Becker versus Coase on consumer behaviour

From the Free to Choose Network comes this video of Gary Becker and Ronald Coase talking consumer behaviour. Half an hour very well spent.

Is the economic theory of utility a useful way of understanding consumer behaviour? Ronald Coase and Gary Becker, Nobel Economists at the University of Chicago, explain and discuss the theory of rational maximizing utility. They describe how consumers rank preferences and then attempt to choose the highest preference according to their resources, and they discuss whether firms and households operate with similar principals. They consider whether it is necessary to even have utility theory, and whether economists have been misled on this subject.

Roger Bootle: Europe is a complete disaster – Britain must leave

Economist & author Roger Bootle talks to Merryn Somerset Webb about Europe’s economic disaster, & should Britain pull out.

There are two books you should take advantage of this offer to buy

"The Theory of the Firm: An overview of the economic mainstream"
https://www.routledge.com/The-Theory-of-the-Firm-An-overview-of-the-economic-mainstream/Walker/p/book/9781138191532

and

"A Brief Prehistory of the Theory of the Firm"
https://www.routledge.com/A-Brief-Prehistory-of-the-Theory-of-the-Firm/Walker/p/book/9781138488267

Is the Phillips Curve Still a Useful Guide for Policymakers?

Morgan Foy writes in the September 2019 issue of the NBER Digest on the question, Is the Phillips Curve Still a Useful Guide for Policymakers?

The Phillips curve, named for the New Zealand economist A.W. Phillips, who reported in the late 1950s that wages rose more rapidly when the unemployment rate was low, posits a trade-off between inflation and unemployment. When unemployment is low, and the labor market is tight, there is greater upward pressure on wages and, through labor costs, on prices.

The conceptual foundations of this relationship have been a subject of active debate, but for many decades, the relationship seemed well-supported by U.S. data. In the last two decades, however, the U.S. inflation rate has not been particularly high, even during periods of low unemployment. The recent data have led many to wonder whether the Phillips curve has weakened or disappeared. In Prospects for Inflation in a High Pressure Economy: Is the Phillips Curve Dead or Is It Just Hibernating? (NBER Working Paper No. 25792) Peter Hooper, Frederic S. Mishkin, and Amir Sufi examine why the Phillips curve relationship has not been evident in recent aggregate data for the United States.

The researchers study both inflation in consumer prices and inflation in wages. They test for a "price" Phillips curve using data on annual costs of goods and services, and for a "wage" Phillips curve using hourly earnings data. They allow for different relationships between inflation and unemployment in tight and in slack labor markets. Using a simple model that assumes a linear relationship between inflation and unemployment, and data from 1961 to 2018, they estimate that a one percentage point drop in the unemployment rate increased inflation by a mere 0.14 percentage points. However, when they allow for different effects of unemployment changes in tight and slack labor markets, they find that the estimated effect of a 1 percentage point unemployment decline on the inflation rate is about -0.32 percentage points when the unemployment rate is 1 percentage point below the natural rate, and -0.12 when it is 1 percentage point above it.

When examining data only from 1988 to 2018, the researchers see less evidence for a robust price Phillips curve. The linear and nonlinear slopes are both close to zero, consistent with the common view that the Phillips curve is flattening. However, the wage Phillips curve is much more resilient and is still quite evident in this time period.

The study points out that in the last three decades, the Great Recession notwithstanding, there has been less variability in the national economy than in prior decades, which makes it harder to detect the impact of unemployment on inflation. In addition, the Federal Reserve has tried to avoid labor market overheating as a way to stabilize inflation, thereby "anchoring" inflation expectations at a 2 percent inflation level and reducing the effect of unemployment fluctuations on price movements.

The researchers observe that state- and city-level data provide more variability in unemployment rates and are less influenced by federal monetary policy than the national figures. Therefore, they explore the relationship between unemployment and inflation at this level. They find a strong negative relationship between the unemployment rate's deviation from the state average and the rate of wage inflation. They also find evidence of a nonlinear price Phillips curve in city-level data.

The researchers point out that the relationship between inflation and the unemployment rate is a key input to the design of monetary policy. They note that the unemployment rate in the U.S. economy is currently near record lows, and they caution that they cannot predict whether inflation will rise in the coming years. However, they conclude that "Evidence that the price Phillips curve has been dormant for the past several decades does not necessarily mean that it is dead... it could be hibernating, and there is a risk of the Phillips curve waking up, with inflationary pressures rising in the face of an overheating labor market."

Normative versus positive analysis in the history of the theory of production

This paper looks at the history of the theory of production. Before the seventieth century, with the advent of mercantilism, the predominant mode of enquiry was a descriptive/ normative one. The frameworks applied were ethical and/or religious. The questions asked were about what production or occupations would find favour with God or what production was ethically justified. The important point is that these normative frameworks did not give rise to a theory of production. Such a theory only began to emerge with the emergence of a positive approach to economic reasoning more generally.

