendar until 1752. It was only then that the Gregorian calendar was commonly used. But Keynes's birth date is, of course, recorded using the Gregorian calendar and Smith's birth date under this calendar would be 16 June. So again the birthdays would not coincide.
Update: At his blog, Adam Smith's Lost Legacy, Gavin Kennedy author of "Adam Smith's Lost Legacy " and "Adam Smith: A Moral Philosopher and His Political Economy" writes,
The 5 June, 1723, is the date on his baptism certificate; his birth date is not known for certain. Also, 5 June is under the old calendar; the modern calendar (from 1752) places it on 16 June, as pedants keep informing me. However, I think it best to stick to the convention of the date on the only known certificate, because retrospectively changing every date on every document before the date was changed by a modern calculation would make historical work prior to 1752 a hopeless mess, as anybody working with 18th century documents will tell you.
Monday, 6 June 2011
Competition cured the “British Disease”
Many may wonder if being British really can be cured!!! But in this article from VoEU.org Nicholas Crafts argues that the "British Disease" can be cured and competition is the way to do it.
Britain’s relative economic decline throughout the 20th century – the so-called “British disease” – was a national embarrassment that only went away in the 1980s. This column presents new research showing that competition provided the cure. Only when Britain returned to a regime of competition and openness similar to that which had prevailed before World War I did productivity growth resume.This has obvious implications for New Zealand. An effort to increase market competition and making sure we maintain our openness to foreign trade will help in the New Zealand's efforts to boost productivity. Crafts argues that
Over the last 20 years or so, there has been a big change in the way economists look at the relationship between competition in product markets and economic growth. Nowadays, at least for “close-to-the-frontier” advanced economies, it is widely accepted that a strong competition policy promotes productivity growth.There are a number of channels vis which competition and productivity are linked.
[...] Once it is recognised that competition plays this role, the range of relevant policies expands beyond competition policy narrowly defined to include, for example, deregulation and trade liberalisation – both of which impact on barriers to entry.
- Stimulating innovation to sustain rents close to the technology frontier;
- Acting as an antidote to corporate governance problems arising from weak shareholders and the separation of ownership and control;
- Acting as a discipline which leads to better management practices; and
- Removing the basis for low-productivity effort bargains between firms and their workers.
These ideas help make sense of the “British Disease” which was particularly virulent from the 1950s through the 1970s. The term refers to the relative economic decline which Britain experienced when other European countries grew more quickly and Britain was overtaken by many of them. The symptoms of “British Disease” included debilitating industrial relations and self-indulgent management. In turn, this episode of British economic history, and the way in which it came to an end, offer further support for the claim that weak competition impairs productivity growth in advanced economies.and
The retreat from competition in the British economy was triggered by the 1930s crisis but was not fully reversed until the 1980s. Early postwar Britain was notable for cartelisation, nationalisation, weak competition policy, and protectionism. [...]Given the problems with productivity in the U.K. in the period from the end of World War Two up until roughly 1980, what changed in the 1980s to reverse things?
The weakness of competition in product markets interacted with two aspects of British exceptionalism in terms of institutions, namely, corporate governance, and industrial relations. The former was characterised by the absence of strong shareholders and an ineffective market for corporate control, the latter by the presence of craft control, multi-unionism, and legal immunities which underpinned trade-union bargaining power. The evidence is that, in these circumstances, weak competition led to poor productivity outcomes. Competition policy was largely neglected which was clearly a mistake. On the one occasion where a serious reform was made, the Restrictive Practices Act in 1956 which led to the abandonment of collusion in many sectors, there was a significant impact on productivity performance.
The results of the “Thatcher Experiment” in the 1980s make the case and paved the way for reversing relative economic decline. Competition was much strengthened by ongoing trade liberalisation, deregulation, and discontinuing 1970s’ industrial policy. As competition strengthened, there were major changes in industrial relations which were associated with organisational change, together with divestment and restructuring in large firms.
At the sectoral level, stronger competition and greater openness were correlated with improved productivity performance. As the age of information and communication technology came along, Britain was able to embrace the opportunities associated with rapid diffusion of the new technologies, which required big changes in working practices and management hierarchies, better than its continental-European peer group. This would not have happened with 1970s-style industrial relations and a heavily-regulated service sector.
Some reflections on this story are worth remembering.
Trade liberalisation was well under way already and the reform of British anti-trust policy was only seriously undertaken by the Labour government in Acts of 1998 and 2002.
- First, it was not just Thatcherism that made the difference.
Fortunately, this time it has been different.
- Second, by implication, it is clear that Britain’s failure to sign the Treaty of Rome in 1957 had a substantial cost in terms of its adverse impact on productivity performance.
- Third, although Britain is an egregious example of the long-lasting damage that the 1930s did to supply-side policy, somewhat similar impacts of that financial crisis were felt across the OECD countries.
Is the theory of the firm big business?
In a recent survey of the Theories of the Firm-Market Boundary, Todd R. Zenger, Teppo Felin and Lyda Bigelow write
But I figured this could just be me, what do I know?, so I wasted a whole pile of bandwidth and checked out the websites of New Zealand’s universities (most of which are awful by the way) to see how many of the economics departments have courses on the theory of the firm or on organisational economics. Answer, none. Or at least, none that I could find. Yes I’m sure that the theory of the firm get a mention in courses on industrial organisation or managerial economics or in more general microeconomics courses but its in passing or just as background needed to deal with whatever the course is really about. There appear to be no dedicated courses on the subject. Are firms really considered as unimportant to the economy as this would suggest?
