Showing posts with label bad journalism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bad journalism. Show all posts

Sunday, 6 November 2016

Private funding of the Parker fight

Related to my previous posting on the withdraw of public funding for the Parker fight in Auckland comes this news from the New Zealand Herald on pay-for-view prices for the event.
Pay-per-view prices for Joseph Parker's heavyweight world title fight are set to go sky high, with punters and pubs expected to cop the fallout from Auckland Council's refusal on ratepayer funding.

The Herald on Sunday understands from a well-placed source that the pay-TV price for Parker's fight against Andy Ruiz Jr next month could now be set between $70 and $100.
The first point to make here is that this is one way for the event to be paid for by those who want to see the event.

The Herald also states,
The expected pay-TV spike comes after Auckland Council's events and economic development arm, Ateed, threw in the towel on funding the fight with ratepayer money.
Now for the bit I don't get about all of this, Why does the Herald journalist think that the pay-TV price has anything to do with public funding? I mean if the profit maximising price for screening the event is around $70 to $100 without public funding then why isn't this the profit maximising price with public funding?

If market conditions are such that the promoter can charge in the $70-$100 range for the fight when there is no public funding then those same conditions mean he can charge the same even with public funding. This basically just turns the public funding into a rent for the promoter.

Friday, 20 May 2016

Sources of biased journalism

Over at the Stumbling and Mumbling blog Chris Dillow outlines some sources of biased journalism.
- Low pay. The problem here isn’t just that if you pay peanuts you get monkeys. It’s that journalists are often paid less than PRs. This leads to many of them being insufficiently critical of their sources simply because they might want to work in PR later.

- Cost-cutting. Foreign correspondents have disappeared, as has much investigative journalism, and has been replaced by cheap celebrity gossip and cobbling stories together from a few tweets. What Ben Rhodes says of the US echoes in the UK:
All these newspapers used to have foreign bureaus,” he said. “Now they don’t. They call us to explain to them what’s happening in Moscow and Cairo. Most of the outlets are reporting on world events from Washington. The average reporter we talk to is 27 years old, and their only reporting experience consists of being around political campaigns. That’s a sea change. They literally know nothing.

- Class. Over half of top journalists were privately educated. This generates a host of distortions, such as a greater sympathy for the rich and powerful than for the poor, and a lack of understanding of economics: “Money? That’s what comes from daddy!”

- Exchanging favours. For years, the relationship between the police and media has been too cosy: the police feed stories to journalists who in return downplay or ignore stories of police malpractice. This is one reason why it took years for the brutality of the police at Orgreave or Hillsborough to become properly known. In the same way, advertisers buy not just advertising space but a cooperative silence, broken only by the occasional brave maverick such as Peter Oborne.

- Misplaced deference. The problem here isn’t just what Adam Smith called the tendency to respect the rich and powerful more than the wise and virtuous. Younger inexpert journalists often need help, which causes them to seek expertise where little exists. Fund managers, for example, are often presented as well-informed when in fact many are simply rip-off merchants. Similarly, their habit of being at the end of a phone with a ready quote about latest market moves or economic releases gives City economists more influence over journalists than academics have.

- Laziness. It’s easy to get a story by getting quotes from talking heads. It’s harder to find out what’s really going on. This leads to a bias in favour of those talking heads, and against groups which aren’t so rich or organized as to have spokesmen; compare, for example, coverage of banks to coverage of anti-capitalist protestors or of the rich to benefit recipients.

- Overcompensation. The problem with trying to balance is that you can sometimes overdo it and topple over – hence, for example, the Today’s programme’s otherwise odd decision to interview Ann Coulter and its giving more coverage to Conservative than Labour voices. Similarly, in the 90s the BBC’s liberal arts bias led to it being unsympathetic to business but in recent years, it has over-corrected and become insufficiently critical. I’ll plead guilty myself here. I might have sometimes been too uncritical in the day job of Brexiteers or active managers, as I’ve tried too hard to be “fair”.