Normative versus positive analysis in the history of the theory of production by Paul Walker on Scribd

Should we assess our economy through trendy 'wellbeing' metrics?

GDP, or Gross Domestic Product, a strange statistic in modern political debate. Economists point out that it fails to capture the value of an increasingly digital economy but it remains the measure most politicians and journalists pay attention to. According to GDP, if a mother decides to go out to work as a childminder and pay a childminder to look after her own child, rather than look after the child herself, that is increased GDP, despite the fact the same number of children are being looked after the same number of people. So, should we be looking to alternative measures, perhaps ones which measure a country’s social and economic performance more holistically? Recently New Zealand’s Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern has backed a ‘different approach for government decision-making altogether.’ “We are not just relying on Gross Domestic Product, but also how we are improving the wellbeing of our people,” said her Finance Minister. Joining the IEA’s Digital Manager Darren Grimes to discuss the best ways to measure a country’s economic performance is the IEA’s Senior Academic Fellow, Professor Philip Booth.

Who pays for the minimum wage?

This question is asked in a new article, Who Pays for the Minimum Wage?, in the latest issue (Vol. 109, No. 8, August 2019) of the American Economic Review.

The paper is by Peter Harasztosi and Attila Lindner and looks at the margins along which firms responded to a large and persistent minimum wage increase in Hungary. It finds that the employment elasticities are small, but negative.

The abstract reads,

This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the margins along which firms responded to a large and persistent minimum wage increase in Hungary. We show that employment elasticities are negative but small even four years after the reform; that around 75 percent of the minimum wage increase was paid by consumers and 25 percent by firm owners; that firms responded to the minimum wage by substituting labor with capital; and that disemployment effects were greater in industries where passing the wage costs to consumers is more difficult. We estimate a model with monopolistic competition to explain these findings.

Bad economic justifications for minimum wage hikes

Ryan Bourne has authored a recent paper at the Cato Institute on Bad Economic Justifications for Minimum Wage Hikes.

The bad reasons he gives are,

• A solution to a market failure?
• To keep pace with productivity trends?
• Costs of living
• Poverty

His conclusion reads,

The metrics that $15 minimum wage advocates use to make the case for substantial minimum wage hikes are not, on their own, economically sensible benchmarks by which to set minimum wage rates.

Economy-wide productivity growth can be a poor guide to productivity trends for minimum wage workers and different localities, and it tells us little about whether firms have the power to set below-market wage levels.

Housing and childcare costs are unrelated to firms’ ability to pay or the value of the work minimum wage employees undertake. And comparing the income of someone working full-time at the federal minimum wage to existing poverty thresholds ignores the role of anti-poverty programs and the fact that many minimum wage earners are not poor.

Campaigners’ arguments often imply that minimum wages should be linked to productivity measures, living costs, or poverty thresholds. The evidence presented above suggests that translating these arguments into policy could produce damaging labor market outcomes.

Bernie Sanders and bad justifications for minimum wage hikes

This audio is from the Cato Daily Podcast.

The tiff between workers for the Bernie Sanders campaign and the campaign leadership illustrates some of the tradeoffs inherent in mandating wage floors. Ryan Bourne is author of a new paper on minimum wage hikes and bad justifications for them.

The Conservative Sensibility

Caleb O. Brown interview George F. Will about his new book The Conservative Sensibility

Rights precede government. That’s the core of the American founding, and George F. Will argues that it’s worth preserving. His new book is The Conservative Sensibility.

Making Sense of the minimum wage

Recently the Cato Institute put out a new Policy Analysis (No. 867) on Making Sense of the Minimum Wage: A Roadmap for Navigating Recent Research by Jeffrey Clemens. Clemens is an associate professor of economics at the University of California, San Diego.

Executive Summary:

The new conventional wisdom holds that a large increase in the minimum wage would be desirable policy. Advocates for this policy dismiss the traditional concern that such an increase would lower employment for many of the low-skilled workers that the increase is intended to help. Recent economic research, they claim, demonstrates that the disemployment effects of increasing minimum wages are small or nonexistent, while there are large social benefits to raising the wage floor.

This policy analysis discusses four ways in which the case for large minimum wage increases is either mistaken or overstated.

First, the new conventional wisdom misreads the totality of recent evidence for the negative effects of minimum wages. Several strands of research arrive regularly at the conclusion that high minimum wages reduce opportunities for disadvantaged individuals.

Second, the theoretical basis for minimum wage advocates’ claims is far more limited than they seem to realize. Advocates offer rationales for why current wage rates might be suppressed relative to their competitive market values. These arguments are reasonable to a point, but they are a weak basis for making claims about the effects of large minimum wage increases.