So theory of the firm economists unite, you have nothing to lose but your obscurity! Assuming there is someone else to unite with.
As one recent review explained, “the theory of the firm has become a big business” (Gibbons, 2005: 200)And indeed Robert Gibbons did write,
After halting beginnings, the theory of the firm has become a big business. Coase (1937) posed the theory’s defining question: which transactions are more efficiently conducted in a firm than in a market? But then the field lay fallow for several decades. Since the 1970s, however, the theory of the firm has become one of the most fertile fields in the profession.This seemed strange to me. From the viewpoint of New Zealand the theory of the firm looks more like a struggling intellectual corner dairy than a big business. The halting never seems to have ended in New Zealand. No matter how fertile the fields no one seems to be ploughing them in this part of down under.
But I figured this could just be me, what do I know?, so I wasted a whole pile of bandwidth and checked out the websites of New Zealand’s universities (most of which are awful by the way) to see how many of the economics departments have courses on the theory of the firm or on organisational economics. Answer, none. Or at least, none that I could find. Yes I’m sure that the theory of the firm get a mention in courses on industrial organisation or managerial economics or in more general microeconomics courses but its in passing or just as background needed to deal with whatever the course is really about. There appear to be no dedicated courses on the subject. Are firms really considered as unimportant to the economy as this would suggest?
So theory of the firm economists unite, you have nothing to lose but your obscurity! Assuming there is someone else to unite with.
Smith and Keynes share a birthday
Or so claims Don Boudreaux over at Cafe Hayek.
In what is surely one of history’s great ironies, today [June 5] is the birthday of both Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes.But I don't think there is a great irony here since we don't know Smith's actual date of birth. June 5 is most likely the date of his baptism, not birth. Why that date is on his gravestone as his date of birth no one knows.
North Korean "Global Happiness Index" ranks China no. 1
From Marginal Revolution comes news of this report on happiness research from North Korea:
China is the happiest place on earth(!!) according to a new global happiness index released by North Korea's Chosun Central Television. China earned 100 out of 100 points, followed closely by North Korea (98 points), then Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela. Coming in at 203rd place is America (or rather "the American Empire", 美帝国), with only 3 happiness points. South Korea got a measly 18 points for 152nd place.Obviously all that income Americans have isn't doing them much good. And some people wonder why there are economists who have doubts about (or aboot, if you happen to come from that place of unreported happiness near to the very unhappy "American Empire") happiness research!!
A graph is worth a thousand words
Tim Worstall at the blog of the Adam Smith Institute points us to this graph.
The graph comes from a new book "The Haves and the Have-Nots", by the World Bank economist Branko Milanovic, which is about inequality around the world. The graph shows inequality within a country, in the context of inequality around the world. It can take a bit of time to get your heard around it but it is worth it. Worstall writes,
Consider, for example, Brazil. Brazil's bottom ventile - the poorest 5 percent of the Brazilian population - is as poor as anyone in the world, registering a percentile in the single digits when compared to the income distribution worldwide. Meanwhile, Brazil also has some of the world's richest, as you can see by how high up on the chart Brazil's top ventile reaches. In other words, this one country covers a very broad span of income groups.
As for America, notice that the entire line is in the top portion of the graph. This tells us that the entire country is relatively rich. In fact, America's bottom ventile is still richer than most of the world: That is, the typical person in the bottom 5 percent of the American income distribution is still richer than 68 percent of the world's inhabitants. Now compare the U.S. to India. India's poorest ventile corresponds, not surprisingly, to the 4th poorest percentile worldwide. But India's richest 5% are only in the 68th percentile. So yes, what this says is that America's poorest are, as a group, about as rich as India's richest.
So being poor in the evil capitalist U.S. is better than being rich in most of the world. Not a result, I'm guessing, too many people would have picked.
It would be cool to see more countries on the graph. What would New Zealand's curve look like?
The graph comes from a new book "The Haves and the Have-Nots", by the World Bank economist Branko Milanovic, which is about inequality around the world. The graph shows inequality within a country, in the context of inequality around the world. It can take a bit of time to get your heard around it but it is worth it. Worstall writes,
A little background. Branko Milanovic, from whom the data comes, is a researcher into inequality. He tells us that there are three ways of measuring this globally. We could use the average income of each country and then compare these averages, this is Concept 1. Not all that useful as we're thus comparing the 400,000 people of Luxembourg as one unit with the 1.3 billion of India as one unit. Concept 2 takes these averages and then weights them by population. Thus we transform the 50 ish units representing the 900 million of Africa into something we can compare to the 1.3 billion of India. Concept 3 is much more difficult to calculate but is much more informative: treating the world as one unit and comparing incomes across the world.What happens when you use method 3? In the graph the population of each country is divided into 20 equally-sized income groups, ranked by their household per-capita income. These are called "ventiles" and of course each "ventile" translates to a cluster of five percentiles (see the horizontal axis). Since the cost of goods varies from country to country, household income numbers are adjusted for purchasing power, i.e. income is show in PPP dollars. In other words, the graph adjusts for the cost of living in different countries, so we are looking at consistent living standards worldwide (as best we can). On the vertical axis, you can see where any given ventile from any country falls when compared to the entire population of the world.
Consider, for example, Brazil. Brazil's bottom ventile - the poorest 5 percent of the Brazilian population - is as poor as anyone in the world, registering a percentile in the single digits when compared to the income distribution worldwide. Meanwhile, Brazil also has some of the world's richest, as you can see by how high up on the chart Brazil's top ventile reaches. In other words, this one country covers a very broad span of income groups.