- Libel laws. As Nick Cohen has shown, the cost of defending libel writs is so high as to have a chilling effect upon journalism; the misdeeds of the rich and powerful simply don’t get reported at all. This helps sustain inequality by leading the public to under-estimate the venality and corruption of the rich.

- Wanting the scoop. Journalists’ healthy urge to get a story leads to a reliance upon sources who have their own agendas. We see one baleful and widespread effect of this in the advance leaking of speeches; “the Prime Minister will say today…”. Such leaks mean that analyses of the speech are quickly out-of-date and stale, with the upshot that the speaker gets less critical coverage than he should.

- Cognitive biases. Every profession is prone to deformation professionnelle. One of journalists’ biases is the fundamental attribution error – the tendency to over-emphasize personal factors and under-rate environmental ones. For example, politicians are described as “weak” – think of John Major in the 90s – when in fact circumstances, such as a fractious party, make them so. It’s this failure to put things into context that led John Birt in 1975 to complain of the BBC’s “bias against understanding” – a bias which, says Steve Richards, still exists today.

- News itself. “Dog bites man” is not news, “man bites dog” is. This means that everyday tragedies such as the fact that tens of thousands still die of poverty are underplayed, whilst the most trivial of first world problems are covered in depth. Also, news prizes “human interest” stories. These are almost equivalent to committing the base rate fallacy – of failing to ask “how common is that?” This can lead to a class bias: lively stories of benefit fraudsters get covered whilst the millions of decent people living in desperate conditions get ignored.
The low pay argument is likely true. At least here in New Zealand I would say it is one reason for so-called economic journalists having no understanding of economics. Those trained as economists can make a lot more money outside of journalism than inside.

With regard to cost cutting and the disappearance of things like foreign bureaus you have ask what are the pressures that have led to these outcomes. Foreign bureaus and the like may simply not be worth it any more. Creative destruction? Have transaction costs been lowered so that vertical integrated companies with news outlets controlling their own foreign bureaus etc are no longer economic?  And it may be that the market for such things is no longer there. Charges in technology may have meant that those who want overseas news and analysis get elsewhere.

As to "class", well Chris is a Marxist so I guess it has to be in here, but I'm not convinced it plays a huge role.

Exchanging favours is nothing new so if its a problem now it has been in the past as well. Not sure what you can do about it. Both sides gain from it and so it looks like an equilibrium, even if you think its an inferior one.

Misplaced deference is more an issue of what experts do you ask. It's good that journalists do ask for help, in New Zealand in many cases it seems to me the problem is that they don't ask, but no matter who they ask you could argue that they are the wrong people to ask if you disagree with what they say. And there is the issue of whether journalists understand what they are told.

Laziness I'm sure is an issue but not just for the reason Chris notes. Its not just a "rich" against the "poor" thing. It really is that journalist don't do the work necessary to understand issues. Think about the coverage of "inequality". Have any journalists ask the question of why inequality matters at all? And if it does matter, inequality of what? Income? Wealth? Consumption? What? And so on.

Overcompensation is an issue. Just think of the coverage the anti-free trade groups get relative to the free trade supporters. The majority of economists support free trade but I'm not sure that's the impression you get from news coverage.

Not too sure liberal laws act in the way Chris seems to think. Again I think Chris overplays the "rich" versus "poor" issue. I don't see why newspapers can not defend themselves against libel actions.

Dealing with those who have agendas is part of the journalist's job and if they can't be bothered sorting out the truth from the crap then they do indeed fail one of the most obvious tests of being a good journalist. All the people/groups journalists deal with have their own agendas, it is the job of the journalist to see through this.

As to cognitive biases I'm sure they exist but what do you do about them? Everybody has them, so the best you can hope for is multiple viewpoints, each of which has different biases, which at least allows comparison of views.

