Tuesday, 9 June 2009

Public-private partnerships

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) seem to offer a solution to a common problem for economies which have been hampered by the poor quality of their infrastructure. PPPs mean, it is argued, that private capital would be used to fund much-needed projects, whether it be in transport, education, health or whatever. Better still, it was further argued, private companies could build and operate the new infrastructure, bringing large cost savings.

At the IEA website Richard Wellings discusses the British experience with PPPs. He explains Why PPPs may offer poor value for money.

Wellings writes that in the UK,
The first modern PPPs were began in the 1980s under what became known as the Private Finance Initiative (PFI). Their numbers grew during the early-mid 1990s, with several design, build, finance and operate (DBFO) road schemes, as well as the construction of a number of privately-operated prisons. These projects were generally viewed as successful within government - a higher proportion were delivered on time and on budget than would have been expected using traditional procurement methods.

Building on these foundations, the election of a New Labour government saw a rapid expansion in the number of PPPs. The model fitted well with Labour’s ‘Third-Way’ approach to the economy. Instead of outright nationalisation, with its well-documented ineffiencies, the dynamism of the private sector would be harnessed for social objectives.

By 2003/04 PPP schemes accounted for 39% of capital spending by UK government departments. And by January 2008 there were over 500 operational PPP projects with a total capital value of around £44 billion and a further number in the pipeline. Their scope was also widened, with a higher proportion used to build new schools and hospitals. Public transport became a major investment priority rather than roads.
But Wellings argues this expansion of PPPs may have been misguided. Indeed, it was arguably when partnerships started to go wrong. In particular, unlike the earlier schemes, the new projects were more likely to be in fields marked by a high level of political sensitivity. Wellings gives as an example of the problems, the London Underground PPP. He writes,
This huge project, designed to upgrade the Tube, required an annual subsidy of £1 billion. Fiercely resisted by the Greater London Authority under Ken Livingstone, who favoured an alternative bond finance scheme, it was imposed on the capital by central government with heavy Treasury backing. So even before it started the process was marked by a high level of controversy.

Extremely complex 30-year contracts were drawn up, at a cost of £455 million in consultancy fees, and the Rail Regulator was appointed as ‘PPP Arbiter’ to adjudicate any disputes. Two consortiums were selected to upgrade and maintain different sections of the network.

In 2003 the Metronet consortium began a £17 billion project covering nine out of twelve tube lines. It soon got into difficulties. In April 2004 it was fined £11 million for poor performance, but this was just the start.

Further fines followed and in June 2007 Metronet, concerned about cost escalation, requested an extraordinary review by the PPP Arbiter. A short-term cost overrun of £551 million was predicted, rising to £2 billion by 2010, and this was blamed on additional demands made by Transport for London.

But the Arbiter had a different view – most of the cost escalation could be explained by Metronet’s inefficiency and only a small fraction of the requested extra payments would be forthcoming. Faced with huge losses, the company went into administration.

The government tried to find private bidders for the Metronet contracts but failed – unsurprisingly given the uncertainty concerning costs. The public sector then became responsible for the upgrades and maintenance. Taxpayers would now pick up the bill for any cost overruns.
The events just described illustrate a key weakness of PPPs. When they involve essential infrastructure that government will not allow to fail (too big to fail?), it is clear that a high proportion of a project’s risk remains with the public sector. But such an acknowledgment undermines one of the major rationales for having PPPs in the first place, that they are good value for money despite apparently higher financing costs, because of their ability to transfer risk to private investors. A transfer that doesn't appear to have taken place.

Wellings goes on to explain that the UK experience thus far suggests that PPP schemes have failed to live up to their early promise. He offers several explanations for this:
Firstly, comparisons with public finance may understate the true cost of government funding. While it may be possible to borrow at low interest rates this is only because potential risks and losses have been offloaded on to taxpayers.

Secondly, a high proportion of recent PPPs have been plagued by high ‘transaction costs’. They have involved tortuous bidding processes and the creation of complex contractual agreements and regulatory frameworks, which have created additional costs and risks for the private-sector partners involved. Value for money has been reduced as a result.

Finally, the operation and outputs of PPP schemes have often been subject to substantial political and bureaucratic intervention. As seen with some of the public transport PPPs, a hostile relationship may develop between the counterparties. There can even be politically-motivated attempts to subvert the viability of projects. This makes it more difficult both to raise private finance and transfer risk. Investors are more likely demand a premium and contractual guarantees if they perceive political risks as high.
Wellings concludes by saying,
Accordingly, PPPs may not be a suitable funding model for some projects. The risks are particularly high in situations when government is unwilling to take a ‘hands-off’ approach. At the same time, if government will stand aside, perhaps after setting a loose regulatory framework, then depoliticisation through full-blooded privatisation may be the best option.
There are warnings from the UK experience of PPPs for other countries, New Zealand?, thinking of going down this route. Hopefully these warnings will be heeded.


Stephen Monrad said...

Good points on public-private partnerships.

I have looked into these deals and agree that they are of dubious value. While the rhetoric supporting PPPs is focused on savings, the real reason they are appealing to government is because they are an off-book form of financing. The government gets to pay for the infrastructure over time without increasing its official debt.

As far as I can tell, the main reason private sector delivery of projects is cheaper is because they are better at controlling wage costs. This saves money but results in low paying jobs that don't offer a living wage.

Kian said...

In my opinion PPPs are still a good instrument to build infrastructure more efficient even though public has to pay for it. The government has to define a clear framework for private investors.