As for America, notice that the entire line is in the top portion of the graph. This tells us that the entire country is relatively rich. In fact, America's bottom ventile is still richer than most of the world: That is, the typical person in the bottom 5 percent of the American income distribution is still richer than 68 percent of the world's inhabitants. Now compare the U.S. to India. India's poorest ventile corresponds, not surprisingly, to the 4th poorest percentile worldwide. But India's richest 5% are only in the 68th percentile. So yes, what this says is that America's poorest are, as a group, about as rich as India's richest.
So being poor in the evil capitalist U.S. is better than being rich in most of the world. Not a result, I'm guessing, too many people would have picked.
It would be cool to see more countries on the graph. What would New Zealand's curve look like?
Sunday, 5 June 2011
Word for the day
BureauPrat
Defined at the MacDoctor blog to mean:
Defined at the MacDoctor blog to mean:
Professional scientist/clinician who has joined theforces of the damnedadministrative workforce.
Test your economic literacy
or lack thereof!!! You can take the 13-question economic literacy test from the Minneapolis Federal Reserve.
I got 13/13, so it must be easy, but a lot of people don't seem to be that literate. The Minneapolis Fed reports that back in 1998 when it set out to answer the question: How Economically Literate are People? it found that the answer was not very.
(HT: Carpe Diem)
I got 13/13, so it must be easy, but a lot of people don't seem to be that literate. The Minneapolis Fed reports that back in 1998 when it set out to answer the question: How Economically Literate are People? it found that the answer was not very.
To try to answer the above question, the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis commissioned a national telephone poll that was conducted in September and October 1998 by the Minnesota Center for Survey Research at the University of Minnesota. Four hundred and four randomly selected adults from throughout the United States were asked 13 questions designed to test their understanding of economic literacy. The average score was 45 percent, which reveals some understanding, also suggests a need for improvement. (The entire survey, which has a sampling error of plus or minus 5 percentage points, follows this article.)Can you do better than 45%?
The Minneapolis Fed's 13 questions were based on the six key concepts of economic literacy described in this article. For example, as discussed earlier, the basis for much of economic reasoning is that people and societies face trade-offs. Yet only 28 percent and 19 percent of those surveyed, respectively, answered correctly the questions that deal with this concept (questions 2 and 3). Respondents did only somewhat better when asked about the role of government in the economy (questions 10, 12 and 13). Only 38 percent got the right answer to the question dealing with incremental thinking (question 9).
Questions 5 through 8 of the survey ask how markets coordinate consumption and production, and 46 percent on average answered correctly. Respondents got a 60 percent score when asked about trade promoting growth (questions 1 and 4). Ninety percent, however, got the right answer to the question about relative prices guiding decision-making (question 11). (emphasis added)
(HT: Carpe Diem)
Saturday, 4 June 2011
U.S. unemployment fact
Tyler Cowen reports,
People unemployed over 6 months rose by a whopping 361k, 44% of all unemployed.What does this tell us about human capital? If you're made redundant and don't get a new job quickly your human capital depreciates to such a degree that you become almost unemployable? Or is it that those with the lowest marginal product, and thus I guess the lowest human capital, get fired first and because of the low human capital find it difficult to get another job?
How migration shaped our world and will define our future
In this audio interview from VoxEU.org Ian Goldin, director of the Oxford Martin School at the University of Oxford, talks to Romesh Vaitilingam about his new book, ‘Exceptional People’, co-authored with Geoffrey Cameron and Meera Balarajan. They discuss how migrants have fuelled human progress over centuries, the benefits for sending and receiving countries, and why pressure from both demand and supply could lead to a doubling of cross-border migration flows over the next few years.
Romer on growth, technological change, and an unlimited human future
Back in 2001 Reason journalist Ronald Bailey interviewed economist Paul Romer. Bailey wrote,
(HT: Adam Smith Institute)
As one of the chief architects of "New Growth Theory," Paul Romer has had a massive and profound impact on modern economic thinking and policymaking. New Growth Theory shows that economic growth doesn't arise just from adding more labor to more capital, but from new and better ideas expressed as technological progress. Along the way, it transforms economics from a "dismal science" that describes a world of scarcity and diminishing returns into a discipline that reveals a path toward constant improvement and unlimited potential. Ideas, in Romer's formulation, really do have consequences. Big ones.At one point Bailey asked about why are people richer today than they were 100 years ago. Romer's rely makes a nice point about how little changes in the way we do things can add up to be big changes in welfare:
Before New Growth Theory, economists recognized that technology contributed substantially to growth, but they couldn't figure out how to incorporate that insight into economic theory. Romer's innovation, expressed in technical articles with titles such as "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth" and "Endogenous Technological Change," has been to find ways to describe rigorously and exactly how technological progress brings about economic growth. As Robert Solow told Wired in 1996, "Paul single-handedly turned [the study of economic growth] into a hot subject."
Many things contributed, but the essential one is technological change. What I mean by that is the discovery of better ways to do things. In most coffee shops these days, you'll find that the small, medium, and large coffee cups all use the same size lid now, whereas even five years ago they used to have different size lids for the different cups. That small change in the geometry of the cups means that somebody can save a little time in setting up the coffee shop, preparing the cups, getting your coffee, and getting out. Millions of little discoveries like that, combined with some very big discoveries, like the electric motor and antibiotics, have made the quality of life for people today dramatically higher than it was 100 years ago.One small step for Starbucks ...