As to the news itself issue, isn't this more of a consumer issue. The issues that get coverage are those for which there is a market. News outlets give people what they want, so if there is a problem with what is delivered as news it may not be because of the news providers so much as a problem with news consumers. Unfortunately crap sells.

Sunday, 8 May 2016

How not to analyse the effects of a minimum wage

From the National Employment Law Project comes this piece of "analysis" of the effects of the minimum wage: Raise Wages, Kill Jobs? Seven Decades of Historical Data Find No Correlation Between Minimum Wage Increases and Employment Levels by Paul K. Sonn and Yannet Lathrop.

At the end of the second paragraph of the Summary comes this analytical and policy gem,
Rather than an academic study that seeks to measure causal effects using techniques such as regression analysis, this report assesses opponents’ claims about raising the minimum wage on their own terms by examining simple indicators and job trends.
So they do not even try to sort out the actual effects, and causation, of having a minimum wage, they just look for a correlation, or lack of a correlation, and this will do.

And yes, stopping reading after the second paragraph is therefore optimal.

Thursday, 26 September 2013

Misunderstanding Coase.

At the Forbes website Steve Denning asks Did Ronald Coase Get Economics Wrong? I would say not, but Denning does get Coase wrong.

Denning writes,
Coase’s 1937 essay set out to explain why firms exist. The article asked: given that “production could be carried on without any organization at all”, and given that “the price mechanism should give the most efficient result,” why do firms exist? Coase’s answer was that firms exist because they reduce transaction costs, such as search and information costs, bargaining costs, keeping trade secrets, and policing and enforcement costs.
The expression
production could be carried on without any organization at all
appears at the end of a paragraph in Coase's paper which begins with the sentence,
It is convenient if, in searching for a definition of a firm, we first consider the economic system as it is normally treated by the economist.
And of course the way the economic system was normally treated by the economists at the time was, implicitly but importantly, as a zero transaction cost system. As to the second expression noted by Denning
the price mechanism should give the most efficient result
I can't find it in Coase's paper and so don't know its context and thus what to make of it.

Denning continues,
These arguments were widely accepted by economists in the 20th Century and are still accepted by many today. But let’s face it: at least one of the starting assumptions of Coase’s article was flat out wrong, even in 1937. Although it’s true for simple commodities that “production could be carried on without any organization at all”, it is simply untrue that complex products and services such as airliners, smart phones or multi-disciplinary professional services “could be carried on without any organization at all.”
Here he has lost the plot entirely with regard to Coase's argument. As I noted above the expression “production could be carried on without any organization at all” occurs in a discussion of the standard, zero transaction cost, approach to the study of the economic system. In such a world production can and would be carried out without organisations such as firms since such organisations would have no reason to exist. As I have noted before, Nicolai Foss summaries the situation as,
With perfect and costless contracting, it is hard to see room for anything resembling firms (even one-person firms), since consumers could contract directly with owners of factor services and wouldn’t need the services of the intermediaries known as firms.
The zero transaction cost world is a world of perfect and costless contracting, that is, a world within which complete contracts can be written. This means that firms serve no purpose, markets can do everything.

But it wasn't a starting assumption of Coase's theory. To quote Coase,
The world of zero transaction costs has often been described as a Coaseian world. Nothing could be further from the truth.It is the world of modern economic theory, one which I was hoping to persuade economists to leave.
The starting point of Coase's theory is assumption of positive transaction costs, it is only in such a world that firms make any sense at all for Coase. That was the basic point Coase was trying to make For 80 years he was saying positive transaction costs matter, let us leave the world of zero transaction costs, - blackboard economics, as he called it - behind and study the world as it really is, a world with positive transaction costs.

Denning goes on to say,
Those products and services [complex products and services such as airliners, smart phones or multi-disciplinary professional services] require collaboration for their very existence. The economic reason that such organizations exist is that they provide value to customers that could not be produced without an organization.
Such collaboration could occur across markets if transaction costs are low compared to the costs of carrying out the transaction in a firm. If transactions are high then Coase wold say that a firm would be formed.