Third, economists’ empirical methods have blind spots. Notably, firms’ responses to minimum wage changes can occur in nuanced ways. I discuss why economists’ methods will predictably fail to capture firms’ responses in their totality.

Finally, the details of employees’ schedules, perks, fringe benefits, and the organization of the workplace are central to firms’ management of both their costs and productivity. Yet data on many aspects of workers’ relationships with their employers are incomplete, if not entirely lacking. Consequently, empirical evidence will tend to understate the minimum wage’s negative effects and overstate its benefits.

Tyler Cowen interviews Russ Roberts

What are the virtues of forgiveness? Are we subject to being manipulated by data? Why do people struggle with prayer? What really motivates us? How has the volunteer army system changed the incentives for war? These are just some of the questions that keep Russ Roberts going as he constantly analyzes the world and revisits his own biases through thirteen years of conversations on EconTalk.

Russ made his way to the Mercatus studio to talk with Tyler about these ideas and more. The pair examines where classical liberalism has gone wrong, if dropping out of college is overrated, and what people are missing from the Bible. Tyler questions Russ on Hayek, behavioral economics, and his favorite EconTalk conversation. Ever the host, Russ also throws in a couple questions to Tyler.

The employment effects of minimum wages

A brief summary of the state of play.

First, the evidence on the disemployment effect of minimum wages is contested, and there clearly are studies that find no employment effect – both in the United States and in other countries. However, the preponderance of evidence indicates that minimum wages reduce employment of the least-skilled workers. Earlier estimates suggested an ‘elasticity’ of about -0.1 to -0.2. Many estimates are still in this range, some are closer to zero, and some are larger. To be clear, some researchers may have reason to put more store in the types of estimates that tend to find no employment effects – typically the research designs that I have labeled ‘close controls’. I have indicated reasons I am somewhat skeptical of these designs, but also indicated that the jury is still out. More definitively, though, it is indisputable that there is a body of evidence pointing to job losses from higher minimum wages. Characterizations of the literature as providing no evidence of job loss are simply inaccurate.

Second, there are two kinds of changes in minimum wages about which we know a lot less. The first change is the adoption of much higher minimum wages – as is happening in the United States with serious movement toward a $15 minimum. There is a great deal of uncertainty about the employment effects of a $15 minimum wage. One thing we do know is that it would impact far more workers than the current minimum wage, especially in lower-wage states and lower-wage areas of most states. More speculatively, my sense is that the costs of a much higher minimum wage are likely to be understated by simply scaling up the effects based on employment elasticities in the existing literature, because the much higher share of workers affected will reduce employers’ ability to partially offset minimum wage increases by changes in margins other than employment.

The second kind of change about which we know relatively little concerns the introduction of a new minimum wage – like in Germany. There is some evidence from the introduction of a new minimum wage in the United Kingdom. Some of this evidence points to job loss, but the evidence is mixed. And, of course, the institutional setting is not the same.

From "The Econometrics and Economics of the Employment Effects of Minimum Wages: Getting from Known Unknowns to Known Knowns" by David Neumark, German Economic Review, Forthcoming.

Coase and Plant on the market versus the firm

In a 1937 paper, "Centralise or decentralise" Arnold Plant writes,

"[...] centralisation is the means by which the collaborating enterprises secure the advantage of specialised services or equipment which would not otherwise be available to them on such favourable terms, if at all. If the service or merchandise in question is freely bought and sold on any scale in a well-organised market, there will be no need for centralisation of firms. It is the absence of a well-organised market which may justify firms in pooling their requirements".

He sees a clear trade-off between market provision and in-house production. When markets are available and relatively cheap their use makes sense. But when they are expensive, or unavailable, production in a firm makes sense. Today we would express this by saying when transaction costs are high we use the firm but when they are low we use the market.

Plant's line of argument has a somewhat modern, Coaseian, feel to it. The question this gives rise to is, For how long had Plant been thinking in this way? And did he discuss this line of reasoning in classes that Coase took? Or does the causation run in the opposite direction? Plant's paper was published in 1937 and we know that Coase's analysis of the firm was largely complete by 1932. Did Coase discuss his approach with his former teacher? Or did the two of them reach similar conclusions independently?

I'm not sure we know enough to answer these questions, but it does raise an interesting possibility about the development of Coase's ideas on the firm.

Ref.:

• Plant, Arnold (1974). 'Centralise or decentralise?'. In Arnold Plant, "Selected Economic Essays and Addresses (174-98), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. First published in Arnold Plant (ed.), "Some Modern Business Problems: A Series of Studies", London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1937.

The 2018 trade war

Has the trade war with China been good for American businesses and consumers? The first results are in, and David Weinstein tells Tim Phillips who the winners and losers are.