(HT: Adam Smith Institute)
Is compulsory voting the way to go?
Dan Usher has a new working paper out on A Duty to Vote. The abstract reads:
A duty to vote may be many things. It may be no more than an obligation to cast one's ballot as self-interestedly or as altruistically as one pleases. It may a requirement to vote for the political party most likely to yield the highest social welfare. It may be a requirement to choose between competing parties in the interest of one's social class or with recognition of the needs of the poor. It may include a requirement to inform oneself about the issues in an election. This paper begins with a critique of the argument denying any duty to vote because, as with participants in the market, there is no conflict between self-interest and public interest in the choice whether to vote or abstain. The core of the paper is a discussion of several interpretations of the duty to vote, and there is a brief review of pros and cons of compulsory voting.I wonder what the incentives are for voting if it is compulsory? I can't see people who are being forced into voting exactly taking a lot of time and effort over getting to know the issues or the candidates. Do you really want these people voting?
Friday, 3 June 2011
Interesting blog bits
- Richard A. Epstein asks Reforms? What Reforms?
One distinguished legal scholar, Epstein, has a go at another distinguished legal scholar, Cass Sunstein.
- Gary Becker asks Another Tech Bubble in the Offing?
The dotcom boom at the end of the 1990s was a classical and magnificent bubble. Venture capitalists and other investors were throwing tens, and often hundreds, of millions of dollars at Internet startups and fledgling biotech companies that usually were not making profits, and frequently did not have any sales. The bubble burst in 2000, and the huge valuations placed on these companies disappeared, along with many of the companies. It is only a decade later, but a second dotcom boom has begun, and some early signs are surfacing of a possibly another bubble.
- Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr. on Money and Inflation: What’s Going On in the World?
Are America and the world at risk for another inflationary episode similar to the 1970s and early 1980s? Or do current low rates of inflation portend low inflation for the foreseeable future?
- Tom Papworth on How to introduce a minimum wage without raising unemployment
Supporters of a minimum wage are quick to point out that the introduction of the minimum wage in the UK was not accompanied by rising unemployment, as economic theory would suggest. What explains the labour market's seeming resilience in the face of what should be a very bad policy?
- David Cowan argues Fiscal autonomy is the key to localism
Local government is arguably one of the fundamental institutions of a free society. It ensures that local people have a significant degree of control over how the state acts in their community. Yet centralising instincts have dominated in recent decades and the central state’s power has increased at the expense of local government and other civil institutions.
- Roger Kerr on The State of the Australian Economy
Recently appointed Australian Secretary to the Treasury Dr Martin Parkinson gave an interesting post-budget speech on the Australian economy. Several themes are relevant to economic challenges in New Zealand
- Hugh Pavletich on Sorry about the sewage, we are too busy gardening in the Red Zone!
While owners of central Christchurch property are being ordered by the government’s bureaucrats at CERA to cough up demolition plans for buildings they are aren't even allowed to visit, supposedly because it’s too risky for them, council gardeners are allowed in to central Christchurch to plant flowers—presumably to make wreaths to plant around the businesses the council has killed.
- Marga Peeters on Egypt’s demographic pressure – Where and how to create jobs?
After the drama of Egypt’s revolution comes the economic reality – one of the catalysts for regime change was the country’s high unemployment. This column shows that the growing number of young people entering the job market will only add to the pressure. It argues that job creation in the private sector should be the number one priority for stimulating Egypt’s economic growth.
Should compensation be paid?
Nigel Hawkins writes at the Adam Smith Institute blog that
Now apply the same argument to a different case. Consider the situation of salve owners at the time the British government declared slavery illegal. The salve owners previously legal business was just shut down by an arbitrary decision by the government. The slave owners suffered a very large loss because of the government's decision. Should they have been compensated?
A third case. Should compensation be paid to businesses who are forced into bankruptcy when a government changes of a policy of protection to a policy of free trade? Again the businesses have suffered because of a arbitrary decision by the government.
So should compensation be paid by the government in all cases, none of the cases or only some of the cases, and why? Here is Steven E. Landsburg with his No answer to, at least, the trade case.
[...] Germany’s Chancellor, Angela Merkel, who confirmed that all 17 of the nation’s nuclear power stations would close by 2022.and notes
However, this controversial decision has wide-ranging repercussions for the EU, whose common energy policy – Germany now being anti-nuclear and France being ardently pro-nuclear – is seriously frayed. Germany will become increasingly reliant on gas-generated power and an expansion of renewables. Both E.On and RWE, Germany’s leading utilities, are furious and may pursue the issue through the courts, unless very large compensation is paid.The question is, Should compensation be paid to power companies who run the nuclear power stations? You may well say yes given that there previously legal business has just shut down by an arbitrary decision by the government. The utilities will suffer a very large loss because of the government's decision.
Now apply the same argument to a different case. Consider the situation of salve owners at the time the British government declared slavery illegal. The salve owners previously legal business was just shut down by an arbitrary decision by the government. The slave owners suffered a very large loss because of the government's decision. Should they have been compensated?
A third case. Should compensation be paid to businesses who are forced into bankruptcy when a government changes of a policy of protection to a policy of free trade? Again the businesses have suffered because of a arbitrary decision by the government.
So should compensation be paid by the government in all cases, none of the cases or only some of the cases, and why? Here is Steven E. Landsburg with his No answer to, at least, the trade case.