Following this Denning notes,
Coase’s theory did help explain the spread of big hierarchical bureaucracies of the 20th Century built on economies of scale. In the 20th Century, firms could generally succeed by pushing products and services at customers with greater efficiency than smaller firm
If economics of scale result in lower costs of management compared to transaction costs then firms would tend to be larger. As Coase said,
Other things being equal, therefore, a firm will tend to be larger :
[...]
(c) the greater the lowering (or the less the rise) in the supply price of factors of production to firms of larger size.
However in a world of low transaction cost there is no reason that things like large fixed costs can not be handled across the market. With complete contracts organising large amounts of capital present no insurmountable problems.

Denning also states,
But even in narrow economic terms, Coase’s theory was just plain wrong.
When properly understood it becomes clear that Coase's theory is fine, its Dennings arguments that are wrong.

Sunday, 8 September 2013

A bizarre piece on Coase

The Guardian in the UK has an absolutely bizarre article on Coase written by a David Walker - no relation I'm very pleased to say or if he is I'm disowning my family! The article is Ronald Coase has died, but his individualist dogma is everywhere: You can't divorce the ideas of the Chicago school economist from his followers today, intent on destroying the protective state.

The piece opens with,
He believed in privatising lighthouses, opposed regulating taxis, thought pollution was a price worth paying for profit, wanted to abolish the BBC and didn't think private companies could ever be monopolistic – you might not call him extreme but the label ideological would surely be applicable.
For a start what exactly would be wrong with privatising lighthouses and doing away with the BBC? What Coase set out to show in his paper on lighthouses was that lighthouses, an often used example of something that has to be provided by the government, were in fact provided by private enterprise in the early years of the British lighthouse system. So privatisation is perfectly possible. As to firms never being monopolistic I don't that Coase ever said this. Murray Rothbard did argue this by applying Mises's argument that about why socialism can't work for a country to the firm. If a firm gets very large it starts to take over its input markets and thus loses prices from those markets and therefore economic calculation is not longer possible. But I don't know what Coase thought about this.

Walker continues,
If, over a long career, that person had won renown as an economist but never once addressed income and wealth inequality or, in markets, the everyday imbalance of bargaining power between employers and employees, you might either think his fame overblown, or the way his reputation was inflated somewhat suspect.
Coase did not say much about income and wealth inequality, but many economists have won renown while not saying much about income and wealth inequality. So what? Its bit like saying X won renown as a physicist but said nothing about elementary particle physics. Well if he wasn't an elementary particle physicist this is not surprising. All this says is that there are gains of specialisation and the division of labour. We don't have a comparative advantage in everything. So we don't work on everything.

Walker goes on,
Coase, they say, was influential. But like cites like. He won a Nobel prize but by what transparent standard is a committee of the Swedish academy the sole arbiter of intellectual merit, or itself unswayed by beliefs and world views? In economics the line between scholarship and ideology is not just fine, but carefully screened from prying eyes.
But by what standard is a committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. we could ask, the arbiter of intellectual merit in physics and chemistry, the other wards they decide. Someone has to decide who gets any award, for the economics, physics and chemistry Nobels it just happens to be the the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. Again, so what. You could ask this question no matter who gave the award. As to ideology, what are we to make of the awards to people like Gunnar Myrdal, Amartya Sen, Daniel Kahneman, Paul Krugman or Arthur Lewis, for example.