Latest Blogwatch column

My Blogwatch column from the latest issue (Issue 63, December 2018) of the NZAE magazine Asymmetric Information

Being neoclassical before it was cool to be neoclassical: the case of the theory of the firm

This paper looks at the contribution made by pre-1870 writers in economics (proto-neoclassicals) to what would later become known as the neoclassical theory of the firm. In particular we briefly consider the work of Dionysius Lardner, Johann von Thunen, John Stuart Mill, Charles Ellet, Jr. and Antoine Augustin Cournot. This paper shows that the proto-neoclassical "theory of the firm" gave rise to the neoclassical theory of markets.

Being neoclassical before i... by on Scribd

The division of labour and the mainstream theory of the firm

This paper looks at the influence (or lack of influence) that ideas to do with the division of labour have had on the mainstream economic theory of the firm. The notion of the division of labour goes back at least to the ancient Greeks and ancient Chinese but it took two thousand years before the division of labour was used to create a theory of the firm. It was only in the 20th century that such a theory started to be developed.

The division of labour and the mainstream theory of the firm by Paul Walker on Scribd

Dave Rubin interviews Tyler Cowen

Tyler Cowen (Economics professor, George Mason U.) joins Dave to discuss his new book “Stubborn Attachments: A Vision for a Society of Free, Prosperous, and Responsible Individuals” covering topics like government regulation, why he identifies as a “small L” libertarian, and economic ideas like Universal Basic Income, climate change, the cryptocurrency revolution, his sensible plan for immigration etc.

The effects of the Australian National Firearms Agreement

There has been, not too surprisingly, much discussion of the government's idea of a compulsory 'gun buyback' scheme, see for example, Peter Cresswell at the Not PC blog. This legislation the Deputy PM says will cost somewhere around $300 million. An obvious question is what will this money buy us?

One way to see the likely outcomes is to look at the effects of the Australian National Firearms Agreement (NFA) introduced after the mass shooting in Port Arthur, Tasmania in 1996. Some studies suggest the effects of the NFA may not have been large. Lee and Suardi (2008), for example, state that

"The 1996-97 National Firearms Agreement (NFA) in Australia introduced strict gun laws, primarily as a reaction to the mass shooting in Port Arthur, Tasmania in 1996, where 35 people were killed. Despite the fact that several researchers using the same data have examined the impact of the NFA on firearm deaths, a consensus does not appear to have been reached. In this paper, we re-analyze the same data on firearm deaths used in previous research, using tests for unknown structural breaks as a means to identifying impacts of the NFA. The results of these tests suggest that the NFA did not have any large effects on reducing firearm homicide or suicide rates."

But there is some evidence that the Australian reforms, as a whole, reduced suicide and homicide rates. Leigh and Neill (2010) say

"In 1997, Australia implemented a gun buyback program that reduced the stock of firearms by around one-fifth. Using differences across states in the number of firearms withdrawn, we test whether the reduction in firearms availability affected firearm homicide and suicide rates. We find that the buyback led to a drop in the firearm suicide rates of almost 80 per cent, with no statistically significant effect on non-firearm death rates. The estimated effect on firearm homicides is of similar magnitude, but is less precise. The results are robust to a variety of specification checks, and to instrumenting the state-level buyback rate".

But you have to be careful with the Australian case as the NFA had several aspects to it, only one of these aspects being a buyback scheme. Leigh and Neill (2010) also say

"Perhaps a more likely explanation of the strength of the relationship found is that the NFA led states with relatively weak legislation or enforcement relating to sale, ownership and storage of firearms to strengthen their regimes relative to states with initially stronger standards. There is evidence that states with relatively high firearm ownership and therefore high gun buyback rates also had relatively weak regulation prior to 1996. Then, our estimates need to be interpreted as reflecting a combination of both the removal of firearms and the relative strengthening of legislation and enforcement. We might expect to see smaller effects in the case of a buyback that was not accompanied by stricter firearm legislation".

Thus there was more going on in the Australian case than just a buyback, and it's difficult to know which bits of the reforms drive the results.

At the very least such results should highlight the need to very clear as to what we are talking about when discussing the likely effects of the government's proposed legislation. Are we talking about the whole package of reforms that the government wishes to introduce or are we just talking about the buyback scheme. It is possible that the whole package could have worthwhile effects, while the buyback scheme by itself would not. It is also possible that the whole package may not be worthwhile.

One reason for not rushing into any new legislation is to give time for a proper valuation of the empirical evidence to be done.

Refs.

• Lee, Wang-Sheng and Sandy Suardi (2008). "The Australian Firearms Buyback and Its Effect on Gun Deaths", Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series Working Paper No. 17/08 August.
• Leigh, Andrew and Christine Neill (2010). "Do Gun Buybacks Save Lives? Evidence from Panel Data", IZA Discussion Paper No. 4995, June.