Crunching the currency
Over at Kiwblog David Farrar writes,
A high dollar may harm the export sector, but so what? It helps importers and consumers. Why should we want to help exporters at the expense of importers and consumers? There is nothing inherently good about exporting, so there is nothing inherently good (or bad) about any level of the exchange rate. Just let the exchange rate be will you!
In my Stuff blog, I take a look at the currency, with the record highs against the US and UK. I concluded:"but in a way which doesn’t harm the export sector"? Will mercantilism not die? I figured that the death blow was delivered to mercantilism back in 1776, but it appears not. Why is Dave, and many others, worried about what happens to exporters? As I have said before Imports good; exports bad:
Politically the currency can have a big impact on the economy and the popularity of the government. But it is not something governments can do a lot about in the short term, unless they want to risk billions of dollars in currency speculation. Long-term policies that lead to better productivity can lead to a stronger currency, but in a way which doesn’t harm the export sector so much, as the increased productivity gives them competitive advantage. That is how you get a win-win.
Why? Well, notice that Adam Smith pointed out more than 240 years ago that "Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production" and that the measure of a country's true wealth, is the total of its production and commerce. That is, a country's wealth is what the people of that country can consume. The great 19th century French economic pamphleteer Frédéric Bastiat wrote, "Consumption is the end, the final cause, of all economic phenomena, and it is consequently in consumption that their ultimate and definitive justification is to be found." Note also that exports are things that we produce and send to other (overseas) people. That is, they are goods and services that we produce but do not consume and thus they lower our welfare. Imports on the other hand, are goods and services that other counties produce and send to us to increase our consumption. This means imports increase our welfare. So imports are welfare increasing and exports are welfare decreasing. Therefore "imports are good; exports are bad"Christina Romer has written about the exchange rate recently,
Our exchange rate is just a price — the price of the dollar in terms of other currencies. It is not controlled by anyone. And a high price for the dollar, which is what we mean by a strong dollar, is not always desirable.Thus a strong dollar is not always a good thing but the same is true of a low dollar. Romer continues - you can replace New Zealand for United States in this,
Such discussions would start with some basic economics. The desire to trade with other countries or invest in them is what gives rise to the market for foreign exchange. You need euros to travel in Spain or to buy a German government bond, so you need a way to exchange currencies.So a high/low dollar could be good or bad. It depends on why its high or low. The exchange rate like any price just tells what the relative demand for the dollar is, but it doesn't tell us anything about whether this is a good or bad thing. The question that must be asked is, Why is the dollar "strong" or "weak"? The answer to this question will tell us if we should be worried about the state of the economy. The exchange rate is just a price, at best a signal of the underlying condition of the economy.
The supply of dollars to the foreign exchange market comes from Americans who want to buy goods, services or assets from abroad. The demand for dollars comes from foreigners who want to buy from the United States.
Anything that increases the demand for dollars or reduces the supply drives up the dollar’s price. Anything that lowers the demand for dollars or raises the supply causes the dollar to weaken.
Consider two examples. Suppose American entrepreneurs create many products that foreigners want to buy, and start many companies they want to invest in. That will increase the demand for dollars and so cause the dollar’s price to rise. Such innovation will also make Americans want to buy more goods and assets in the United States — and fewer abroad. The supply of dollars to the foreign exchange market will fall, further strengthening the dollar. This example describes very well the conditions of the late 1990s — when the dollar was indeed strong.
Now suppose the United States runs a large budget deficit that causes domestic interest rates to rise. Higher American interest rates make both foreigners and Americans want to buy more American bonds and fewer foreign bonds. Thus the demand for dollars increases and the supply decreases. The price of the dollar will again rise.
[ ... ]
Both developments — brilliant American innovation and troublesome American budget deficits — caused the dollar to strengthen. Yet one is clearly a positive for the American economy, the other a negative. The point is that there is no universal good or bad direction for the dollar to move. The desirability of any shift in the exchange rate depends on why the dollar is moving. (Emphasis added)
A high dollar may harm the export sector, but so what? It helps importers and consumers. Why should we want to help exporters at the expense of importers and consumers? There is nothing inherently good about exporting, so there is nothing inherently good (or bad) about any level of the exchange rate. Just let the exchange rate be will you!
Thursday, 2 June 2011
Sustaining top-line growth: The real picture
This article by Bing Cao, Bin Jiang, and Tim Koller comes from the McKinsey Quarterly.
Maintaining high growth rates for a company is a lot harder than many business seems to think.
Maintaining high growth rates for a company is a lot harder than many business seems to think.
Finally, it’s worth bearing in mind just how many casualties the growth game has. Beginning in the mid-1970s, a quarter of all the large companies we studied actually shrank in real terms in a given year. That’s sobering, since most companies today are publicly projecting healthy growth over the next five years. In fact, many of these mature companies will get smaller in real terms. In related research, we find that a startling 44 percent of all companies that grew at rates faster than 15 percent from 1994 to 1997 were growing at rates lower than 5 percent ten years later.The last sentence in particular illustrates the problem and suggests just how important entrepreneurship within a company can be. Without ongoing innovation a firm can die, there is always the need to find new products to replace revenue declines from current offerings as they mature. As markets grow sometimes large amount market share must be grabbed to meet growth goals. Given that all your competitors will be doing the same thing, this is not easy task.
Tyler Cowen gives advice on academic publishing
George Mason University economics professor Tyler Cowen gives advice on academic publishing for aspiring classical liberal academics. Dr. Cowen made these remarks at the Institute for Humane Studies Summer Research Fellowship weekend seminar in May 2011.