Later Walker writes,
Coase was praised for writing about the real world, for example his assertion that firms grow in relation to the cost of doing business. It's a theory, and attracted attention because so little economics is about real existing companies and the highly imperfect markets in which they operate. But Coase was careful never to frame his theory to make it empirically testable.
Both the transactions cost and property rights theories, which follow from Coase's work, have been empirically tested often. Oliver Williamson has noted at different times over the years,
The transaction cost approach to the study of integration yields numerous refutable implications many of which are unique to this approach. The cumulative evidence, which includes mundane, forward, lateral, and backward integration, is broadly corroborative.
and
To be sure, transaction cost economics, like everything else, will benefit from more and better empirical work. I have no hesitation, however, in declaring that transaction cost economics is an empirical success story.
and
TCE is an empirical success story ... research has been broadly corroborative of the predictions of transaction cost economics
In their 2007 look at "Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence" Francine Lafontaine and Margaret Slade note that
Since Ronald H. Coase’s (1937) seminal paper, a rich set of theories has been developed that deal with firm boundaries in vertical or input–output structures. In the last twenty-five years, empirical evidence that can shed light on those theories also has been accumulating.
Its hard to see empirical work accumulating for 25 years if the theories are not empirically testable.

After this Walker comments,
Coase belonged to the Chicago school. Like his pal Milton Friedman, government was anathema. Without regulation, and particularly without the welfare state, markets would resolve themselves in benign benefit – all you need are saintly courts and judges where the rampant individualism prevalent everywhere else is miraculously absent.
Was Coase part of the Chicago School? In many ways yes but in others no. Coase, for example,  rejected Friedmanite positivism, as David Henderson has written,
A gentle man, Coase is also quite willing to take on some of the giants of economics when he disagrees with them. In one essay, "How Should Economists Choose?," Coase criticizes a famous 1953 article on methodology by Milton Friedman. Friedman had argued that the correctness of one's assumptions is unimportant and that all that matters for an economic theory is that it be capable of accurate predictions. Coase responds with a devastating counterexample.

"We could have predicted," writes Coase, "over the last few years what the American government's policies on oil and natural gas would be if we had assumed that the aim of the American government was to increase the power and income of the OPEC countries and to reduce the standard of living in the United States. But I am sure that we would prefer a theory that explains why the American government, which presumably did not want to bring about these results, was led to adopt policies which harmed American interests. Testable predictions are not all that matters. And realism in our assumptions is needed if our theories are ever to help us understand why the system works the way it does. Realism in assumptions forces us to analyze the world that exists, not some imaginary world that does not."
Was government really an anathema to Coase (or Friedman for that matter)? Coase showed that in a world of zero transaction costs government actions - normally the imposition of taxes - were not needed to correct for negative externalities. But he goes on to say,
Of course, it does not imply, when transaction costs are positive, that government actions (such as government operation, regulation or taxation, including subsidies)  could not produce a better result than relying on negotiations between individuals in the market. Whether this would be so could be discovered not by studying imaginary governments but what real governments actually do. My conclusion: Let us study the world of positive transaction costs.
In a world of positive transactions costs what policy should be carried out can only be determined by working out empirical case studies. Does this sound like a man for whom government is an anathema or a man who just wants to study the world, including markets and governments, as they really are.

The truth about Coase, work and his legacy is much more subtle than David Walker seems able to comprehend.

Wednesday, 4 September 2013

You just have to love journalists (updated x2)

Josh Barro has an article on the Business Insider Australia website on Here's The Key Thing You Should Know About Ronald Coase, The Great Economist Who Died Yesterday At 102. To accompany the article is the picture below. The title on the picture is "Prof. Ronald Coase, 1910-2013".


The key thing you need to know about this picture is that its of Oliver Williamson!! Not Ronald Coase.

Below is a picture of Coase, aged 101.


Update: These guys are really on to it. I've just check the page again (5:50pm 6/9/13 NZ Time) and the Williamson picture is still there. This despite the fact that in the discussion section below the article Ian Deans has written "That picture is of Oliver Williamson, not Ronald Coase. If you want to honor the man, maybe choose a photo of the right guy." Good to see just how much notice they take of the comments on their site.

Update 2: I've checked the page again (10:14pm 13/04/16 NZ Time) and the picture of Williamson is still there.