Tyler Cowen: Academic Publishing from Kosmos on Vimeo.
Tyler Cowen: Academic Publishing from Kosmos on Vimeo.
Journalists and economics :-(
One of the things that economist John Taylor is famous for is the Taylor Rule (the Taylor Rule says that the federal funds rate should equal 1.5 times the inflation rate plus .5 times the GDP gap plus 1), something so well known now that even journalists have heard of it. Unfortunately. Note the following:
No calculations are given in either of these articles. I wonder if the journalists involved ever thought that checking the calculations of the results they were reporting would be a good idea? As it turns out such a thought would have been at good idea as at his blog, Economcis One, John Taylor writes,
Over at Market Beat: WSJ.com's inside look at the markets, Mark Gongloff reports that Standard Chartered’s David Semmens says that “Based on a strict Taylor-rule calculation, the first effective fed-funds rate increase shouldn’t come until the first quarter of 2013.”So the Taylor Rule tells us that interest rates should stay basically where they are, at least for now.
And over at Business Insider, Art Cashin of UBS reports that Jim Brown of Premium Investor says that “the Taylor rule says the Fed funds rate should be -1.65%” suggesting the need for a QE 2.5.So the Taylor Rule also tells us that interest rates should fall.
No calculations are given in either of these articles. I wonder if the journalists involved ever thought that checking the calculations of the results they were reporting would be a good idea? As it turns out such a thought would have been at good idea as at his blog, Economcis One, John Taylor writes,
So I think the economy would be better off if the Fed started moving to a higher funds rate now rather than later, and I certainly see no rationale for another round of quantitative easing.Thats right, John Taylor says that the Taylor Rule argues for an interest rate increase and he provides the calculations to back it up.
Over here at Economics One, I can report that the Taylor Rule says that the fed funds rate should now be 1 percent, and I can provide the calculations. Available data (through the 1st quarter) show that the inflation rate is about 1.6 percent (GDP deflator smoothed over four quarters) and the GDP gap is about 4.8 percent (average of San Francisco Fed survey). This implies an interest rate of 1.5 X1.6 + .5X(-4.8) + 1 = 2.4 - 2.4 +1 = 1.0 percent.
Wednesday, 1 June 2011
Tapu Misa on the "Dismal Science" (updated)
In an article in the New Zealand Herald Tapu Misa asks
This comes from Professor David Levy, writing in The Freeman magazine, who does understand why economics is the dismal science:
Update: I see Eric Crampton made this point before me.
Since the global financial crisis, I've wondered if even economists understand what Thomas Carlyle called "the Dismal Science".I would ask, Does Tapu Misa understand why Carlyle called it the "Dismal Science"? It seems strange to me that Misa would invoke Carlyle. There are a any number of errors in Misa'a attack on economics contained in the Herald article but what I find particularly weird is that Misa, like so many people who wish to attack economics, quotes Carlyle.
This comes from Professor David Levy, writing in The Freeman magazine, who does understand why economics is the dismal science:
In December 1849 Thomas Carlyle published “Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question” in the London monthly Fraser’s Magazine. In it he labeled the economics of his contemporaries “the dismal science.” In the next issue of Fraser’s, the greatest British economist of that era, John Stuart Mill, responded. That brief exchange—it counts less than 20 pages—is at the very heart of the nature and significance of classical British economics.Carlyle's article was reprinted in pamphlet form in 1853 under the title "Occasional Discourse on the Nigger Question". The rest of Levy's article is well worth reading. For a book length treatment of the subject try Levy's book "How the Dismal Science Got Its Name: Classical Economics and the Ur-Text of Racial Politics". I'll guess Tapu has not read Levy's book.
While everyone has heard that economics is the “dismal science,” almost no one in economics these days seems to know what aroused Carlyle’s ire. The failing is not Carlyle’s; he is as clear as can be as to what exactly is the problem with economics. It stands opposed to racial slavery. In the passage I quote next—which contains the first use of “dismal science” in the language—the only fact that a modern reader lacks is that Exeter Hall was the heart of organized Evangelicalism, the moral center of the British antislave movement:
Truly, my philanthropic friends, Exeter Hall Philanthropy is wonderful; and the Social Science—not a “gay science,” but a rueful [one]—which finds the secret of this universe in “supply-and-demand,” and reduces the duty of human governors to that of letting men alone, is also wonderful. Not a “gay science,” I should say, like some we have heard of; no, a dreary, desolate, and indeed quite abject and distressing one; what we might call, by way of eminence, the dismal science. These two, Exeter Hall Philanthropy and the Dismal Science, led by any sacred cause of Black Emancipation, or the like, to fall in love and make a wedding of it,—will give birth to progenies and prodigies; dark extensive moon-calves, unnameable abortions, wide-coiled monstrosities, such as the world has not seen hitherto!*Much of the rest is unprintable in this respectable periodical; it reads like the vile racist screed it is. Nonetheless, if one can bear the racial pornography, Carlyle makes a point of vital importance: the economics of his contemporaries in its idealization of market relationships among equals stands in opposition to his dream of slavery’s hierarchical obedience.
* [Thomas Carlyle], “Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question,” Fraser’s Magazine for Town and Country, December 1849, pp. 672-73.
Too often soft-pedaled by those who admire his attack on economics, Carlyle was the premier theorist of the idealized slave society. In opposition to the economists’ supply-and-demand model of human society, he put forward the doctrine of obedience to one’s betters. While he had been making such arguments through the 1840s, it wasn’t until the “Negro Question” that he realized that all white people are “better” than all black people. This certainly made the idealized slavery more attractive for white Britons than one in which they might be on the cutting end of the “beneficent whip”—a phrase in “Negro Question” that Mill singled out for particular attention.
Carlyle idealized slavery in the same way economists idealized markets. To match the economists’ claim of mutual gain from exchange, Carlyle put forward the doctrine of the joys of service to one’s betters. And according to the way things were supposed to work, the common religion would give the details of the hierarchy. (This is why Carlyle and his admirers often had “problems” with Jews; in particular, why we find the Anglo-German writer H. S. Chamberlain cited in Mein Kampf for his rants on the subject.)
Update: I see Eric Crampton made this point before me.
The state and 100 percent reserve banking
At the Free Banking blog George Selgin looks at the history of 100 percent reserve banking and points out that every significant 100-percent bank known to history was a government-sponsored enterprise, which depended for its existence on some combination of direct government subsidies, compulsory patronage, or laws suppressing rival (fractional reserve) institutions. Selgin writes,
Free bankers have been fighting a war on two fronts. On one they face champions of central banking and managed money. On the other they struggle against advocates of 100-percent reserve banking. Although the second front is a lot smaller than the first, it’s far from being unimportant, in part because the battle there is being fought against people who generally favor free markets, who might have been expected to join rather than to oppose our cause.The rest of the posting is a great read for those interested in this topic.
They oppose it for a variety of reasons, one of which is their belief that, in a truly free-market setting, fractional reserve banking wouldn’t survive. Instead, they insist, 100-percent reserve banks would prevail. That they haven't is due, in their opinion, to a banking industry playing field slanted in favor of favor fractional-reserve banks, especially by either implicit or implicit deposit guarantees financed through forced levies upon all banks, and sometimes by taxation or inflation. In short, fractional-reserve banking has been nurtured by government subsidies.
Free bankers have tried responding to this argument by noting how fractional reserve banking has prevailed under every sort of bank regulatory regime, from the earliest beginnings of banking, not excepting regimes that involved very little regulation, like those of Scotland, Canada, and Sweden, and that lacked even a trace of government guarantees or other sorts of artificial support. But since some 100-percenters seem unmoved by this approach, I here take a different tack, which consists of pointing out that every significant 100-percent bank known to history was a government-sponsored enterprise, which depended for its existence on some combination of direct government subsidies, compulsory patronage, or laws suppressing rival (fractional reserve) institutions. Yet despite the special support they enjoyed, and their solemn commitments to refrain from lending coin deposited with them, they all eventually came a cropper. What’s more, it was these government-sponsored full-reserve banks, rather than their private-market fractional reserve counterparts, that were the progenitors of later central banks, starting with the Bank of England.
The weak foundations of Arab economy
Timur Kuran writes in the New York Times on The Weak Foundations of Arab Democracy but in the process he also gives an outline of why the Arab world has advanced economically more slowly than the Western world.
On the political front Kuran says,
On the political front Kuran says,
THE protesters who have toppled or endangered Arab dictators are demanding more freedoms, fair elections and a crackdown on corruption. But they have not promoted a distinct ideology, let alone a coherent one. This is because private organizations have played only a peripheral role and the demonstrations have lacked leaders of stature.He goes on to point out problems that affect both the political and the economic aspect of Islamic society. He notes,
Both limitations are due to the longstanding dearth, across the Arab world, of autonomous nongovernmental associations serving as intermediaries between the individual and the state. This chronic weakness of civil society suggests that viable Arab democracies — or leaders who could govern them — will not emerge anytime soon. The more likely immediate outcome of the current turmoil is a new set of dictators or single-party regimes.
But the handicaps of Arab civil society also have historical causes that transcend the policies of modern rulers. Until the establishment of colonial regimes in the late 19th century, Arab societies were ruled under Shariah law, which essentially precludes autonomous and self-governing private organizations. Thus, while Western Europe was making its tortuous transition from arbitrary rule by monarchs to democratic rule of law, the Middle East retained authoritarian political structures. Such a political environment prevented democratic institutions from taking root and ultimately facilitated the rise of modern Arab dictatorships.The development of the corporation was one, albeit significant, factor in the economic development of Europe. Kuran continues,
Strikingly, Shariah lacks the concept of the corporation, a perpetual and self-governing organization that can be used either for profit-making purposes or to provide social services. Islam’s alternative to the nonprofit corporation was the waqf, a trust established in accordance with Shariah to deliver specified services forever, through trustees bound by essentially fixed instructions. Until modern times, schools, charities and places of worship, all organized as corporations in Western Europe, were set up as waqfs in the Middle East.
A corporation can adjust to changing conditions and participate in politics. A waqf can do neither. Thus, in premodern Europe, politically vocal churches, universities, professional associations and municipalities provided counterweights to monarchs. In the Middle East, apolitical waqfs did not foster social movements or ideologies.
Starting in the mid-19th century, the Middle East imported the concept of the corporation from Europe. In stages, self-governing Arab municipalities, professional associations, cultural groups and charities assumed the social functions of waqfs. Still, Arab civil society remains shallow by world standards.
A less powerful business sector also hindered democracy. The Middle East reached the industrial era with an atomistic private sector unequipped to compete with giant enterprises that had come to dominate the global economy. Until then, Arab businesses consisted exclusively of small, short-lived enterprises established under Islamic partnership law. This was a byproduct of Islam’s egalitarian inheritance system, which aimed to spread wealth. Successful enterprises were typically dissolved when a partner died, and to avoid the consequent losses Arab businessmen kept their enterprises both small and transitory.Kuran closes by saying,
Arab businesses had less political clout than their counterparts in Western Europe, where huge, established companies contributed to civil society directly as a political force against arbitrary government. They also did so indirectly by supporting social causes. For example, during industrialization, major European businesses financed political campaigns, including the mass education and antislavery movements.
Since the late 19th century, commercial codes transplanted from abroad have enabled Arabs to form large, durable enterprises like major banks, telecommunications giants and retail chains. Still, Arab companies tend to be smaller relative to global norms, which limits their power vis-à-vis the state.
A stronger civil society alone will not bring about democracy. After all, private organizations can promote illiberal and despotic agendas, as Islamist organizations that denounce political pluralism and personal freedoms demonstrate. But without a strong civil society, dictators will never yield power, except in the face of foreign intervention.So development of a strong civil society with its long lasting corporations which includes a powerful business sector, all of which which acts as a counterweight to government, helps both economically as well as politically.
Independent and well-financed private organizations are thus essential to the success of democratic transitions. They are also critical to maintaining democracies, once they have emerged. Indeed, without strong private players willing and able to resist undemocratic forces, nascent Arab democracies could easily slip back into authoritarianism.
Broadband and productivity
New Zealand is to spend billions of dollars on ultra-fast broadband (UFB) and I have to ask why? Often the answer is that UFB will increase productivity and lend to greater employment.
A similar note is struck by Bronwyn Howell and Arthur Grimes ("Feeding a Need for Speed or Funding a Fibre ‘Arms Race’? Productivity Questions for FTTH Network Financiers", New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation, April 2010) when they write:
The productivity boost from that investment would add 1.8 percent to GDP and create 70,000, the minister has said.But will it? Below is the abstract from a Motu Working Paper, “The Need for Speed: Impacts of Internet Connectivity on Firm Productivity" by Arthur Grimes, Cleo Ren and Philip Stevens (Motu Working Paper 09-15 Motu Economic and Public Policy Research October 2009):
Fast internet access is widely considered to be a productivity-enhancing factor. Internet access speeds vary regionally within countries and even within cities. Despite articulate pleas for network upgrades to accelerate internet access, there is little rigorous research quantifying benefits to individual firms that arise from upgraded internet connectivity. We use a large New Zealand micro-survey of firms linked to unit record firm financial data to determine the impact that differing types of internet access have on firm productivity. Propensity score matching is used to control for factors, including the firm’s (lagged) productivity, that determine firms’ internet access choices. Having matched firms, we examine the productivity impacts that arise when a firm adopts different types (speeds) of internet connectivity. Broadband adoption is found to boost productivity but we find no productivity differences across broadband type. The results provide the first firm-level estimates internationally of the degree of productivity gains sourced from upgraded internet access.The paper's conclusion reads, in part,
After estimating our prediction models for connectivity choices, we match each “treated” firm with a set of like “control” firms (both in terms of their estimated propensity to have broadband and on their observable characteristics). Two types of matching (kernel and stratified) are adopted to check robustness of results. We then estimate the average treatment effect for treated firms (ATT) across a range of samples. We focus on ATTs relating to shifts from: (i) broadband versus no broadband, (ii) slow versus no broadband, and (iii) fast versus slow broadband. We find a (levels) productivity effect of broadband relative to no broadband of approximately 10% across all firms. The estimates indicate a marginally stronger impact on firm productivity for firms in rural (low population density) relative to urban (high density) areas but the differences are not significantly different. Our estimates show that all of these productivity gains can be attributed to adoption of slow relative to no broadband, with no discernable additional effect arising from a shift from slow to fast broadband. (Emphasis added)Thus we conclude that a shift to broadband connectivity (from dial-up) appears to raise firm productivity but a move from slow to fast broadband may have no effect on productivity at all.
A similar note is struck by Bronwyn Howell and Arthur Grimes ("Feeding a Need for Speed or Funding a Fibre ‘Arms Race’? Productivity Questions for FTTH Network Financiers", New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation, April 2010) when they write:
Fast internet access is widely considered to be a productivity-enhancing factor. However, despite promises of substantial gains from its deployment, the evidence from recent empirical studies suggests that the productivity gains may not be as large as originally hypothesised. If substantiated, these findings suggest that current government plans to apply significant sums to bring forward the deployment of fast fibre networks (e.g. in both Australia and New Zealand) may ultimately be unlikely to generate returns to the extent anticipated by their sponsors.So, again, why are we spending billions on ulta-fast broadband? If we are to spend huge amounts of money on UFB I would at least want to know that there are good reasons for doing so. I'm not sure increases in productivity is such a reason.
Even more questions
Previously I had Questions and more questions from Bryan Caplan and Mark Perry. Now Sam Bowman at the Adam Smith Institute blog wants to ask his own questions:
3. An excess of supply in labour is usually called unemployment; minimum wage supporters deny that minimum wage laws create unemployment. What other goods can a price floor be set above the market price without creating an excess of supply?Again I'm sure there will be no answers forthcoming.
4. Why don't you want minimum wage to be £20/hr, or £100/hr, or £1,000/hr? If wages can be set by government without any ill effects, why not solve most social problems simply by raising the minimum wage?
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